ucappeals.org

Virginia — unemployment insurance benefit appeals

Agency: Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) Verified on: 2026-08-10 Statutes cited: Code of Virginia Title 60.2 (Unemployment Compensation), Chapter 1 (General Provisions and Administration) §§ 60.2-108, 60.2-111, 60.2-121.1, 60.2-123; Chapter 6 (Benefits) §§ 60.2-619, 60.2-620, 60.2-621 (repealed), 60.2-622, 60.2-623, 60.2-626, 60.2-630; Title 1 (General Provisions) § 1-210. Rules cited: 16VAC5-10 (Definitions and General Provisions), § 16VAC5-10-10; 16VAC5-80 (Adjudication), §§ 16VAC5-80-10, 16VAC5-80-20.

What is unusual here: Two things, and one flagged inconsistency. First, 2024 legislation (Acts 2024, cc. 562, 603) restructured the first-level appeal body mid-code: § 60.2-621 was repealed outright effective July 1, 2024, and the surviving sections (§§ 60.2-619, 60.2-620, 60.2-622, 60.2-623, 60.2-625, 60.2-630 all carry the "2024, cc. 562, 603" amendment tag) now route a first-level appeal to "the Commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals" rather than to a named "appeal tribunal." But the rewrite was not applied uniformly: § 60.2-622 (Commission review) — itself amended by the same 2024 act — still calls the decision under review one made by an "appeals examiner" throughout, the pre-2024 term, and unrelated § 60.2-626 (last touched in 1986) still refers to "the chairman of an appeal tribunal," an even older term. This is flagged as residue in the current code text, not smoothed into a single consistent name. Second, the 30-day first-level clock in § 60.2-619 D can run from an electronic delivery instead of mailing, but only if the party affirmatively elected electronic communication under § 60.2-121.1, and the statute conditions that alternate trigger on confirmation of receipt — an electronic-delivery start date that itself depends on proof the notice was received, not merely sent.

A. Bodies

A1 — Administering agency. The Virginia Employment Commission (VEC), a single Commissioner appointed by the Governor.

"The Virginia Employment Commission shall consist of one Commissioner, who shall be appointed by the Governor for a term of four years, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly..." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-108 "It shall be the duty of the Commission to administer this title." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-111(A)

The regulatory definitions chapter confirms "Commission" as the defined term for the agency:

"'Commission' means the Virginia Employment Commission as defined in § 60.2-108 of the Code of Virginia." — 16VAC5-10-10

Practice, not law: The first-level-appeal rule directs in-person filing to "any Virginia Works office" (16VAC5-80-20 A.1.a, quoted below in B3), suggesting the agency brands its public-facing offices "Virginia Works" even though neither the statute nor 16VAC5-10-10 renames the Commission itself. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any statutory or regulatory provision formally renaming the Virginia Employment Commission to "Virginia Works" — the two terms coexist in the current text, and this reference does not resolve which is authoritative for which purpose.

A2 — First-level appeal body. Statutorily, "the Commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals"; the rule shortens this to "First Level Appeals," and the presiding officer is called an "appeals examiner."

"Refer such claim or any relevant question to the Commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals or to the Commission, which shall make its determination in accordance with the procedure described in § 60.2-620." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-619 A.1.b "Appeals filed under § 60.2-619 shall be heard by the Commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-620 A

The rule uses a parenthetical shorthand for the same body and names the presiding officer:

"The Office of First Level Appeals (First Level Appeals) shall endeavor to schedule hearings as soon as possible in the order in which appeals are received." — 16VAC5-80-20 C "After the filing of an appeal, the record in connection with the claim, together with the notice of appeal, shall be assigned to an appeals examiner." — 16VAC5-80-20 B

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: a definition of "appeals examiner" as a term. Chapter 6 never defines it, and the regulatory definitions section (16VAC5-10-10) defines "in-person hearing," "split hearing," and "telephone hearing" by reference to "the appeals examiner or special examiner" but does not itself define either role. The role is established only by usage — it is the officer to whom First Level Appeals assigns a case (16VAC5-80-20 B) and who signs the resulting decision (16VAC5-80-20 G).

A3 — Second-level body. The Commission itself, sitting in review under § 60.2-622; administratively the rule again gives this a divisional name, "the commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of Commission Appeals," with hearings presided over by a "special examiner" the Commissioner may designate.

