New Hampshire — unemployment insurance benefit appeals
What is unusual here. New Hampshire's ladder has three administrative rungs, and the middle one is not an appeal in the ordinary sense. RSA 282-A:60 says in terms that "[t]he second level of appeal shall be to the commissioner," but the power it confers is to reopen — "on the basis of fraud, mistake, or newly discovered evidence" — and a reopened case goes back to the appeal tribunal on those grounds only, unless the commissioner orders a hearing de novo. Only past that does the case reach the appellate board, a body of eight sitting in panels of three. Above the board there is no trial court and no intermediate appellate court: RSA 282-A:67, II runs the appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and RSA 282-A:68 makes that route "exclusive of all other methods of judicial review of unemployment compensation decisions, including extraordinary writs, including the writ of certiorari."
The hearing rule is the inverse of the pattern this reference usually finds. Most states covered here default a first-level hearing to the telephone. New Hampshire's rule makes in-person or video the baseline for an intrastate appeal and puts the telephone behind four conditions that must all be met — every party given the chance to object, no party having objected, no credibility question turning on a witness's demeanour, and actual hardship in attending. A party who objects to a telephone hearing therefore does not get one.
Two provisions push in the claimant's direction and are worth reading together. RSA 282-A:134 puts a full-time state employee, the claim representative, inside the department with the duty of "the presentation of, or assistance therein, a claimant's case before an appeal tribunal including request for reopening" — a state-paid advocate, not merely an explainer — though the same section shuts the door on most cases: "No claimant shall be a beneficiary of this provision, except for preliminary evaluation, unless the commissioner or the claim representative finds the case to be one about which reasonable men may disagree." And Emp 211.01(d) requires the department, when a claimant appeals a denial of continued eligibility, to offer that claimant a choice the rules of most states never put in writing: keep receiving payments for the denied weeks while the appeal runs, or let them be suspended. Each branch has a different consequence if the appeal is lost, and the rule says what each one is.
The two halves of the rulebook are dated very differently, and the reason is visible in the files themselves. The department's appeal-tribunal rule, Emp 202.01, was last superseded by document #9526 effective 17 August 2009 — but the Emp file's own appendix records the statute it implements as RSA 541-A:16, I(b)(2), and RSA 541-A:17, II exempts organizational and procedural rules adopted under RSA 541-A:16, I from the ten-year limit that RSA 541-A:17, I imposes on every other rule. A seventeen-year-old rule is not necessarily a stale one here. The appellate board's rules are a separate agency's — Emab, formerly Ucab — and every section of Emab 202 is stamped to document #10394, effective 9 August 2013, while the board's own appendix names RSA 282-A:62 and specific RSA 541-A sections, and cites RSA 541-A:16, I for two other parts but not for its rules of practice and procedure. The file therefore does not establish, on its face, that the exemption reaches them, and it records neither a readoption nor an expiry; this page cites them as the state publishes them and says so rather than resolving it. See the note under Sources.
One thing this page does not have. Every other state in this reference has been checked against the agency's own claimant-facing pages, which serve both as evidence of practice and as a cross-check on the rules. New Hampshire Employment Security's website returns HTTP 403 on every path attempted, including its own robots.txt, so no practice source was available and none is cited. Every field below is law, or is marked as an inference from law, and where the law is silent the silence is reported as silence.
A. Bodies
A1. Agency — law. The department is created by statute and the commissioner is the officer who makes and delegates benefit determinations.
There shall be a department of employment security which shall include an unemployment compensation bureau, an employment service bureau, and an economic and labor market information bureau.
— RSA 282-A:107
Certifying Officer. "Certifying officer" shall mean the commissioner or his representative authorized to make determinations on claims.
— RSA 282-A:42, II
Claims for benefits shall be made in accordance with such rules as the commissioner of the department of employment security may adopt.
— RSA 282-A:43
A2. First-level body — law. The first appeal from a certifying officer's determination goes to an appeal tribunal. It sits as a panel of three or as a single member, and in both configurations the chairman is a department employee.
Appeal from a certifying officer's determination and a decision made pursuant to RSA 282-A:164 shall be to an impartial tribunal appointed by the commissioner. Each such tribunal shall be known as an appeal tribunal, and shall consist of 3 members or one member. If the tribunal consists of 3 members, one member shall be a representative of employees, one shall be a representative of employers, and one shall be an employee of the department of employment security who shall serve as chairman of the tribunal. If the tribunal consists of one member, that member shall be an employee of the department of employment security and shall be the chairman.
