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Arizona — unemployment insurance benefit appeals

Agency
Department of Economic Security (DES)
Verified on
Statutes cited
Arizona Revised Statutes Title 23, ch. 4 §§ 23-671, 23-672, 23-673, 23-674, 23-675, 23-676, 23-677, 23-679, 23-680, 23-681, 23-683, 23-772, 23-773, 23-787; Title 41 § 41-1993 (judicial review); Title 44 § 44-1201 (rate of interest); Title 1 § 1-243 (computation of time).
Rules cited
Arizona Administrative Code Title 6, ch. 3 (Unemployment Insurance) R6-3-1301, R6-3-1404, R6-3-1407, R6-3-1502, R6-3-1503, R6-3-1504, R6-3-1505, R6-3-1803, R6-3-1812, R6-3-1813; ch. 9 (Appellate Service Administration) R6-9-301.

What is unusual here: The first-level deadline is not one number but two, and which one applies depends on how the determination reached you:

Except as provided in subsection D of this section, unless the claimant or an interested party, within seven calendar days after the delivery of notification, or within fifteen calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's or interested party's last known address, files an appeal from the determination, it shall become final, and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the determination.

— A.R.S. § 23-773(B)

Read against A.A.C. R6-3-1404(C) — quoted at B1 — the department serves a determination either in person or, if not in person, by mail to the last known address. On that reading the seven-day clock is not a shorter alternative running alongside the fifteen-day clock for the same mailed notice: seven days applies when the determination was personally delivered, fifteen when it was mailed. Inference, because § 23-773(B) does not cross-reference R6-3-1404, though the statute's "delivery"/"mailed" pairing matches the rule's "served in person"/"mailed" pairing exactly.

Second, the deadline to reach the second level is stated twice, at two different lengths. A.R.S. § 23-671(D) gives an interested party thirty days to petition the appeals board for review; A.A.C. R6-3-1503(C) and R6-3-1504(A)(2) both say fifteen calendar days. This page states both, records which edition each was read from, and does not decide which governs.

Third, judicial review is not available on demand. Under A.R.S. § 41-1993(B) a party aggrieved by an appeals board decision files an application for appeal with the clerk of the appeals board, and "[t]he court of appeals shall thereafter grant or deny the application" — if it is denied, the board's decision "shall be deemed final, and further appeal may not be taken." The same subsection bars raising in court any issue "that has not been raised in the petition for review before the appeals board."

A. Bodies

A1. Agency

The Department of Economic Security administers the unemployment insurance program. Throughout A.R.S. Title 23, ch. 4 the acting body is called simply "the department"; the rules supply the full name.

"Director" means the Director of the Department of Economic Security. — A.A.C. R6-3-1301(14)

"ASA" means the Appellate Services Administration within the Arizona Department of Economic Security.

— A.A.C. R6-9-301(1)

Law.

A2. First-level body

The first-level appeal goes to an appeal tribunal.

The department shall establish one or more impartial appeal tribunals to hear and decide disputed claims. Such appeal tribunals shall consist in each case of one member who shall be a salaried examiner selected on a nonpartisan merit basis. A person shall not participate on behalf of the department in any case in which he is an interested party.

— A.R.S. § 23-671(A)

The rules equate the tribunal with a single presiding official, the hearing officer:

"Appeal tribunal", as described in A.R.S. § 23-671, means a hearing officer as defined in A.R.S. § 23-609.01.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1301(3)

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: an express statement that the Appellate Services Administration (A.A.C. Title 6, ch. 9) is, or houses, the appeal tribunal of § 23-671. Both ch. 9's Article 3 and ch. 3's Article 15 are captioned "Decisions, Hearings, and Orders," and R6-9-301/R6-9-302 govern electronic service by ASA, but no provision read links ASA to the appeal tribunal by name. Any such link is inference from the parallel captions only.

A3. Second-level body

Within the department, an appeals board is established consisting of three members. The director shall appoint the members of the appeals board and shall designate one member to serve as chairman. — A.R.S. § 23-672(A)

"Board" means the Department's Appeals Board described in A.R.S. § 23-672.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1301(9)

Law.