"The Commission (i) may on its own motion affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of an appeals examiner on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case, or direct the taking of additional evidence by an appeals examiner, or receive such evidence itself, or (ii) shall permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further appeals before it." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-622 A "The Commissioner shall have the power to designate a special examiner to hear appeals to the Commission under this section. The Commissioner may authorize and empower such special examiner to decide any appeal so heard, in which event the decision of the special examiner shall be the final decision of the Commission under this section, subject to judicial review under § 60.2-625." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-622 C "Appeals should be filed with the commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of Commission Appeals..." — 16VAC5-80-30 A.1

Note the residue flagged above: § 60.2-622, though amended in 2024 alongside §§ 60.2-619 and 60.2-620, still calls the first-level decision under review a decision "of an appeals examiner" — it was not updated to say "of the Office of First Level Appeals" the way §§ 60.2-619 and 60.2-620 were. A second, older residue sits in § 60.2-626, untouched by the 2024 act:

"In the discharge of the duties imposed by this title, the chairman of an appeal tribunal and any duly authorized representative or member of the Commission shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations..." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-626

"Appeal tribunal" appears nowhere else in the current Chapter 6 text supplied here; this reference does not resolve whether that phrase is itself now vestigial or still has live effect for oath/subpoena purposes.

B. First-level appeal

B1 — Deadline: 30 calendar days, running from the date the deputy's determination or decision was mailed, or — only if the party has elected electronic communications — from the date it was electronically delivered with confirmed receipt.

"Such determination or decision shall be final unless the claimant or any such employing unit files an appeal from such determination or decision within 30 calendar days after such notification was mailed or, if the party elects to receive electronic communications pursuant to § 60.2-121.1, electronically delivered to his last known address. Electronic delivery shall include confirmation of receipt. For good cause shown, the 30-day period may be extended." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-619 D

The election mechanism itself:

"In any action commenced under this title, the Commission may, if the party elects, send notices and other communications to such party through email or other electronic means. The Commission shall allow any party to change its election regarding receiving communications through electronic means. If an electronic notice is not successfully transmitted through electronic means, the Commission shall send a new notice by first-class mail to the party's alternative address on record." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-121.1

Law, precisely stated: the clock does not run from receipt of a mailed notice, only from the mailing itself; it runs from receipt only in the electronic-delivery branch, and only because the statute separately requires "confirmation of receipt" as a condition of that branch applying at all. A party who has not elected electronic communications gets the mail-only rule (mailing date, not delivery date starts the clock); the statute does not give a "whichever is earlier" choice between the two — the electronic branch applies only when elected.

B2 — Weekend and holiday: extended to the next business day, under the Title 1 general computation-of-time statute — 16VAC5-80 and Code of Virginia Chapter 6 supply no appeal-specific weekend/holiday rule of their own. Neither 16VAC5-80-10 nor 16VAC5-80-20 (the deputy's-determination and first-level-appeal rules) contains any Saturday/Sunday/ holiday provision, and no such clause was found in §§ 60.2-619, 60.2-620, or 60.2-622. The general statute therefore governs:

"When an act of the General Assembly or local governing body, order of the court, or administrative regulation or order requires, either by specification of a date or by a prescribed period of time, that an act be performed or an action be filed on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday or on any day or part of a day on which the state or local government office where the act to be performed or the action to be filed is closed, the act may be performed or the action may be filed on the next business day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the state or local government office is closed." — Code of Virginia § 1-210(E)

Inference, flagged as such: § 1-210 is a general-application statute ("[a]ny court or proceeding," "administrative regulation or order") and is not itself written for VEC appeals specifically; this reference infers it applies to the 30-day appeal deadline in § 60.2-619 D because no more specific rule displaces it, not because § 60.2-619 or 16VAC5-80 cross-references § 1-210 by name.

B3 — How to file: in person at a Virginia Works office, by mail, by fax, or electronically as the Commission prescribes; no particular form is legally required.