— RSA 282-A:53
The tribunal's own procedural rule is N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01, a single long section running from (a) to (z). N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 201 is a different track — appeals from a determination of employer liability — and is treated under G below. Part Emp 203, "Appellate Division; Organization and Applicability of Rules," appears in the published rules as a heading marked expired and reserved; it has no operative text and nothing here rests on it.
A3. Second-level body — law. The statute labels the commissioner the second level, and the label is narrower than it sounds.
The second level of appeal shall be to the commissioner. The commissioner may, upon written request of an interested party or upon his own initiative, in any case in which a decision has been rendered, reopen the case on the basis of fraud, mistake, or newly discovered evidence.
— RSA 282-A:60
The third rung is the appellate board, appointed by the governor, sitting in panels of three, with a statutory ceiling on how many of its members may be lawyers.
There shall be an appellate board consisting of 8 members, who are and continue to be residents of New Hampshire, appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the executive council for 4-year terms and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Two of the members shall be attorneys-at-law admitted to the practice of law in the state of New Hampshire, one of whom shall be the chair, and one of whom shall be the vice chair and shall serve in the absence of the chair. These 2 members shall be the only members of the appellate board who are attorneys-at-law.
— RSA 282-A:62, I
The appellate board shall be part of the department of employment security for organizational purposes but shall operate independently of that department.
— RSA 282-A:63
The board decides under its own rules, adopted as a separate agency in the state's rules index under the prefix Emab — formerly Ucab — and not under the department's Emp prefix. A reader who searches only the Emp rules will find nothing at all about procedure before the board.
B. First-level appeal
B1. Deadline — law. Fourteen calendar days, and the clock starts from the mailing of the determination, not from its receipt. Two acts satisfy it: actual receipt by the department within the period, or, for an appeal sent by mail, a postmark within it.
Any interested party may appeal from a certifying officer's determination by filing an appeal to an appeal tribunal which must be received or, if filed by mail, postmarked within 14 calendar days after the determination was mailed to his last known address; provided that, if the commissioner finds sufficient grounds to justify or excuse a delay in filing an appeal, he may extend the time for filing the appeal.
— RSA 282-A:48
The department's rule states the same period without repeating the postmark alternative:
An appeal to an appeal tribunal from a certifying officer’s determination shall be in writing and filed in any office of the department within 14 calendar days from the date of mailing of said determination.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(a)
That gap is closed by the rules themselves rather than left open, and it is worth following, because the department's general filing rule points the other way.
All written documents governed by these rules shall be rebuttably presumed to have been issued on the date noted on the document and to have been filed with the department on the actual date of receipt by the department, as evidenced by a date stamp placed on the document by the department in the normal course of business.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 207.07
Applied to an appeal posted on day fourteen, that presumption would defeat the statute's postmark alternative. But Emp 207 states its own reach:
The rules in this part shall apply to adjudicative proceedings conducted under RSA 282-A only to the extent not addressed in RSA 282-A and in other rules of the department.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 207.02
RSA 282-A:48 addresses it. The statute's postmark alternative therefore governs, and Emp 207.07's receipt presumption does not displace it. (Inference, from the scope clause quoted above applied to the two texts. The rules do not say so in a sentence.)
B2. Weekend and holiday rule — law, from the general statute rather than from RSA 282-A. Neither RSA 282-A nor Emp 202.01 says what happens when day fourteen is a Saturday, a Sunday or a holiday, and the department's computation rule is silent on it too:
(b) Computation of any period of time referred to in these rules shall begin with the day after the action which sets the time period in motion, and shall include the last day of the period so computed.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 207.10(b)
The answer is in the state's general rules of statutory construction, which supply both the counting rule and the weekend extension:
Except where specifically stated to the contrary, when a period or limit of time is to be reckoned from a day or date, that day or date shall be excluded from and the day on which an act should occur shall be included in the computation of the period or limit of time.
— RSA 21:35, I
If a statute specifies a date for filing documents or paying fees and the specified date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the document or fee shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by the next business day.
— RSA 21:35, II
RSA 282-A:48 is a statute specifying a filing period, and nothing in RSA 282-A states the contrary, so RSA 21:35 reaches it and the two rules agree on the counting method. (Inference. No provision of RSA 282-A or of the Emp rules cites RSA 21:35, and no source read says in a sentence that it applies to this deadline.)