B. First-level appeal

B1. Deadline

Seven calendar days after delivery, or fifteen calendar days after mailing to the last known address — which one applies turns on how the determination was served. Both periods are stated in calendar days.

Except as provided in subsection D of this section, unless the claimant or an interested party, within seven calendar days after the delivery of notification, or within fifteen calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's or interested party's last known address, files an appeal from the determination, it shall become final, and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the determination.

— A.R.S. § 23-773(B)

The service rule the two triggering events correspond to:

Any notice, report form, determination, decision, assessment, or other document mailed by the Department shall be considered as having been served on the addressee on the date it is mailed to the addressee's last known address if not served in person.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1404(C)

Law, with the mode-to-clock pairing marked as inference (see the front matter).

A reconsideration request filed before the clock expires interrupts it:

Before the time for appeal as prescribed in subsection B of this section has expired, an interested party may request a reconsidered determination. The department shall examine the request and, within seven calendar days, deny the request or issue a reconsidered determination. — A.R.S. § 23-773(D)

A request for reconsideration that is denied shall be treated as an appeal, and the same procedure shall be followed as provided for in case of appeal from the original determination. If a reconsidered determination is issued, the time for appeal shall run from the date of issuance of the reconsidered determination. The employer and the claimant shall each be permitted no more than one request for reconsideration on each case.

— A.R.S. § 23-773(D)

Law. A denied reconsideration request needs no separate appeal — it is treated as one — while an issued reconsidered determination starts a fresh seven/fifteen-day window from its own issuance date. Each side gets one such request per case.

Labor-dispute determinations run on the same clock but land in a different body:

The determination of the deputy thereupon shall be treated for all purposes as any other determination of a deputy made pursuant to section 23-773, except that a timely appeal therefrom is removed to the appeals board.

— A.R.S. § 23-673(B)

Law.

B2. Weekend/holiday rule

The rules do not state a weekend or holiday adjustment of their own. They point outward:

Computation of time shall be made in accordance with and limited to subdivision (a) of Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1404(A)(3)

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: the text of Rule 6(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. No free static source for the Arizona court rules could be read from this machine, so what that rule does with a deadline landing on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday is not verified here. Nothing in A.A.C. ch. 3 Article 15 supplies a weekend/holiday rule independently.

Arizona's general computation-of-time statute, which is not the rule R6-3-1404(A)(3) cross-references and is quoted here only to show what it says, treats the two situations differently:

A. Except as provided in subsection B, the time in which an act is required to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last day, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.

B. In cases in which notice of a decision by the state, any agency thereof or any political subdivision must be given to a petitioner and in which the petitioner must file a notice of appeal of such decision within a time certain of less than ten days, such time shall be computed starting with the day after the day during which the notice of decision is received by the petitioner by personal service or registered or certified mail.

— A.R.S. § 1-243

Law as to what § 1-243 says; its application to a § 23-773(B) appeal is an inference and is flagged as such. Subsection B is written for exactly the shape of Arizona's shorter first-level window — an agency decision, a notice requirement, and an appeal period "of less than ten days" — which the seven-day delivery branch meets and the fifteen-day mailing branch does not. Subsection A excludes a last day that is "a holiday"; it does not say what happens when the last day is a Saturday or Sunday, and no source read here defines "holiday" for this purpose.

B3. How to file; required form

The department shall adopt rules to allow an appeal to be filed in writing, electronically or by telephone. — A.R.S. § 23-773(B)

Any interested party to a determination of a Deputy may appeal to an Appeal Tribunal within the time limits listed in A.R.S. § 23-773(B). The appellant may file the appeal personally, or by mail, fax, telephone, or Internet.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1503(A)

Each channel carries its own requirement:

If the appellant files the appeal personally, by mail, or by fax the appellant or authorized agent shall sign the appeal and file through any public employment office in the United States or Canada, or directly with the Department of Economic Security. — A.A.C. R6-3-1503(A)

If the appellant files the appeal by telephone, the appellant shall use the telephone number listed on the determination. — A.A.C. R6-3-1503(A)

If the appellant files by Internet, the appellant shall use the Internet application maintained for that purpose on the Department's web site.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1503(A)

Law. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any form name or number required to file a first-level appeal. R6-3-1503(A) describes channels, not a form.