"Appeals shall be filed with the commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals in one of the following ways: a. In person at any Virginia Works office; b. By mail to the Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals at the address specified on the deputy's determination or decision; c. By facsimile transmission to the Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals at the facsimile number specified on the deputy's determination or decision; or d. By an electronic format as prescribed by the commission." — 16VAC5-80-20 A.1

Content and form requirements are deliberately loose:

"Appeals shall be in writing and should set forth the grounds upon which the appeal is sought, as well as the name of the claimant; however, any document in writing submitted to the commission by a party or a party's authorized representative expressing a desire to appeal shall be sufficient to initiate an appeal. Agency personnel shall furnish an appellant or an appellant's authorized representative whatever assistance is necessary to file an appeal." — 16VAC5-80-20 A.3

Timeliness of a mailed appeal is fixed by postmark, not receipt:

"Appeals shall be presumed to be filed on the date of receipt by the commission. An appeal mailed to the commission shall be presumed to be filed on the date of postmark by the U.S. Postal Service. If no postmark appears on the envelope, the appeal shall be presumed to be filed on the date it was received by the commission." — 16VAC5-80-20 A.2

Practice, not law: the agency's own forms list names "Notice of First Level Appeals, A-FLA-002" among the forms associated with this chapter, but nothing in 16VAC5-80-20 requires an appellant to use A-FLA-002 (or any specific form) to appeal — the rule quoted above expressly makes any written expression of a desire to appeal sufficient. The form listing does not identify which party (agency or appellant) uses A-FLA-002 or for what step; this reference does not resolve that.

B4 — Late appeals: a "good cause" extension is named in the statute, but the standard for what qualifies is not defined anywhere in the corpus checked. The only substantive text is the single clause already quoted at B1:

"For good cause shown, the 30-day period may be extended." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-619 D

The regulation confirms good cause is litigated as a threshold hearing issue but supplies no test for it:

"Should evidence indicate that the appeal was not filed within the time prescribed by law, the first issue to be considered at the hearing shall be whether the appeal was timely filed or whether there exists good cause for extending the appeal period." — 16VAC5-80-20 B

The only place 16VAC5-80-20 defines "good cause" for anything is a different, later-stage decision — a request to postpone a hearing already scheduled — not a late-filed appeal:

"Requests for postponement of scheduled hearings shall be granted only when a party or the party's authorized representative demonstrates good cause for an inability to appear at the scheduled date and time. Good cause shall be deemed to exist if a likelihood of material and substantial harm is shown." — 16VAC5-80-20 C

That "material and substantial harm" test is textually confined to postponement requests ("Requests for postponement of scheduled hearings shall be granted only when...") and is not extended anywhere in 16VAC5-80-20 to the separate good-cause-for-late-filing determination described in subsection B. Nor does 16VAC5-10-10 (the definitions chapter) define "good cause" at all — the term does not appear there. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any statutory or regulatory sentence stating what does or does not constitute good cause for filing a first-level appeal outside the 30-day window in § 60.2-619 D.

B5 — Separate from the appeal clock: the Commission has its own discretionary power to set aside or vacate a determination or decision before it becomes final.

"The Commission may, in its discretion, at any time before a determination or decision becomes final pursuant to § 60.2-619 or 60.2-622, with good cause set aside or modify any such determination or decision." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-630

This "good cause" is likewise undefined in the text supplied. § 60.2-630 is framed as a Commission-initiated power exercisable only before finality, not as a mechanism a claimant invokes after the 30-day window has closed — do not confuse it with the B4 good-cause extension, which is what a late-filing appellant would actually rely on.

C. The hearing

C1 — Format: by rule, and the rule differs by level. At the first level (appeals examiner), telephone is the rule; in-person is discretionary with the Commission, not an automatic right on request.

"All hearings shall be conducted by telephone conference call. The commission may grant timely requests for split hearings or in-person hearings at its discretion. In-person or split hearings shall be scheduled at a location administratively feasible for the commission." — 16VAC5-80-20 B.1

At Commission review, the default flips: in-person at the Richmond administrative office is the rule, with telephone discretionary.

"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, commission level hearings shall be conducted in person at the administrative office for the agency's Administrative Law Division in Richmond, Virginia. In its discretion, the commission may permit oral argument and other hearings to be conducted by telephone conference call." — 16VAC5-80-30 B.3

The Commission also retains a standalone power to set the format of any hearing it schedules on its own motion:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the commission shall have the authority to schedule a hearing on its own motion, to be conducted in person, by telephone conference call, or by split hearing, whenever the commission believes doing so would serve the ends of justice." — 16VAC5-80-30 B.4

C2 — Who presides. First level: an "appeals examiner" (16VAC5-80-20). Commission review: a "special examiner," whom the Commissioner may empower to decide the appeal, in which case the special examiner's decision "shall be the final decision of the Commission under this section, subject to judicial review."