B3. How to file — law, and a gap. The appeal must be in writing and may be filed at any office of the department (Emp 202.01(a), quoted at B1). NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: no statute or rule read prescribes a form, a form number, an address, a fax number or an online route for the first-level appeal. In every other state in this reference that gap is filled from the agency's own pages; here there is no reachable agency page, so it is left open rather than guessed at.
Notice of the appeal goes out from the department, not from the appealing party:
Notice of an appeal shall immediately be sent by e-mail notice pursuant to Emp 405.01, Emp 405.03, or Emp 405.05, or by first class mail to the other interested parties and third party administrators or other representatives, and an appeal tribunal chairman shall by e-mail notice pursuant to Emp 405.01, Emp 405.03, or Emp 405.05, or by first class mail send notice of the time and place of hearing to all interested parties and third party administrators or other representatives.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(b)
B4. Late appeals — law. There is a good-cause exception, in the statute as a discretion and in the rule as a duty, and the rule supplies examples the statute does not.
...provided that, if the commissioner finds sufficient grounds to justify or excuse a delay in filing an appeal, he may extend the time for filing the appeal.
— RSA 282-A:48
The commissioner shall extend the time for filing pursuant to RSA 282-A:48 if he finds sufficient grounds which shall include illness, accident, the death of a family member, or similar problem beyond the control of the claimant, to justify or excuse a delay in filing.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(a)
The two are not phrased alike. The statute says the commissioner "may extend"; the rule says he "shall extend" on a finding of sufficient grounds, and names four categories that count. Absent a timely appeal or an extension, the determination is final:
If no appeal from a determination by a certifying officer is taken within the time limits in RSA 282-A:48, such determination shall thereupon become final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith, subject to the provision in RSA 282-A:48 relative to good cause for late filing of the appeal; provided, however, that the certifying officer's determination shall continue to have effect as though no appeal had been filed with respect to all weeks of unemployment and any amount not affected by the appeal.
— RSA 282-A:49
C. Hearing
C1. Format — law, set by rule. For an intrastate appeal the baseline is in person or video, and the telephone is an exception behind four cumulative conditions.
Testimony in intrastate appeals shall be in person, or by video conference that shall allow parties to view and hear witnesses as testimony is being presented and to cross-examine, subject to (x) and (y) below.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(w)
Testimony in intrastate appeals shall be by telephone only if: (1) All parties have been given opportunity to object; (2) No party has objected; (3) There is not a question of credibility for which there is no direct evidence other than the demeanor of one or more witnesses; and (4) Presence at an in-person or video conference hearing would be difficult for one or more parties due to: a. Illness or disability; b. Prohibitive distance; c. Lack of transportation; or d. Similar reasons.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(x)
Ability to submit testimony by telephone or by video conference shall be contingent on availability of the necessary services and equipment.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(y)
Interstate appeals run the other way, with the out-of-state party on the telephone or video by default:
Testimony in interstate appeals by parties located out of state shall be by telephone or video conference unless otherwise ordered due to the request of the party or parties located out of state, the presence in the state of all parties or similar reasons. If the party or parties located out of state will be testifying by telephone, testimony by parties located within the state may give testimony either by telephone, video conference or in person.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(v)
C2. Who presides — law. The chairman, who is always a department employee (RSA 282-A:53, quoted at A2), and whose presence is a condition of the hearing happening at all.
In no case shall a hearing proceed unless the chairman is present.
— RSA 282-A:56
The chairman alone rules on the admissibility of evidence; where the tribunal sits as three, the decision is by majority, with a written dissent permitted (Emp 202.01(g), (o)).
C3. Recorded, and evidentiary — law. The first-level hearing is a fresh evidentiary hearing, and it is recorded verbatim.
The appeal tribunal shall hear the appeal de novo and shall not be bound by prior findings or determinations of the department of employment security although the records of said department shall be part of the evidence to be considered by the tribunal.
— RSA 282-A:56
A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with an appeal, and all testimony at any hearing shall be recorded verbatim.
— RSA 282-A:57
The department shall record the hearing by tape recording or other method that will provide a verbatim record.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 207.25(a)
This is the one hearing at which evidence is taken. The appellate board's review is confined to the record, and its own rules say so before anyone reaches them:
The appellate board’s review is confined to the record. The appellate board does not receive or consider evidence and therefore rules relative to adjudicative hearings are inapplicable.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emab 201.01
C4. Subpoenas — law. The statutory power sits with the commissioner and with the chairman of an appeal tribunal.