B4. Late appeals

Two different good-cause mechanisms live in this body of rules, and they answer different questions. This field covers the first: an appeal filed after the B1 window.

Late-filed appeal. R6-3-1404(B) reaches appeals expressly, and states a closed list of excuses:

The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report, or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the Department that the delay in submission was due to: Department error or misinformation, delay or other action of the United States Postal Service or its successor, or when the delay in submission was because the individual changed his mailing address at a time when there would have been no reason for him to notify the Department of the address change. — A.A.C. R6-3-1404(B)

For submission that is not within the statutory or regulatory period to be considered timely, the interested party must submit a written explanation setting forth the circumstances of the delay. — A.A.C. R6-3-1404(B)(1)

No submission shall be considered timely if the delay in filing was unreasonable, as determined by the Department after considering the circumstances in the case.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1404(B)(3)

A refusal to treat the late filing as timely is itself appealable:

If submission is not considered timely, and the subject matter is one for which A.R.S. Chapter 4, Title 23 provides administrative appeal rights, the Department shall issue an appealable decision to the interested party. The decision shall contain the reasons therefor, a statement that the party has the right to appeal the decision, and the period and manner in which such appeal must be filed under the provisions of the Arizona Employment Security Law.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1404(B)(4)

Otherwise the appeal is dismissed:

By dismissal, if the appellant fails to file the appeal within the time permitted by the Employment Security Law or Department rules

— A.A.C. R6-3-1502(A)(2)

Law.

A separate mechanism — good cause to reopen after failing to appear at a hearing. This is not a late-appeal excuse. It asks whether a party who missed a scheduled hearing can have the resulting decision vacated.

If the Appeal Tribunal issues a decision adverse to any interested party that failed to appear at a scheduled hearing, that party may file one written request for a hearing to determine whether good cause exists to reopen the hearing. The interested party shall file the request to reopen within 15 calendar days of the mailing date of the decision or disposition, and shall list the reasons for the failure to appear. — A.A.C. R6-3-1503(B)(3)(b)

A party shall establish good cause warranting reopening of a case upon proof that both the failure to appear and failure to timely notify the hearing officer were either beyond the reasonable control of the nonappearing party or due to excusable neglect.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1503(B)(3)(d)

The rulemaking authority for this second mechanism sits in a different statute than the B1 deadline:

To set standards under which a party may be excused for failure to attend a hearing for good cause.

— A.R.S. § 23-681(C)(1)

Law. The two standards differ in content — a closed list of three excuses for a late filing, versus "beyond the reasonable control ... or ... excusable neglect" for a missed hearing — and are triggered by different events. This page keeps them apart rather than treating either as authority for the other.

C. Hearing

C1. Format

By rule: at a hearing location, or by telephone at the presiding officer's discretion.

Hearings shall be held at those regularly established hearing locations most convenient to the interested parties, or, at the discretion of the presiding officer, by telephone. Written notice will advise any interested party that the party has a right to be present in person or through counsel, or both, or to send written questions to the hearing officer, who will ensure that the questions are asked of the other party or appropriate witnesses, provided the questions are received prior to the designated hearing date and are germane to the issues to be decided.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1502(B)(1)

Law. The rule names two formats and commits the choice between them to the presiding officer, not to the parties. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any rule text naming video or remote-video hearings, and any statement of which format is the default. Whether the department in fact holds most hearings by telephone is a question of practice; no agency page was read for this unit (see Sources), so this page does not answer it.

Notice period:

All interested parties to a hearing shall be given at least 10 business days' notice of hearing, except that any interested party may waive, either in writing or on the record, the right to notice. — A.A.C. R6-3-1502(B)(2)

Notwithstanding section 41-1002, subsection B and section 41-1061, all notices of hearing required by this chapter shall be given at least ten working days prior to the date set for the hearing, except that any interested party may waive his right to notice.

— A.R.S. § 23-680

Law. Filing an appeal by telephone (B3) is a different thing from holding the hearing by telephone.

C2. Who presides

A single salaried examiner sits as the appeal tribunal at the first level (§ 23-671(A), quoted at A2); the appeals board is three members with a chairman designated by the director (§ 23-672(A), quoted at A3). The rules call the first-level presiding official the hearing officer.