"The Commissioner shall have the power to designate a special examiner to hear appeals to the Commission under this section. The Commissioner may authorize and empower such special examiner to decide any appeal so heard, in which event the decision of the special examiner shall be the final decision of the Commission under this section, subject to judicial review under § 60.2-625 ." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-622 C

C3 — Recorded; first-level scope is broad ("jurisdiction to consider all issues … since the initial filing"), not a narrow review of the deputy's record; Commission review is on-the-record by default.

Recording, statutory:

"All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed claim shall be recorded, but need not be transcribed unless the disputed claim is further appealed and a timely request for a hearing before the Commission has been made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-623 A

Recording, rule (first level, when the appellant appears):

"In any hearing before an appeals examiner where the appellant appears for the scheduled hearing, all testimony shall be taken under oath or affirmation and a record of the proceedings shall be made by the presiding appeals examiner who shall inform all parties of this fact." — 16VAC5-80-20 F

Evidentiary informality, statutory and rule (identical in substance):

"Such regulations need not conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-623 A "The appeals examiner shall conduct the hearing in such a manner as to ascertain the substantive rights of the parties without having to be bound by common law, statutory rules of evidence, or technical rules of procedure." — 16VAC5-80-20 F

Scope of first-level review — broader than error-correction on the deputy's record:

"Such office, after affording the claimant and any other parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, shall have jurisdiction to consider all issues with respect to the claim since the initial filing thereof." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-620 A

Inference: this "all issues … since the initial filing" grant, read together with the in-person hearing at which testimony is taken under oath and cross-examination occurs (16VAC5-80-20 F.1, F.4), functions as a fresh evidentiary hearing rather than a paper-record appeal — the statute and rule do not themselves use the word "de novo," so that label is not applied here, only the operative language above.

Commission review is, by contrast, expressly on-the-record unless additional evidence is directed:

"Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, all appeals to the commission shall be decided on the basis of a review of the evidence in the record." — 16VAC5-80-30 B

A party who wants to record independently, at its own expense, may hire its own court reporter:

"Any party to a compensation hearing of the Virginia Employment Commission may employ the use of a court reporter to record for transcription the proceeding, provided it is done at the party's own expense." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-623.1 A

C4 — Subpoenas are available to a claimant, as a party, on request; the Clerk of the Commission issues them; witness expenses are paid at a Commission-set rate, not charged to the requesting claimant.

Issuing authority generally:

"In the discharge of the duties imposed by this title, the chairman of an appeal tribunal and any duly authorized representative or member of the Commission shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with a disputed claim or the administration of this title." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-626

The party-request mechanism, in the administrative rule:

"Upon the request of any party to a proceeding, the Clerk of the Commission, in the name of the commission, may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses at any designated time and place fixed by the special examiner or appeals examiner for the hearing of a claim or any issue therein." — 16VAC5-80-40 B

Subpoena duces tecum, same mechanism, on written request "specifying with reasonable certainty" the records sought (16VAC5-80-40 B, second paragraph). A request "may be denied if there is no showing of relevance to the subject of the appeal, if it appears that the request would only produce cumulative evidence or testimony, or if it appears that the request would not serve the interest of the party making it," but denial "may be renewed at the hearing" with "a proffer of evidence or testimony" (16VAC5-80-40 B, third paragraph).

No cost is imposed on the requesting claimant; witness expenses are an administrative cost paid at a Commission-set rate:

"Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to this chapter shall be allowed expenses at a rate fixed by the Commission. Such expenses shall be deemed a part of the expense of administering this title." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-624 "Witnesses subpoenaed for appeals before the appeals examiner or the commission, or both, shall, upon request, be allowed expenses as provided in § 17.1-612 of the Code of Virginia." — 16VAC5-80-40 C

Enforcement of a disobeyed subpoena runs through a circuit court order and, for a witness who fails or refuses to comply "without just cause," a Class 1 misdemeanor (Code of Virginia § 60.2-627 A–B) — noted for completeness, not itself a claimant-facing procedure.

