Louisiana — unemployment insurance benefit appeals

Agency

Louisiana Works — the statute's "administrator" is its secretary (La. R.S. 23:1472(1)), and the program sits in the office of unemployment insurance administration (La. R.S. 23:1651)

First-level body

Appeal referee (La. R.S. 23:1628) — the rules and the agency call the same officer an administrative law judge, sitting in what the rules name the Appeals Tribunal

Second-level body

Board of Review (La. R.S. 23:1652) — five members appointed by the governor with Senate consent: one from the public, two from labor, two from management

Verified

2026-08-22

A. Bodies

A1. Agency

Law. The chapter of the Revised Statutes governing unemployment compensation is titled the "Louisiana Employment Security Law." The official charged with running it is the "administrator," a defined term:

"Administrator" means the secretary of Louisiana Works.

— La. R.S. 23:1472(1)

The statutes also create a dedicated internal office for the program:

There is created the office of unemployment insurance administration, which shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 36:304(A)(6).

— La. R.S. 23:1651

The administrator's general powers are broad and largely self-executing:

The administrator shall administer this Chapter, and to that end he may adopt, amend, or rescind such rules and regulations, employ such persons, make such expenditures, require such reports, make such investigations, and take such other action as he deems necessary.

— La. R.S. 23:1653(A)

Law — naming trap. The agency's name in the statute books and on the agency's own current website is "Louisiana Works" (see R.S. 23:1472(1), 1628, 1657, quoted above and below). But the administrative rules that govern the appeal process — the same rules quoted throughout this page — were promulgated under, and still recite, the prior name. For example, the amendment history to the appeal-filing rule reads:

amended by the Workforce Commission, Office of Unemployment Insurance, LR 39:2312 (August 2013), repromulgated LR 39:3101 (November 2013)

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-109, Notes

The newest of the nineteen sections in the appeal-procedure rule chapter is dated February 2014, and it too was promulgated by the "Workforce Commission." No rule in that chapter has been repromulgated to substitute "Louisiana Works" for "Louisiana Workforce Commission" or its predecessor names. Both names are quoted here exactly as each source prints them; neither has been modernized to match the other.

A2. First-level body

Law. The first-level adjudicator is appointed under a statute that calls the position an "appeal referee":

To hear and decide appealed claims, the secretary of Louisiana Works shall with the approval of the governor appoint one or more impartial appeal referees all of whom shall complete a course of study prescribed by the administrator of Louisiana Works, by rule, to ensure competency prior to their participation in any claim resolution under this Chapter.

— La. R.S. 23:1628

The statute also disqualifies a referee from sitting on a case in which he has a personal stake ("No referee shall participate in any case in which he is an interested party," R.S. 23:1628). The rule implementing the statute's "course of study" requirement describes a training curriculum rather than a credentialing exam:

Prior to participation in any claim resolution, newly hired administrative law judges will participate in web-based and/or in-person training on: agency policy and precedent, benefits analysis, the unemployment insurance system, the appeals process, and the proper methods for conducting hearings and writing decisions according to federal quality standards.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-303

Inference — naming trap. R.S. 23:1628 and 1629 use only the term "appeal referee." Louisiana Admin. Code tit. 40, Part IV, Subpart 1, Chapter 1 (§§ IV-113 through IV-135) uses only the term "administrative law judge" for the identical first-level hearing officer, and the agency's claimant FAQ does the same ("you are requesting a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge"). No source in this set states in so many words that "appeal referee" and "administrative law judge" name the same office; that they do is inferred from the two sets of rules and statutes describing the same appointment, the same appeal-referee-level hearing, and the same decision process under a different label in each text family. Both terms are used below as the sources use them, without silently substituting one for the other.

A3. Second-level body

Law. The second-level body is the Board of Review, a five-member panel:

The board of review shall consist of five members appointed by the governor, with the consent of the Senate. The governor shall, immediately after the effective date of this Section, appoint the initial five members for overlapping terms of two, three, four, five and six years each. Their successors shall be appointed for six years each. The board shall elect a chairman; the election is to be held within thirty days after July one of each odd-number year. The board of review shall be composed of a representative from the public generally, two representatives from labor, and two representatives from management, each of whom shall be regarded as fairly representative because of his vocation, employment, or affiliation. Three members shall constitute a quorum. Each member shall be paid from the Employment Security Administration Fund ninety dollars per day of active service plus necessary travel expenses subject to the approval of the secretary, in conformity with agency travel regulations.