In the discharge of the duties imposed by this chapter, the commissioner of the department of employment security, the chairman of an appeal tribunal, and any duly authorized representative of either of them shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with a disputed claim or the administration of this chapter.
— RSA 282-A:124
The rule sets the showing required, and states it without naming which party may ask:
Subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence shall be issued pursuant to RSA 282-A:124 upon a showing that: (1) The testimony or evidence is necessary, relevant and non-repetitive; and (2) The witness or evidence cannot be voluntarily obtained.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(t)
Neither text limits the showing to one side, and neither confers the request expressly on a claimant. On its face the rule is open to any party. (Inference from the absence of a limiting word; no source read says a claimant may request a subpoena, and none says a claimant may not.)
D. Representation
D1. Who may represent — law. The statute grants the right to the claimant and says nothing about the employer; the rule is written for any party.
No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding under this chapter by the commissioner of the department of employment security, or by his representative or by any court or by any officer thereof. Any individual claiming benefits before the commissioner or his representative may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent; but no such counsel or agent shall either charge or receive for such services more than an amount approved by the commissioner. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
— RSA 282-A:158
Any party may be represented by counsel or other representative, but such person appearing on behalf of a party, except for a claims representative providing assistance pursuant to RSA 282-A:134, shall first file a letter announcing the fact of representation at the earliest date practical and shall send a copy of such letter to all parties. Parties shall retain counsel at their own expense and requests for appointment of counsel shall not be entertained.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(p)
The statute's silence as to employers is reported here as silence; the rule reaches "any party" and so covers an employer at the tribunal, and no source read explains the difference. The notice of hearing must tell the parties about representation, and about help:
The notice shall advise parties that they may be represented by an attorney or other authorized representative of their choosing and that free or low cost assistance may be available.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(b)
The assistance the notice refers to is a department employee, and the statute defines both the job and its limit.
There shall be in the department, assigned to the commissioner's office, a full-time, classified employee with the title of claim representative. He shall be qualified as a certifying officer and possess such other requisite skills, knowledge and abilities as appropriate. His duties shall include advice to claimants relative to presentation of their best case to a certifying officer for purpose of redetermination, and the presentation of, or assistance therein, a claimant's case before an appeal tribunal including request for reopening.
— RSA 282-A:134
No claimant shall be a beneficiary of this provision, except for preliminary evaluation, unless the commissioner or the claim representative finds the case to be one about which reasonable men may disagree.
— RSA 282-A:134
Before the appellate board the right runs to a party generally:
A party may appear personally, through legal counsel, or by a duly authorized agent acting on a party’s behalf.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emab 202.06(e)
D2. Fees — law. No figure is set anywhere. RSA 282-A:158 (quoted above) does two separate things: it bars the department, a court or a court officer from charging a claimant fees "of any kind in any proceeding under this chapter," and it caps a claimant's own counsel or agent at "an amount approved by the commissioner," on pain of a misdemeanour. The rule that implements the second half sets a reasonableness test, not a number.
These rules shall govern all petitions for approval of fees pursuant to RSA 282-A:158.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 204.01
Any individual claiming benefits may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent. No such counsel or agent shall either charge or receive for such services more than an amount approved by the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee following the filing of a written petition requesting such approval.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 204.02(a)
(a) Upon receipt of an objection to a petition, or following expiration of the 14-day period for objecting, the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee shall approve a fee in a reasonable amount.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 204.03(a)
(b) A fee shall be considered reasonable if the following are true: (1) The time and labor required are commensurate with the fee; (2) The complexity of the case, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the services properly are proportionate with the fee; (3) The amount of benefits involved and the results obtained justify the fee; (4) If the employer was represented by an attorney, it made the case more difficult for the claimant or representation by an attorney necessary or desirable; (5) The terms of the claimant’s attorney’s fee agreement, if any, are consistent with the fee; and (6) If an unsuccessful appeal to the appeal tribunal was initiated by the claimant, the fee is not for an appeal which was without merit based on statutory and case law unless evidence shows that the appeal was against the advice of the counsel or agent.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 204.03(b)
The petition is filed after the work is done, itemising the services and the result, and the claimant gets fourteen calendar days to object to it (Emp 204.02(b)–(e)). No percentage and no dollar ceiling appears in RSA 282-A, in the Emp rules or in the Emab rules. Taking more than the approved amount is separately a ground for the chairman to shut a representative out of the hearing:
A chairman shall deny access to a hearing or to the use and benefits of an appeal tribunal to an individual, interested parties excepted, for conduct which constitutes: (1) Fraud; (2) Neglect of duty; (3) Disorderly, unruly or willfully contemptuous conduct at a hearing; (4) Intentional or repeated failure to observe the New Hampshire unemployment compensation law; or (5) The acceptance of fees in excess of those allowed by the commissioner.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 202.01(l)
The Emab rules contain no fee provision of their own, and no source read says whether Emp 204's approval procedure reaches a fee for representation before the appellate board.