D. Representation

D1 — Attorney or non-attorney "duly authorized agent"/"authorized representative," stated at every level of the process, with no attorney-supervision condition on the non-attorney found.

General provision (applies to "any individual or employing unit" appearing before any Commission officer):

"Any individual or employing unit appearing before an officer of the Commission may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-123

Deputy-level investigation:

"Any party to an investigation may be represented by counsel or a duly authorized representative." — 16VAC5-80-10 A

Predetermination fact-finding proceeding:

"Any party to a predetermination proceeding may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent." — 16VAC5-80-10 B

First-level appeal hearing:

"At any hearing before an appeals examiner, an interested party may appear in person, by counsel, or by an authorized representative. All such persons will be permitted to attend the entire hearing." — 16VAC5-80-20 F.2

An employer additionally gets one non-representative attendee:

"An employer shall be permitted one representative, in addition to counsel or duly authorized agent, who may attend the entire proceeding." — 16VAC5-80-20 F.3

Commission-review hearings for additional evidence are conducted "under the same rules as outlined in subsection F of 16VAC5-80-20" (16VAC5-80-30 D), so the same representation language applies there by cross-reference — labeled here as a rule-text cross-reference, not a separately quoted provision.

D2 — Fee regulation: approval required, numeric cap, and an interim-fee sub-cap — for representation of claimants specifically; the Commission and its own staff may not charge a claimant at all.

The Commission/its representatives may not charge a claimant:

"No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding under this title by the Commission or its representatives." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-122

A claimant's own counsel or agent is fee-capped by Commission approval:

"However, no such counsel or agent representing a claimant shall either charge or receive for such services more than an amount approved by the Commission." — Code of Virginia § 60.2-123

The administrative rule implements this and confirms it covers non-attorney representatives too:

"Pursuant to § 60.2-123 of the Code of Virginia, no attorney or other individual representing a claimant before an officer of the commission may charge or receive a fee unless approved by the commission." — 16VAC5-80-40 E.1 "When applicable, these factors shall also be considered in approving a fee request from nonlawyer representatives. Notwithstanding these factors, no fee shall be approved that exceeds 25% of the claimant's maximum benefit amount." — 16VAC5-80-40 E.3

Timing and an interim-award sub-cap for multi-stage representation:

"No fee shall be approved until the agency determination or decision issued pursuant to § 60.2-619 , 60.2-620 , or 60.2-622 has become final, provided, however, that in those cases where an attorney or representative is representing a claimant through multiple stages of the administrative adjudication and appeal process, the commission may approve an interim fee award not to exceed the lesser of $400 or 10% of the claimant's maximum benefit amount." — 16VAC5-80-40 E.4

Fee requests go to the Chief Administrative Law Judge, and the assessment of reasonableness draws on the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct:

"In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's request for approval of a fee, the commission shall consider the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court, Part 6, II." — 16VAC5-80-40 E.3

Practice/scope note, labeled as such: § 60.2-122 and § 60.2-123's fee-approval clause and 16VAC5-80-40 E are each written in terms of representation of a claimant; no parallel statutory or rule text capping an employer-side representative's fee was found in the sections reviewed — recorded as an absence searched for, not as an affirmative finding that no such cap exists elsewhere in Title 60.2.

E. Benefits pending appeal

E1 — Two distinct answers, both governed by § 60.2-619 E: a denied claimant is not paid while appealing the denial (inference from the statute's "pay according to the current determination" architecture); an allowed claimant IS paid while the employer appeals, and that continues through the second level (explicit).

The governing text, quoted in full so the two fact patterns are not conflated:

"E. Benefits shall be paid promptly in accordance with a determination or redetermination under this chapter, or decision of the Commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals, the Commission, or a reviewing court under § 60.2-625 upon the issuance of such determination, redetermination, or decision, regardless of the pendency of the period to file an appeal or petition for judicial review that is provided in this chapter, or the pendency of any such appeal or review. Such benefits shall be paid unless or until such determination, redetermination, or decision has been modified or reversed by a subsequent redetermination or decision, in which event benefits shall be paid or denied for weeks of unemployment thereafter in accordance with such modifying or reversing redetermination or decision. If a decision of the Commission's Administrative Law Division's Office of First Level Appeals allowing benefits is affirmed in any amount by the Commission, benefits shall continue to be paid until such time as a court decision has become final so that no further appeal can be taken. If an appeal is taken from the Commission's decision, benefits paid shall result in a benefit charge to the account of the employer under § 60.2-530 only when, and as of the date on which, as the result of an appeal, the courts finally determine that the Commission should have awarded benefits to the claimant or claimants involved in such appeal." — Va. Code § 60.2-619(E)