— La. R.S. 23:1652

The governor may remove a member for cause, after notice and hearing and with Senate consent, and vacancies are filled the same way as initial appointments (R.S. 23:1652). The rule chapter separately addresses the board's internal organization. On where the board sits, the rule as printed reads:

The Office of the Board of Review, hereinafter referred to as "the board," shall be domiciled in the Office of Regulatory Services Administrative Office Building in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-101(A)

Section IV-101 goes on to provide that the board elects a chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary from its own membership (§ IV-101(B)), and § IV-103 requires the chairman to call meetings and to give the members at least three days' written notice unless notice is waived. On the number of members needed to act, the rule text as currently printed reads:

Except as otherwise expressly provided in these rules, two members of the board shall constitute a quorum, until January 1, 1989, at which time three members will constitute a quorum, as per Act R.S. 23:1652 of the 1988 Regular Session of Louisiana Legislature.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-105(A)

Law — reporting the text as printed. Section IV-105 is written as a then-future transition: a two-member quorum until January 1, 1989, and a three-member quorum from that date forward. The statute's current text, quoted above, states flatly that "three members shall constitute a quorum" (R.S. 23:1652), with no two-member phase mentioned. Both are quoted above exactly as each source prints them; § IV-105 has not been rewritten to drop the now-passed 1989 transition language, and this page does not smooth that over. Likewise, § IV-101 names a specific building — the "Office of Regulatory Services Administrative Office Building in Baton Rouge, Louisiana" — as the board's domicile; that is what the rule says, reported here without independent confirmation that the board still occupies that building today.

B. First-level appeal

B1. Deadline

Law. The controlling statute for an appeal from an initial determination gives the party fifteen days:

Within fifteen days after notification was given or was mailed to his last known address, the claimant or any other party entitled to notice of a determination may file an appeal from such determination with an appeal referee either by mailing such appeal, as evidenced by the postmarked date, or by delivering such appeal.

— La. R.S. 23:1629(A)(1)

The implementing rule restates the same fifteen-day period, in its own wording:

The party appealing from the agency's initial determination shall file a written appeal, setting forth information required therein within 15 days after date notification was given or was mailed to his last known address.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-109(A)

Law — trap: three formulations of the start date. R.S. 23:1629(A)(1) starts the clock "after notification was given or was mailed to his last known address." Section IV-109(A) starts it "after date notification was given or was mailed" (no "last known address" clause on the giving branch). The agency's claimant FAQ states the same fifteen-day period two different ways in the same paragraph: "you may appeal that determination within 15 days of the mailing date of the document," and, two sentences later, "the letter must be postmarked no more than 15 days from the date of the determination." All are printed above or below as written; this page does not reconcile "notification was given," "mailing date of the document," and "date of the determination" into a single rule, because the sources themselves do not.

Law. A structurally separate fifteen-day statute governs labor-dispute determinations specifically:

Such determination shall be the final decision on the claim, unless within fifteen days after the date notification was given or was mailed to a party's last known address, an appeal is filed with an appeal referee.

— La. R.S. 23:1627

Law — a different route, same number of days. R.S. 23:1626(B) creates a fifteen-day period that is not an appeal at all, but a protest to the administrator against a nonmonetary determination, triggering the administrator's own reconsideration rather than referee review:

either of the parties entitled to notice of determination as specified in R.S. 23:1625 protests the decision within fifteen days from the date of the determination

— La. R.S. 23:1626(B)

If the administrator finds the protest evidence insufficient to justify a redetermination, R.S. 23:1626(B) directs that the protest be transferred, without a further determination, to the appeal referee for appeal proceedings — but the protest itself, filed under 1626(B), is a distinct procedural track from the appeal filed under 1629(A)(1), even though both run fifteen days from the determination.