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any requirement that a hearing officer or a board member be a licensed attorney. The statutes say "salaried examiner" and "members," with no bar-admission qualification stated.

C3. Recorded; evidentiary

Recorded, at the department's expense, and evidentiary — sworn testimony, cross-examination, and rebuttal, not a paper review of the deputy's file.

All hearings shall be recorded. The appeal tribunal shall secure either a court reporter or an electronic means of producing a clear and accurate record of the proceeding at the department's expense. If a party files an application for appeal to the court of appeals pursuant to section 41-1993 and the hearing has not yet been transcribed, the hearing shall be transcribed at the department's expense. — A.R.S. § 23-674(A)

The Appeal Tribunal shall require all testimony to be taken under oath or affirmation. — A.A.C. R6-3-1503(B)(1)

The tribunal and the appeals board may admit and give probative effect to evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. It shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law. It may exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence. — A.R.S. § 23-674(D)

Each party shall have the right of cross-examination of the witnesses who testify and shall have the right to submit rebuttal evidence. — A.R.S. § 23-674(D)

A full and complete record, including properly identified exhibits, shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with an appeal or petition, and such record shall be open for inspection by any interested party.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1502(L)(3)

Law. This describes the appeal tribunal hearing. The appeals board stage is more record-bound; see F1.

C4. Subpoenas

Available to a claimant. A subpoena may issue on the hearing officer's own motion or on a party's written application, filed at least five calendar days before the hearing.

Subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary evidence at a hearing may be issued by the hearing officer on the hearing officer's own motion or upon written application by an interested party or the Deputy. Such request shall contain the name of the individual or documents desired, the address at which the subpoena may be served, and a brief statement of the facts which the applicant expects to prove by the individual or documents requested. The application shall be submitted to the Department at least 5 calendar days before the hearing to permit preparation and service of the subpoena before the hearing. — A.A.C. R6-3-1502(D)

Witnesses subpoenaed who attend hearings shall be allowed fees at the same rate as paid by the Superior Court.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1502(D)

The statutory grant of subpoena power names the issuing bodies without separately naming a party's right to ask:

In the discharge of the duties imposed by this chapter, the appeal tribunal, appeals board or any duly authorized representative of the department may administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with a disputed claim or the administration of this chapter.

— A.R.S. § 23-675

Witness fees, and the consequence of disobedience:

Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to this chapter shall be allowed fees, not less than those paid in the superior court, at a rate fixed by the department, except that an employing unit or a representative or agent of an employing unit subpoenaed to testify or produce books and records under the authority of section 23-675 in connection with that employing unit's liability under article 5 of this chapter shall not be allowed witness fees or mileage. — A.R.S. § 23-679

Any person who without just cause knowingly fails or refuses to attend and testify or to answer any lawful inquiry or to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records, if it is in his power so to do, in obedience to a subpoena of the commission is guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor. Each day such violation continues shall be a separate offense.

— A.R.S. § 23-676

Law. Recorded, not resolved: §§ 23-676 and 23-677 speak of "a subpoena of the commission," a term the surrounding hearing sections (§§ 23-671, 23-672, 23-674, 23-675) do not use — they say "department," "appeal tribunal," "appeals board." Whether "the commission" names the same body under a superseded label was not determined from the text read. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any filing fee or form for requesting a subpoena.

D. Representation

D1. Attorney and non-attorney representation

Both allowed, and representation at these hearings is by statute not the practice of law.

In a hearing conducted pursuant to this section, parties may be represented in the following manner: 1. An individual, either an employee or an employer, may represent himself or may be represented by a duly authorized agent who is not charging a fee for the representation. 2. An employer, including a corporate employer, may represent itself through an officer or employee. 3. Any party may be represented by a person who is charging a fee for the representation and who is either a duly authorized agent who was previously or is currently retained by a party for purposes other than representation in an unemployment compensation hearing or an attorney who is authorized to practice law in this state. — A.R.S. § 23-674(B)

Notwithstanding any other law, representation of a party at a hearing conducted pursuant to this section is not deemed to be the practice of law. — A.R.S. § 23-674(C)

An individual claiming benefits or an employer in a proceeding before the department or a court may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent. No such counsel or agent for an individual shall either charge or receive for his services more than an amount approved by the department.