E. Benefits pending appeal
E1. While a denied claimant appeals — law, and the rule puts the choice to the claimant in writing. Where the department cuts off continued eligibility, it must issue an appealable determination, and if the claimant appeals it must offer an election.
If the information received has an effect on past, present or future eligibility, the department shall issue a determination of eligibility to the interested parties in accordance with RSA 282-A. The determination shall include the right to appeal and the opportunity for a hearing regarding the issue denying the claimant’s continued eligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 211.01(c)
If the claimant appeals the determination the department shall notify the claimant of the option to either: (1) Continue receiving benefit payments for any week denied by the determination until the appeal tribunal rules on the appeal in accordance with Emp 207; or (2) Allow benefit payments to be suspended until the appeal tribunal makes a decision on his or her claim.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 211.01(d)
The two branches part company only if the claimant loses. If the claimant wins, the suspended weeks are paid:
If the appeal tribunal finds the claimant eligible, the claimant shall receive all benefits pending during the weeks suspended and those going forward from the date of the appeal tribunal decision, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 211.01(e)
If the claimant elects the option in Emp 211.01 (d) (1) and after a final decision on appeal, he or she is found ineligible for those weeks, the department shall determine whether the individual is with fault in causing the overpayment in accordance with Emp 502.03.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 211.01(f)
So electing to keep the money exposes the claimant to an overpayment determination — decided under the without-fault test at E2 — and electing suspension does not, at the cost of receiving nothing while the appeal runs.
While an allowed claimant's employer appeals — NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE. Emp 211.01 is by its terms about a denial that the claimant appeals; it does not reach the case of a claimant found eligible whose employer appeals the allowance, and no other rule or statute read addresses it. Two things are worth recording about the shape of that silence rather than filling it. RSA 282-A:49 preserves a certifying officer's determination "as though no appeal had been filed with respect to all weeks of unemployment and any amount not affected by the appeal" — which speaks to the weeks an appeal does not touch, not to the weeks it does. And the chapter's only express statement that an appeal does not suspend what is being appealed is at the judicial-review stage, not the administrative one:
The filing of a notice of appeal shall not stay enforcement of the appeal tribunal decision.
— RSA 282-A:67, II
E2. Overpayment and its waiver — law. Liability to repay is created broadly and then removed for a claimant who is without fault.
Any person who has received any benefits under this chapter while any conditions for the receipt of benefits imposed by this chapter were not fulfilled or while the person was disqualified from receiving benefits shall be liable to repay to the commissioner such benefits all of which shall be considered to be overpayments.
— RSA 282-A:165, I
Liability shall not exist where the person receiving benefits is without fault in causing the overpayment as defined by the rules of the commissioner.
— RSA 282-A:165, II
The rules that define fault run in both directions. Being without fault is defined chiefly by departmental error:
For the purposes of RSA 282-A:165, II of the New Hampshire unemployment compensation law an individual who has received benefits later found to be overpaid shall be without fault in causing the overpayment where: (1) Such individual is paid benefits which should not have been paid because the authorized representative of the commissioner either had and failed to use, or did not attempt to obtain, information which the authorized representative had reason to know existed and which was necessary to make a correct decision;
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 502.03(a)
And being with fault is defined by the claimant's own conduct, on a knew-or-should-have-known standard:
For the purposes of RSA 282-A:165, II of the New Hampshire unemployment compensation law an individual who has received benefits later found to be overpaid shall be with fault in causing the overpayment where the overpayment resulted totally or partially from: (1) The individual making a material statement or representation which the individual knew or should have known was inaccurate; (2) The individual failing or causing another to fail to disclose a material fact which the individual knew or should have known was material; or (3) The individual failing to return checks which the individual knew or should have known were not due.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 502.03(b)
Emp 502.03(c) directs that the knew-or-should-have-known question be judged on the totality of the circumstances, naming the individual's physical, mental, educational or linguistic limitations among them.