Law. Section IV-109(D) fixes how a party proves an appeal was mailed on time:

Proof of the timeliness of mailing a request for appeal shall be shown only by the date indicated on the electronic transmission, by a legible official United States postmark, or by official receipt or certificate from the United States Postal Service made at the time of mailing which indicates the date thereof. In the event that the date of the electronic transmission or postmark is absent, illegible, or manifestly incorrect, the date that the request is received in the Appeals Tribunal or Board of Review office shall determine whether the appeal was timely filed.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-109(D)

This provision matters because it forecloses other kinds of proof of mailing date (for example, a party's own affidavit of the date mailed, unsupported by a postmark or USPS receipt) as a way to establish timeliness — if the electronic date or postmark is missing, illegible, or wrong, the rule falls back to the date of actual receipt by the Appeals Tribunal or Board of Review, not to any other evidence of the mailing date.

Law — a general statute nobody in this chain cites. Section IV-109(D) is not the only provision fixing when a mailed filing counts. Title 1 of the Revised Statutes carries a timely-filing rule that reaches state agencies generally and opens by overriding everything else:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the filing of papers, including but not limited to applications, forms, reports, returns, statements, and filings of any kind with the state, its agencies, boards, and commissions shall be deemed timely in either of the following cases: (1) The papers are delivered on or before the due date. (2) The papers are mailed on or before the due date.

— La. R.S. 1:60(A)

The same paragraph then adds a presumption that § IV-109(D) does not contain:

If the papers are received by mail on the first working day following the due date, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that they were timely filed. In all cases where the presumption does not apply, the timeliness of the mailing shall be shown only by an official United States postmark or by official receipt or certificate from the United States Postal Service made at the time of mailing which indicates the date thereof.

— La. R.S. 1:60(A)(2)

The two texts overlap almost word for word on how a mailing date is proved — postmark or postal receipt — and diverge in two places: § IV-109(D) adds the date on an electronic transmission, which R.S. 1:60 does not mention, and R.S. 1:60 adds the first-working-day presumption, which § IV-109(D) does not mention. R.S. 1:60 excludes some bodies from its reach by name:

The provisions of this Section shall not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of government, the Department of State, the Department of Revenue, or to adjudications conducted pursuant to Chapter 13-B of Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.

— La. R.S. 1:60(B)

Neither the labor department nor its appeals tribunal nor the board of review is named in that exclusion list. Nothing in R.S. 23:1629, in R.S. 23:1630, in the rule chapter, or on the agency's appeal pages refers to R.S. 1:60, and this page does not assert how the two would be reconciled in a particular case — it records that both exist and that they are not identical.

B2. Weekend and holiday rule

Law — trap. Two provisions in the rule chapter speak to weekends and holidays, and read together they point toward no extension for these particular deadlines. The general rule on computing rule-prescribed time periods is:

Whenever these rules prescribe a time for the performance of any act, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays (half holiday is considered a legal holiday) in the state of Louisiana shall count as any other days, except that when the time prescribed for the performance of an act expired on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday in Louisiana, such time shall extend to and include the next succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or such legal holiday, provided that, when the time for performing any act is prescribed by statute, nothing in these rules shall be deemed to be a limitation or extension of the statutory time fixed.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-107(A)

Read alone, the first half of § IV-107(A) extends a period ending on a weekend or legal holiday to the next non-holiday weekday. But the fifteen-day appeal periods addressed on this page are fixed by statute — R.S. 23:1629(A)(1), 23:1630(A), and 23:1627 — and § IV-107(A)'s own final clause (the "provided that" proviso) removes statutory time periods from the rule's extension: "nothing in these rules shall be deemed to be a limitation or extension of the statutory time fixed." A second, appeal-specific provision addresses the same point even more directly:

Legal holidays and days on which the Louisiana Workforce Commission is closed shall not serve to extend the delay periods specified in R.S. 23:1629 and R.S. 23:1630.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-109(C)

Law — what these two texts do and do not cover. Section IV-109(C) affirmatively states that legal holidays and agency-closure days do not extend the R.S. 23:1629 and R.S. 23:1630 delay periods — it says nothing one way or the other about a period that ends specifically on a Saturday or a Sunday (as opposed to a legal holiday or a closure day) as its own separate category. Section IV-107(A) does address Saturdays and Sundays by name, but its own proviso removes statutorily prescribed periods — which the 1629 and 1630 fifteen-day periods are — from that extension. Between the two, no provision in this rule chapter or in R.S. 23:1629 or 23:1630 themselves was found that extends a fifteen-day appeal period ending on a Saturday or Sunday to the following business day. That absence is reported as found; it is not a certainty that no such rule exists anywhere in Louisiana law outside the sources reviewed for this page.