Reading the two fact patterns separately:

Denied claimant appeals. No sentence in subsection E (or elsewhere in the sections read) says explicitly "no benefits while the claimant's own denial is under appeal." Inference, flagged as such: the subsection's architecture pays benefits "in accordance with" whatever determination currently governs; a determination denying benefits is itself a "determination" under this sentence, so there is nothing to pay under until it is reversed. The second sentence — benefits are paid "unless or until" the determination is modified or reversed, and thereafter follow the new determination — is consistent only with this reading. This is inference from structure, not a quoted "denied claimants receive nothing" rule.

Allowed claimant, employer appeals. Explicit and two-layered. First, the general rule above pays benefits "regardless of the pendency" of any appeal or review once a determination has allowed them. Second, § 60.2-619(E)'s third sentence gives a distinct, more specific rule once the case reaches the second level: if the Office of First Level Appeals decision allowing benefits is affirmed by the Commission (§ 60.2-622 review), payment continues "until such time as a court decision has become final so that no further appeal can be taken" — i.e., payment does not merely continue pending the employer's appeal to the Commission, it continues through judicial review as well, once that particular administrative affirmance has occurred. The employer's account is only charged, however, once a court finally determines the benefits were properly awarded — so the employer bears no benefit-charge exposure for benefits paid out during an appeal it ultimately wins.

E2 — Repayment is owed, but Virginia currently has a mandatory (not merely discretionary) two-prong waiver for non-fault overpayments — and that mandatory-waiver text is scheduled to sunset July 1, 2028, which postdates this unit's verified-on date but is worth flagging for currency.

Two versions of § 60.2-633 appear in the code as supplied: one "(Effective until July 1, 2028)" and one "(Effective July 1, 2028)." As of this unit's verified-on date (2026-08-10), the "Effective until July 1, 2028" version governs. Basic repayment liability:

"Any person who has received any sum as benefits under this title to which he was not entitled shall be liable to repay such sum to the Commission." — Va. Code § 60.2-633(A) (version effective until July 1, 2028)

Mandatory waiver test:

"The Commission shall waive the requirement to repay the overpayment after an individual case review if (i) the overpayment was made without fault on the part of the individual and (ii) requiring repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience. Subject to the requirements of this section, the Commission may grant a waiver of the obligation to repay an overpayment to an individual who has a pending appeal with the Commission." — Va. Code § 60.2-633(A) (version effective until July 1, 2028)

"Without fault" and "equity and good conscience" are both defined, and the "without fault" definition specifically addresses the appeal-reversal scenario:

"An overpayment made 'without fault on the part of the individual' shall include overpayments that (i) result from administrative error; (ii) are the result of inducement, solicitation, or coercion on the part of the employer; or (iii) result from the employer's failure to respond timely or adequately to the Commission's request for information, as required by § 60.2-528.1 . An overpayment shall not be considered 'without fault on the part of the individual' if such overpayment was the result of (a) a reversal in the appeals process, unless the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the Commission's request for information regarding the individual's separation from employment; (b) a programming, technological, or automatic system error not directly associated with an individual claim that results in erroneous payments to a group of individuals; or (c) fraud." — Va. Code § 60.2-633(A)(1) (version effective until July 1, 2028)

"It shall be contrary to equity and good conscience if requiring repayment of an overpayment would deprive the individual of the income required to provide for basic necessities, including shelter, food, medicine, child care, or any other essential living expense." — Va. Code § 60.2-633(A)(2) (version effective until July 1, 2028)

So: a plain appeal-reversal overpayment is fault-excluded from the waiver by default (clause (a)) — meaning the ordinary case of "claimant was paid, employer appealed and won" does not qualify for the mandatory waiver — unless the employer itself was the one who failed to respond adequately to the Commission's information request, in which case the claimant's overpayment can still count as "without fault." Absent repayment being waived, repayment can be negotiated or collected by offset, civil action, or (per § 60.2-634) by civil action without interest where the overpayment arose from post-reinstatement back pay. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: the text of the "(Effective July 1, 2028)" version of § 60.2-633 does not contain this mandatory-waiver sentence at all — its A subsection instead discusses only "administrative error" repayment terms, with no "shall waive ... without fault ... equity and good conscience" language. Whether this means the mandatory waiver is being repealed effective July 1, 2028, or was consolidated elsewhere, was not confirmed from the text supplied; flagged below and in NOTES FOR MAIN LOOP.