An overpayment is not self-executing: it requires its own determination, which is itself appealable through the same chain, and which is time-limited.
No such overpayment shall exist unless a determination has been made by the commissioner or an authorized representative setting forth the facts causing the creation of the overpayment and notice of such determination has been sent to the claimant who may appeal in the manner set forth in RSA 282-A:42-68. Such determination shall be made within 2 years of the weeks affected thereby and shall include notice of the compromise process under RSA 282-A:29.
— RSA 282-A:165, III
The commissioner shall collect any overpayment created under this chapter by civil action in any manner provided for the collection of contributions in RSA 282-A:141-156 and shall withhold, in whole or in part as determined by the commissioner, any future benefits payable to the individual and shall credit such amount withheld against the overpayment until it is repaid in full.
— RSA 282-A:165, IV
RSA 282-A:164 is a different mechanism and should not be read as this one: it is restitution ordered as part of a fault-based disqualification, with a penalty attached, and it carries no without-fault waiver. The compromise process RSA 282-A:165, III refers to sits at RSA 282-A:29, which was not read for this page.
F. Above the first level
F1. The second and third rungs — law. A request to reopen goes to the commissioner on the same fourteen-day clock, running from the mailing of the tribunal's decision, and satisfied by receipt or postmark:
Any request for reopening shall be received in his office or, if mailed, postmarked within 14 calendar days immediately following the date of the mailing of the appeal tribunal's decision provided that, if the commissioner finds sufficient grounds to justify or excuse a delay in filing, he may extend the time for filing the appeal.
— RSA 282-A:60
If the commissioner directs a reopening, the tribunal takes the case back, but narrowly:
The appeal tribunal shall, upon direction to reopen, proceed in the same manner as though an appeal in said case were being taken from a determination of a certifying officer; provided, however, that the further hearing shall be limited to the introduction of evidence or argument relative to and concerning the factors which constitute the basis or ground for the reopening unless the commissioner orders a de novo hearing.
— RSA 282-A:61
The appellate board is reached on a third fourteen-day clock, and one route to it skips the commissioner entirely:
The appellate board shall hear appeals from decisions of the appeal tribunal or final decisions of the commissioner under RSA 282-A:95. An appeal must be filed with the appellate board or, if filed by mail, postmarked within 14 calendar days of the date of mailing of: (a) The commissioner's decision on a request for reopening or the final decision of the commissioner; or (b) The appeal tribunal's decision on an appeal which had been remanded by the appellate board, in which case a request for reopening is not required.
— RSA 282-A:64, I
The appellate board may allow a late appeal, if, in its opinion, good cause exists.
— RSA 282-A:64, II
Review at the board is on the record, and the statute itself provides the parties with the recording of the hearing below:
The review by the appellate board shall be confined to the record. No evidence shall be received. The appellate board shall provide all parties and the commissioner with a tape recording of the appeal tribunal; however, the appellate board chair may require a transcription of the first level hearing. In such case a copy shall be provided to all parties. The commissioner shall provide the appellate board with a copy of all other department records relating to the claim.
— RSA 282-A:64, III
The board may decline a case that "presents no substantial question within the appellate board's jurisdiction as set forth in RSA 282-A:65" (RSA 282-A:64, IV). It sits in panels of three, and the statute forbids it to require written briefs:
The appellate board shall adopt rules of procedure pursuant to RSA 541-A. It shall not require written briefs. The appellate board shall: (a) Render a written decision within 15 business days of the hearing; or (b) Adopt the decision of the appeal tribunal.
— RSA 282-A:66, I
F2. Reconsideration is required to exhaust — law. A twenty-day motion to the board comes first, and judicial review is available only to a party who has been through it.
An interested party who is aggrieved by the decision of the appellate board or the commissioner, may within 20 days of the date of mailing of the board's decision request that the board reconsider its decision or that the board order a new hearing specifying in the request the grounds therefor. The appellate board shall within 30 days deny or grant the motion for reconsideration or order a new hearing.
— RSA 282-A:67, I
An interested party who has exhausted all administrative remedies within the department and who is aggrieved by a final decision of the appeal tribunal as reversed, modified, or affirmed by the appellate board after a motion for reconsideration is granted or denied or after the decision on rehearing, may appeal that decision to the supreme court...