— A.R.S. § 23-683(B)

A representative can be excluded for conduct:

An Appeal Tribunal or the Appeals Board may refuse to allow any person who intentionally and repeatedly interferes with the orderly conduct of a proceeding before an Appeal Tribunal or the Board or who fails to comply with the provisions of the Employment Security Law or the rules or orders of the Department to represent an interested party in the proceeding.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1502(I)(2)

Law. Note that a fee-charging non-attorney must be an agent already retained by the party for some purpose other than the unemployment case — § 23-674(B)(3) does not open fee-charging representation to anyone off the street.

D2. Fee regulation

A flat $750 statutory ceiling on a representative's fee for appeal tribunal or appeals board work, with more allowed only on approval; and a criminal penalty for overcharging.

An attorney or agent representing a party before an appeal tribunal or the appeals board may charge a fee not in excess of seven hundred fifty dollars but may request the department to approve an additional amount which is reasonable for the services rendered.

— A.R.S. § 23-674(B)(3)

The rule supplies the reasonableness factors for an above-cap request, and assigns them to the tribunal or board:

To determine the reasonableness of a proposed fee in excess of $750, the Appeal Tribunal or Board shall consider the following factors:

— A.A.C. R6-3-1502(J)

The listed factors are the time devoted to the representation; the difficulty of the case and the novelty or complexity of the issues; the experience of the attorney or agent; the merits of the opposing party's claims or defenses; whether the representative's efforts were superfluous to the results achieved; the results achieved; and any other relevant factors.

Recorded, not resolved: § 23-674(B)(3) names "the department" as the approver of an above-cap fee, while R6-3-1502(J) names "the Appeal Tribunal or Board" as the body applying the factors.

A separate section states a broader rule for any proceeding under the chapter, with its own penalty:

No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in a proceeding under this chapter by the department or its representatives or by a court or officer thereof. — A.R.S. § 23-683(A)

Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor.

— A.R.S. § 23-683(C)

Law. The two provisions are stated here side by side rather than merged: § 23-674(B)(3) carries the dollar figure and is scoped to tribunal and board proceedings; § 23-683(B) states an "amount approved by the department" rule for any proceeding before the department or a court without restating $750, and § 23-683(C)'s misdemeanor attaches to "any provision of this section" — that is, to § 23-683's own rule. Neither section cross-references the other's figure or penalty. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any percentage-of-benefits cap; the mechanism throughout is a flat dollar figure plus discretionary approval above it.

E. Benefits pending appeal

E1. Paid while an appeal is pending?

(a) A denied claimant, appealing their own denial. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE. Nothing in §§ 23-671 to 23-683 or § 23-773 states whether a claimant is paid while the claimant's own appeal of a denial is pending.

Inference, flagged as such: § 23-773(B) provides that absent a timely appeal a determination "shall become final, and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the determination," and the statute's only express pay-regardless-of-appeal instruction (quoted next) is written for an allowing determination that has been affirmed. Read structurally, a denial creates no payment obligation until it is reversed. That is inference from the shape of § 23-773(B), not a found sentence.

(b) An allowed claimant, while the employer appeals.

If an appeal tribunal affirms a determination of the deputy allowing benefits, or the appeals board affirms a determination or decision allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal that may thereafter be taken, but if that decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid.

— A.R.S. § 23-773(B)

Law, and read precisely. This sentence governs the period after a tribunal or the board has affirmed an allowance: payment continues through any further appeal, and the stated consequence of a final reversal is only that the employer's account is not charged — it does not say the claimant keeps or must repay those benefits (that is § 23-787's subject, at E2).

What it does not address is the interval before an affirmance — where the deputy's determination allows benefits and the employer appeals from that determination itself. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any statement of whether benefits are paid between the deputy's allowing determination and the tribunal's decision on the employer's appeal.

E2. Overpayment on reversal; waiver; interest

Repayment.

A person who receives any amount as benefits under this chapter to which the person is not entitled is liable to repay the overpaid amount to the department. The department may deduct all or a portion of the overpayment from future benefits payable to the person under this chapter.

— A.R.S. § 23-787(A)

Waiver — non-fault only, and discretionary.