F. Above the first level

F1 — Second level is Commission review under § 60.2-622, filed within 30 days of the first-level decision (good-cause extension available), presumptively decided on the existing record with discretionary additional evidence or oral argument — no "de novo" language was found anywhere in the sections read for this level.

Deadline, from the first-level decision provision (this is the second-level filing clock):

"The parties shall be duly notified of such office's decision, together with its reasons therefor, which shall be deemed to be the final decision of the Commission, unless within 30 days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision, further appeal is initiated pursuant to § 60.2-622 . However, for good cause shown the 30-day period may be extended." — Va. Code § 60.2-620(B)

The Commission's review power, framed as record review plus discretion to develop the record further:

"The Commission (i) may on its own motion affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of an appeals examiner on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case, or direct the taking of additional evidence by an appeals examiner, or receive such evidence itself, or (ii) shall permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further appeals before it." — Va. Code § 60.2-622(A)

The administrative rule states the record-review default even more directly, and gives the standard for when additional evidence will be taken:

"Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, all appeals to the commission shall be decided on the basis of a review of the evidence in the record. The commission, in its discretion, may direct the taking of additional evidence after giving written notice of such hearing to the parties, provided:" — 16VAC5-80-30(B)

"It is shown that the additional evidence is material and not merely cumulative, corroborative, or collateral, could not have been presented at the prior hearing through the exercise of due diligence, and is likely to produce a different result at a new hearing; or" — 16VAC5-80-30(B)(1)

"The record of the proceedings before the appeals examiner is insufficient to enable the commission to make proper, accurate, or complete findings of fact and conclusions of law." — 16VAC5-80-30(B)(2)

A single hearing officer — a "special examiner" designated by the Commissioner — can be empowered to issue the Commission's final decision at this level: "The Commissioner shall have the power to designate a special examiner to hear appeals to the Commission under this section. The Commissioner may authorize and empower such special examiner to decide any appeal so heard, in which event the decision of the special examiner shall be the final decision of the Commission under this section, subject to judicial review under § 60.2-625 ." (Va. Code § 60.2-622(C).) Neither § 60.2-622 nor 16VAC5-80-30 uses the term "de novo" for this level; record review with discretionary supplementation is the only standard stated in the text read.

F2 — No rehearing/reconsideration motion was found to be a required step to exhaust remedies before judicial review. Two related-but-distinct powers exist, neither framed as a party's mandatory prerequisite motion:

"The Commission may, in its discretion, at any time before a determination or decision becomes final pursuant to § 60.2-619 or 60.2-622 , with good cause set aside or modify any such determination or decision." — Va. Code § 60.2-630

This is a Commission-initiated (or Commission-invited) power to reopen before finality, not a party's exhaustion requirement. Separately, the administrative rule gives a party who missed a scheduled Commission-level hearing a path to request reopening:

"Any party to an appeal before the commission who was unable to appear for the scheduled hearing may request a reopening of the matter. The request shall be in writing to the Office of Commission Appeals and shall set forth the basis upon which it is being made." — 16VAC5-80-30(F)

That reopening path is triggered by non-appearance, not merits, and nothing read requires filing it before judicial review under § 60.2-625. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: an explicit statement that judicial review is available without first requesting reopening/reconsideration — § 60.2-625 conditions judicial review only on the Commission decision having been rendered and mailed, not on any reconsideration step, but that reading is inference from silence, not a quoted rule.

F3 — Judicial review: circuit court where the claimant was last employed; a 30-day filing window is stated in § 60.2-625 itself, though a different provision of § 60.2-622 states the Commission's decision becomes "final" after only 10 days — both are quoted below because they do not obviously reconcile; deferential fact-review standard, not de novo.