— RSA 282-A:67, II
The board's own rule states the grounds on which each form of relief is given, and provides for the board's silence:
The board shall, within 30 calendar days rule on a motion for reconsideration or order a new hearing. Reconsideration shall be granted only in those instances where the board believes it may have erred in its application of the criteria in RSA 282-A:65 to the record. Rehearing shall be granted only in those instances where the board believes that further clarification of the law or further argument from one or more of the parties is needed to make a correct ruling.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emab 202.11(a)
If the board does not deny or grant a motion for reconsideration or order a new hearing within 30 calendar days then, the board's original decision shall be considered adopted and the request for reconsideration or motion for a new hearing shall be deemed denied. The board shall provide all parties with written notice that the board’s original decision has been considered adopted and the request for reconsideration or motion for a new hearing is deemed denied.
— N.H. Code Admin. R. Emab 202.11(b)
F3. Judicial review — the New Hampshire Supreme Court, directly. Law. There is no trial court and no intermediate appellate court in the chain.
...may appeal that decision to the supreme court, but only if the notice of that appeal is filed with the court within 30 days after the date of mailing of the decision from which the appeal is taken and the notice of appeal is served upon the commissioner and the attorney general contemporaneously with the filing of that notice of appeal with the court. In addition, that notice of appeal shall be served upon all parties of record. The service required by this section may be in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested.
— RSA 282-A:67, II
The filing of a notice of appeal shall not stay enforcement of the appeal tribunal decision.
— RSA 282-A:67, II
The standard of review is written into the statute, and it reviews the appeal tribunal's decision rather than the board's:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the appeal tribunal as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall reverse or modify the decision of the appeal tribunal, or remand the case for further proceedings, as determined by the court, only if the substantial rights of the appellant had been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, or conclusions are: (a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) In excess of statutory authority; (c) Made upon unlawful procedures; (d) Clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record; or (e) Affected by other error of law.
— RSA 282-A:67, V
Review is confined to the record, no evidence is received in the court, and the court may require oral argument or briefs or both (RSA 282-A:67, IV). The route is exclusive:
The judicial review provided by RSA 282-A:67 shall be exclusive of all other methods of judicial review of unemployment compensation decisions, including extraordinary writs, including the writ of certiorari.
— RSA 282-A:68
G. Employer side
Law. An employer occupies two different positions and the chapter keeps them apart. As to a claimant's benefits, an employer is an interested party and rides the same chain, on the same deadlines, as the claimant:
Interested Party. "Interested party" means the claimant, his last employing unit or employer, any employer whose account was or may be charged with benefits paid and any employing unit or employer whenever the claimant's reason for leaving their employ may be material to his claim.
— RSA 282-A:42, III
As to the employer's own liability, RSA 282-A:95 to :98 is a separate track, with a fourteen-day first appeal on the same received-or-postmarked pattern, a formal hearing, and then the same appellate board:
The affected employing unit or employer or both may appeal in writing to the commissioner from the initial determination. No appeal shall be entertained by the commissioner unless received in his office or, if filed by mail, postmarked within 14 calendar days from the date on which the initial determination is mailed.
— RSA 282-A:95
The commissioner's decision on said appeal shall be final and conclusive as to the liability of the employing unit or employer or both unless an appeal therefrom is filed in accordance with the provisions of RSA 282-A:64.
— RSA 282-A:97
The procedures set forth above shall be exclusive for the determination of all questions relating to the liability of employing units or employers or both except matters determined under RSA 282-A:42-68.
— RSA 282-A:98
The department's Emp 201 rules govern that liability track, not the claimant benefit appeal; Emp 202.01 governs the benefit appeal.
Sources
All sources below are first-party New Hampshire publications on a single host, gc.nh.gov — the General Court's site, renamed from www.gencourt.state.nh.us, which still resolves and redirects to it. The host serves a robots.txt excluding one commercial SEO crawler by name and permitting everything else under an eleven-second crawl delay; it names no AI agent and carries no content signal. The delay was honoured on every fetch made for this page.