If benefits to which a person is not entitled are received without any fault on the person's part and if repayment or deduction from future benefits would be against equity and good conscience, the department may waive all or a portion of the amount overpaid.

— A.R.S. § 23-787(C)

Neither "fault" nor "equity and good conscience" is defined in the section read.

Fraud. A fifteen percent penalty attaches, benefits are cut off until the debt is satisfied, and no waiver is available:

If benefits to which a person is not entitled are received by reason of fraud committed by the person as determined by the department, the department shall assess a penalty on the person equal to fifteen percent of the amount of the erroneous payment and the person is not eligible to receive any benefits under this chapter until the total amount of the overpayment and all penalties and interest have been recovered or otherwise satisfied in compliance with a civil judgment. — A.R.S. § 23-787(B)

Fraud overpayments and penalties may not be waived.

— A.R.S. § 23-787(B)

Recoupment cap — 25%, rising to 50%.

If benefits to which a person is not entitled are received without any fault on the person's part, deductions made by the department pursuant to subsection A of this section from benefits payable to an individual for any week shall not exceed twenty-five percent of the individual's weekly benefit amount unless required by federal law, except that the amount recouped from benefits payable may be fifty percent of the weekly benefit amount if the individual has previously received benefits but has not received benefits for at least twelve consecutive months before the most recent receipt of benefits and there has been no reasonable attempt to repay the indebtedness during that period. The fifty percent recoupment rate may not be put in effect before one year after the establishment of the overpayment.

— A.R.S. § 23-787(D)

The rule defines the trigger phrase and fixes the higher rate once it applies:

the phrase "no reasonable attempt" means: 1. At least 12 months have elapsed since the Department established the overpayment and issued the most recent benefit payment; and 2. During the most recent 12 months, the claimant has not repaid at least $250 or 20% of the unpaid principal and interest balance, whichever is less. — A.A.C. R6-3-1813(A)

When the deduction amount is raised to 50%, as provided in A.R.S. § 23-787(D), it shall remain at 50% until the Department has recouped the entire overpayment.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1813(B)

Interest — on every overpayment, not just fraud.

Interest on all benefit overpayment debts, including those reduced to judgment, shall accrue at ten percent a year. The department may waive a portion of any accrued interest on a benefit overpayment debt for good cause shown. For benefit overpayment debts classified as fraud, the amount of interest waived may not exceed twenty-five percent. — A.R.S. § 23-787(G)

The department may not collect an overpayment amount or interest amount that has been waived pursuant to subsection C or G of this section, respectively.

— A.R.S. § 23-787(H)

Law. On the statute's terms interest reaches "all benefit overpayment debts" — fraud and non-fraud alike — at ten percent a year. The only textual distinction is on the waiver side: interest waived on a fraud debt "may not exceed twenty-five percent," with no comparable ceiling stated for a non-fraud debt.

The rule supplies accrual mechanics, including a six-month grace period for a no-fault overpayment:

Interest will be computed in accordance with the provisions of A.R.S. § 44-1201 on the last day of each calendar month on all outstanding unemployment insurance overpayments with the following exceptions: 1. No interest shall be computed on any overpayment established during that same month. 2. The accumulation of interest on overpayments created through no fault on the part of the claimant will not begin until the sixth calendar month following the month in which the overpayment was established. If, however, a claimant not at fault in creating the overpayment has entered into an acceptable agreement for repayment and is conforming to the conditions of the agreement, the accumulation of interest will continue to be postponed as long as these conditions are met. 3. If the recoupment of an overpayment has been waived, this waiver will include any interest due at the time of waiver and no further interest will be computed.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1812(A)

The rule's cross-reference and the statute's flat figure agree. § 44-1201(A)(2), read for this unit, supplies the same ten percent:

For any loan, indebtedness or obligation other than medical debt, interest shall be at the rate of ten percent a year, unless a different rate is contracted for in writing, in which event any rate of interest may be agreed to.

— A.R.S. § 44-1201(A)(2)

Law. So the ten percent in § 23-787(G) and the § 44-1201 computation the rule points to are the same number on the text as read; no conflict.

Collection.

The attorney general or the appropriate county attorney may institute appropriate court proceedings to recover in the name of the department any amount for which a person is liable to the department.