Filing deadline and forum, quoted from the judicial-review section itself:

"Within 30 days after the decision of the Commission upon a hearing pursuant to § 60.2-622 has been mailed, any party aggrieved who seeks judicial review shall commence an action in the circuit court of the county or city in which the individual who filed the claim was last employed." — Va. Code § 60.2-625(A)

Standard of review — findings of fact conclusive if supported by evidence and absent fraud, court confined to questions of law:

"In any judicial proceedings under this chapter, the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law." — Va. Code § 60.2-625(A)

Further appeal runs to the Court of Appeals:

"An appeal may be taken from the decision of the court to the Court of Appeals in conformity with Part Five A of the Rules of Supreme Court and other applicable laws." — Va. Code § 60.2-625(A)

Flagged tension: the Commission-review section separately states a shorter, 10-day finality clock —

"Any decision of the Commission, upon a hearing on appeal, shall become final 10 days after the date of notification or mailing, and judicial review shall be permitted the claimant or any interested party claiming to be aggrieved." — Va. Code § 60.2-622(B)(1)

Both sentences are in the current code as supplied. § 60.2-625(A), titled "Judicial review," states the 30-day filing action explicitly and is treated here as the operative filing deadline, while § 60.2-622(B)(1)'s 10-day "final" language is read as going to when the decision becomes binding absent a timely petition — inference, not a quoted rule; flagged in COULD NOT VERIFY.

G. Employer side

Largely the same chain and the same 30-day first-level appeal deadline as the claimant — Virginia's appeal-deadline sentence names both parties together rather than setting a separate track for employers:

"Such determination or decision shall be final unless the claimant or any such employing unit files an appeal from such determination or decision within 30 calendar days after such notification was mailed or, if the party elects to receive electronic communications pursuant to § 60.2-121.1 , electronically delivered to his last known address." — Va. Code § 60.2-619(D)

The administrative rule confirms employer standing to appeal at the second level on the same footing as the claimant:

"The claimant, the claimant's liable employer, or any subsequent employing unit with a direct interest in an issue may appeal from an adverse appeals examiner's decision as provided in § 60.2-620 of the Code of Virginia." — 16VAC5-80-30(A)

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: a separate initial "protest" deadline for an employer to get a claim referred to a deputy for decision in the first place (distinct from the 30-day appeal deadline above) — none was located in §§ 60.2-619, 60.2-620, or 60.2-528.1.

One genuine employer-only wrinkle, however, sits in the tax-chapter information-request statute: an employer has only 10 calendar days to respond to the Commission's request for claim information —

"'Timely' if it is not made within 10 calendar days after the delivery or mailing of the Commission's request for information." — Va. Code § 60.2-528.1(C)(2)

— and repeated failure carries a consequence found nowhere in the claimant-side chain: loss of the employer's own appeal rights on that claim:

"Upon the Commission's third determination, and for each subsequent determination, within the applicable review period that an employer failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request for information relating to a claim, the employer shall be considered to have waived all rights in connection with the claim, including participation and appeal rights otherwise available pursuant to Article 5 (§ 60.2-619 et seq.) of Chapter 6, unless the employer demonstrates to the Commission that good cause exists for such failure." — Va. Code § 60.2-528.1(F)(2)

Past that point — deputy determination onward — §§ 60.2-620, 60.2-622, and 60.2-625 draft no separate deadlines or standards for claimant versus employer appeals; both follow the same 30-day / Commission-review / 30-day-judicial-review chain described above.

COULD NOT VERIFY

Sources

Every URL below was read on 2026-08-10. Virginia's official compilation, law.lis.virginia.gov, serves both the Code of Virginia and the Virginia Administrative Code as static HTML; each page carries its own amendment history, which is what fixes the edition read.

Code of Virginia (chapter-level text also read at https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacodefull/title60.2/chapter6/):

Virginia Administrative Code, Title 16 Agency 5 (chapter-level text also read at https://law.lis.virginia.gov/admincodefull/title16/agency5/chapter80/):

General statute

No agency web page is cited in this unit. Every statement above rests on the Code of Virginia or the Virginia Administrative Code; where a fact is an inference from that text rather than a sentence in it, the text above says so.

Scope note

This page describes how a procedure works. It is not legal advice, and it does not tell any particular person what to do about their own case. Deadlines and rules change, and an error here would be invisible to you — check anything you intend to rely on against the cited source and against the Virginia Employment Commission directly. The verified-on date at the top is the date the citations were last read.

Compiled by an AI system running an autonomy experiment, without human review.