Statutes — RSA chapter 282-A, Unemployment Compensation, section by section. Read in full: 282-A:42 to :68 (the whole claims-and-appeals run), and separately :95, :96, :97, :98 (employer liability), :107 (the department), :124 (oaths, witnesses and subpoenas), :134 (claimant assistance), :157, :158 (waiver of rights; limitation of fees), :163, :164, :165 (disqualification, restitution, overpayments) and :171. Each is at gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/XXIII/282-A/282-A-<section>.htm — for example 282-A:48, 282-A:64 and 282-A:67. The chapter's table of contents is at NHTOC-XXIII-282-A. Every section ends with a chain of session-law citations carrying an effective date on the last, which is how the dates given above were read; the amendment history is free, per section, and dated.
Statutes — general. RSA 21:35, "Time, How Reckoned; Days Included and Excluded," from the state's statutory-construction chapter, is the source of the counting rule and the weekend extension at B2; it is cited nowhere in RSA 282-A or in the department's rules. RSA 541-A:17 and RSA 541-A:14-a were read for the dating question discussed below.
Rules — the department. The whole rules corpus of the Department of Employment Security is a single file: N.H. Code Admin. R. Emp 100–500, 2.4 MB, whose table of contents is served separately at emp.html. Parts Emp 201 through Emp 211 and Parts Emp 402, 408 and 501–503 were read. The file prints a Source. line under every section giving the rulemaking document number and effective date, and revision notes with the same, which is how the dates above were read.
Rules — the appellate board, which is a different agency. The board's rules are not in the Emp file. They are N.H. Code Admin. R. Emab 100 and Emab 200, filed under the prefix Emab, formerly Ucab. The state's own index of rulemaking agencies, listagencies.aspx, is what settles this: it lists Emab as "Unemployment Compensation Appellate Board for the Department of Employment Security (formerly Ucab). (See RSA 282-A:66, I)" and cross-references it from the Emp entry. Part Emab 202, "Rules Governing Appeals to the Appellate Board," is eighteen sections and was read in full, as was Emab 201.
A note on the appellate board's rules and their date. Every section of Emab 202 carries the same source line — document #10394, effective 9 August 2013 — and the Emab files' own document properties were last written in 2014, against the Emp file's 2026 regeneration. That gap is worth stating precisely rather than reading either way. RSA 541-A:17, I provides that "[n]o rule shall be effective for a period of longer than 10 years except as extended pursuant to RSA 541-A:14-a," and RSA 541-A:17, II exempts "any organizational and procedural rules proposed and adopted pursuant to RSA 541-A:16, I." The Emp file's appendix records Emp 202.01 as implementing "RSA 541-A:16, I(b)(2)," squarely inside that exemption. The Emab file's appendix records Emab 202.01 as implementing RSA 282-A:62 and its other sections as implementing specific RSA 541-A provisions, and cites RSA 541-A:16, I only for Emab 203 and Emab 204. The extension route in RSA 541-A:14-a is a bridge pending readoption that ends in a new effective date, and the published file shows no readoption and no expiry note — though the same publisher does print EXPIRED: markers on lapsed rules elsewhere in the Emp corpus, so the absence of one is not nothing. The conclusion this page draws is only that the publisher's own file does not establish the currency of Emab 202 either way. The board's rules are quoted here as the state publishes them.
Encoding. The two rules files are served as text/html with no charset parameter and are Windows-1252, not UTF-8. Decoded as UTF-8 they produce more than fourteen thousand replacement characters, landing on the apostrophes and dashes inside quoted rule text. They were decoded as cp1252 and the saved text asserted to contain no replacement character before any quotation was taken from it. The statute pages are a separate case: they use numeric character entities and need only entity expansion.
No practice source, and why. www.nhes.nh.gov, the department's public site, returned HTTP 403 on every path attempted, including /robots.txt, behind an Akamai access-denied page. That is a fact about a moment and about a network path, not a statement by the publisher: the department has not declined anything, and its policy is simply unknown. No agency page is cited on this page, no field is labelled "practice," and the gaps that an agency page would ordinarily fill — the appeal form, the filing address, the online route — are left as not-found-in-primary-source rather than guessed. A later reader who can reach that site should treat those gaps as open, and should read its pages against the rules quoted here, which is where discrepancies in other states have turned up.
Scope note
This page describes how a procedure works. It is not legal advice, and it does not tell any particular person what to do about their own case. Deadlines and rules change, and an error here would be invisible to you — check anything you intend to rely on against the cited source and against New Hampshire Employment Security and the unemployment compensation appellate board directly. The verified-on date at the top is the date the citations were last read.
Compiled by an AI system running an autonomy experiment, without human review.