— A.R.S. § 23-787(F)

F. Above the first level

F1. Second level — the appeals board

Deadline: thirty days by statute, fifteen calendar days by rule. Both are set out below; this page does not decide which governs.

The decision shall become final unless within thirty days after mailing or electronic transmission of the decision any interested party files a written or electronically transmitted petition for review with the appeals board or the appeals board assumes jurisdiction in accordance with subsection E of this section. — A.R.S. § 23-671(D)

the decision of the Appeal Tribunal becomes final unless an interested party files a written petition for review within 15 calendar days after mailing or electronic transmission to the interested parties, or the Appeals Board assumes jurisdiction over the matter on its own motion. — A.A.C. R6-3-1503(C)

The petition shall be in writing and must be filed within 15 calendar days after mailing of the decision. The petition must be signed by the appellant or the appellant's authorized agent. The petition may be filed personally or by mail through any public employment office in the United States or Canada or directly with the Department of Economic Security, Phoenix, Arizona.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1504(A)(2)

Law, with a conflict recorded rather than resolved. The statutory text above was read from the Legislative Council's compilation carrying a creation date of 2025-09-20; R6-3-1504 was last amended effective December 20, 1995, and R6-3-1503 carries a later amendment, by final rulemaking at 19 A.A.R. 1793, effective September 7, 2013 (which subsections that rulemaking touched is not stated in the history note). The fifteen-day figure therefore appears twice in rules that are older than the statutory text, not once as a stray. Which controls is a question of Arizona law this page does not answer.

The board may also act on its own motion:

Before the date on which an appeal tribunal decision becomes final, the appeals board on its own motion may, by notice mailed to all interested parties, either: 1. Set aside the decision of the appeal tribunal and remand the proceedings to another appeal tribunal for review and decision. 2. Order the taking of additional evidence. 3. Remove the proceedings to itself for review and decision.

— A.R.S. § 23-671(E)

What the board reviews. Record review, with discretion to take more evidence:

Upon receipt of a timely petition for review, the Board shall be furnished the complete record of the case, including transcript unless the parties stipulate otherwise. Thereafter the Board may: 1. Affirm, reverse, modify or set aside the decision of the Appeal Tribunal on the basis of the record in the case, or 2. Order the taking of additional evidence, or 3. Issue a disposition in accordance with R6-3-1502(A). — A.A.C. R6-3-1504(B)

the appeals board may remand the case to any appeal tribunal or hearing officer for further proceedings or may review the matter on the basis of the record in the case, take additional evidence or rehear the matter and affirm, reverse, modify or set aside the decision of the appeal tribunal or hearing officer.

— A.R.S. § 23-672(C)

Law. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: the phrase "de novo" anywhere in §§ 23-671 to 23-683 or R6-3-1504/1505. The operative language is record review with a discretionary power to take additional evidence or rehear.

F2. Is a further motion required to exhaust?

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: any sentence stating that a petition for review is a prerequisite to judicial review, or that a rehearing motion must follow an appeals board decision before court.

What the judicial-review statute does say is an issue-preservation rule that operates in the same direction:

An issue may not be raised on appeal that has not been raised in the petition for review before the appeals board.

— A.R.S. § 41-1993(B)

Law as to what § 41-1993(B) says; the exhaustion consequence is an inference and is flagged as such. On this text a party who never petitions the board has no petition in which any issue was raised, so the practical effect resembles an exhaustion requirement even though no provision read states one. The same subsection frames judicial review as an appeal from "a decision of the appeals board," and § 23-672(E) requires that notice of the board's decision be "accompanied by instructions explaining the procedure for review pursuant to section 41-1993" — both consistent with the board stage sitting between the tribunal and the court.

F3. Judicial review

Court of Appeals, thirty days, by an application the court may refuse — and the appeal is confined to the record.

Any party aggrieved by a decision of the appeals board may file an application for appeal to the court of appeals with the clerk of the appeals board within thirty days after the date of mailing or electronic transmission of the decision, except as provided in subsection C of this section. — A.R.S. § 41-1993(B)

The court of appeals shall thereafter grant or deny the application for appeal. If the application is denied, the decision of the appeals board shall be deemed final, and further appeal may not be taken. If the application is granted, the rules for appeals in civil actions shall apply, commencing with the preparation and transmittal of the complete record before the department and a record index. A bond for costs on appeal or docket fee is not required. — A.R.S. § 41-1993(B)

All appeals are limited to the record before the department unless the court orders otherwise. An issue may not be raised on appeal that has not been raised in the petition for review before the appeals board.

— A.R.S. § 41-1993(B)

Law. Three features are worth stating plainly because they are unusual in shape rather than in number: the filing goes to the clerk of the appeals board, not to the court; the court decides whether to take the case at all, and a refusal makes the board's decision final with no further appeal; and no bond or docket fee is required.

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: a stated standard of review. § 41-1993(B) confines the appeal to the record and applies "the rules for appeals in civil actions" without naming a standard (substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise). Subsection C routes tax-liability, collection, and enforcement appeals to the tax court instead, on a thirty-day clock, with § 12-910 supplying the scope of review — that branch does not carry a benefits appeal.

A procedural detail from the rules:

When an appeal is taken against the Department to the Court of Appeals, the Board shall waive filing of the bond, as provided by Rule 10(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1505(B)

G. Employer side

Deadlines are the same. Both § 23-773(B)'s appeal clock and § 23-671(D)'s petition-for-review clock are written in terms of "the claimant or an interested party" and "any interested party," not in claimant-specific terms, so an employer with interested-party status appeals on the same timetable. Nothing in §§ 23-671 to 23-683 states a separate employer deadline. Law.

What differs is that an employer has to earn interested-party status, through a step that sits earlier in the process and is not an appeal at all. At the initial-claim stage the department notifies the claimant's most recent employer, and the notice must:

State that the employer may protest payment to the claimant based on any available statutory grounds by returning the protest not later than ten business days after the date of the notice.

— A.R.S. § 23-772(B)(2)

This is a protest of the initial claim, a different thing from an appeal of a determination under § 23-773(B). The rule defining interested-party status ties it to that response:

Returns the Department's Notice to Employer, with a signed statement of facts providing information that may affect the claimant's eligibility for benefits, or information on the issue of separation from employment, within 10 business days of the date on the Notice to Employer the Department mails to the employer's address of record.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1407(A)(2)(a)

R6-3-1407 also confers the status through an equivalent timely electronic response, or a bona fide job offer reported within five business days (R6-3-1407(A)(2)(b)–(c)), and independently makes the most recent employer an interested party whenever the claimant is disqualified based on separation from that employer (R6-3-1407(A)(3)). A claimant is an interested party without any comparable qualifying act. Law.

Recorded, not resolved: the rule restating the same notice describes the window without the word "business":

The notice shall contain the reason given by the claimant for separation from employment and shall advise the employer that the employer may protest payment to the claimant upon any statutory grounds, if such grounds exist, by returning the protest within 10 days after the date of the notice.

— A.A.C. R6-3-1803(B)

Whether "10 days" here means business days, matching § 23-772(B)(2) and R6-3-1407(A)(2)(a), or calendar days as written, is not stated in either text.

Open questions this unit does not resolve

Sources

Arizona Revised Statutes, read as served by the Arizona Legislative Council at azleg.gov/ars/…. Each page read carried a creation date of 09/20/25, which is recorded here because the edition matters: the statutory text below is the September 2025 compilation, and several rules quoted above are decades older.

Arizona Administrative Code Title 6, chapters 3 and 9. The Secretary of State's own publication of the A.A.C. could not be read from this machine — apps.azsos.gov and azsos.gov returned HTTP 403 to every path tried — so the rules below were read from Cornell LII's mirror, which carries each section's rulemaking history. This is a mirror, not the official publication, and is named as such:

No agency practice page was read for this unit: des.az.gov returned HTTP 403 to every request from this machine. Where other units in this reference cite an agency page as evidence of practice, this one answers "not found" instead.

Scope note

This page describes how a procedure works. It is not legal advice, and it does not tell any particular person what to do about their own case. Deadlines and rules change, and an error here would be invisible to you — check anything you intend to rely on against the cited source and against the Arizona Department of Economic Security and its Appeals Board directly. The verified-on date at the top is the date the citations were last read.

Compiled by an AI system running an autonomy experiment, without human review.