Law — the general law was opened rather than assumed silent, and it does not agree with the rule. Louisiana's general-provisions title has no computation-of-time section: R.S. 1:1 through 1:17 are rules of construction about citation, retroactivity, words and phrases, figures, number, gender, headings, cross-references and repeals, and none of them counts days. Two provisions outside the unemployment chapter do bear on the question, and neither is cited anywhere in that chapter or in the appeal rules. The first defines the term the rule uses:

The following shall be days of public rest and legal holidays: Sundays; January 1, New Year's Day; January 8, Battle of New Orleans; the third Monday in January, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Birthday; the third Monday in February, Washington's Birthday and Presidents' Day; the day of Mardi Gras; Good Friday; the last Monday in May, National Memorial Day; July 4, Independence Day; August 30, Huey P. Long Day; the first Monday in September, Labor Day; the second Monday in October, Christopher Columbus Day; November 1, All Saints' Day; November 11, Veterans' Day; the fourth Thursday in November, Thanksgiving Day; December 25, Christmas Day; Inauguration Day in the city of Baton Rouge

— La. R.S. 1:55(A)(1)

Saturday is not on that statewide list. It appears in the same paragraph as a local exception:

provided, however, that in the parish of Orleans, the city of Baton Rouge, in each of the parishes comprising the second and sixth congressional districts, except the parish of Ascension, and in each of the parishes comprising the fourteenth and thirty-first judicial districts of the state, the whole of every Saturday shall be a legal holiday

— La. R.S. 1:55(A)(1)

So under Louisiana's own definition, Sunday is a legal holiday everywhere in the state and Saturday is a legal holiday only in the parishes and districts that paragraph names.

Law — and a Code of Civil Procedure article that says the opposite of § IV-109(C). Article 5059 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a computation rule that by its own opening words is not confined to acts performed in court:

In computing a period of time allowed or prescribed by law or by order of court, the date of the act, event, or default from which the period begins to run is not included. The last day of the period is included, unless it is a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a legal holiday.

— La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 5059(A)

Paragraph D of the same article addresses administrative appeals by name:

A legal holiday shall be excluded in the computation of a period of time allowed or prescribed to seek rehearing, reconsideration, or judicial review or appeal of a decision or order by an agency in the executive branch of state government.

— La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 5059(D)(1)

That paragraph carries its own list of bodies it does not reach, and the labor agency is not among them:

Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph shall not apply to the computation of a period of time allowed or prescribed to seek rehearing, reconsideration, or judicial review or appeal of a decision or order by the Department of Revenue, the Department of Environmental Quality, or the Department of Insurance relative to examination reports in R.S. 22:1983.

— La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 5059(D)(2)

Law — what that leaves. Article 5059(D)(1) says a legal holiday shall be excluded in computing the time to appeal an executive-branch agency's decision. Section IV-109(C) says legal holidays shall not serve to extend the R.S. 23:1629 and R.S. 23:1630 delay periods. The two instruments state opposite results for the same day. The dates are checkable on the face of each source: article 5059 carries the amendment chain "Acts 2018, No. 128, §1; Acts 2019, No. 300, §1; Acts 2025, No. 250, §3," and § IV-109 was last amended at LR 39:2312 (August 2013) and repromulgated at LR 39:3101 (November 2013), so the article is both the later instrument and the one enacted by the legislature. Nothing read for this page cites either text to the other, and no decision resolving them was consulted — that is beyond what this page covers. What is on the record is that a claimant counting fifteen days over a Louisiana legal holiday is counting under two instruments that disagree, and that whether a Saturday is one of those holidays depends on the parish.

B3. How to file

Law. The filing-method language sits in the same sentence as the deadline quoted in B1:

the claimant or any other party entitled to notice of a determination may file an appeal from such determination with an appeal referee either by mailing such appeal, as evidenced by the postmarked date, or by delivering such appeal

— La. R.S. 23:1629(A)(1)

The rule chapter broadens what counts as an appeal beyond a formal notice of appeal:

It is hereby further provided that any communication written by claimant or employer to the Louisiana Workforce Commission or the board disputing the determination or appeal decision may be accepted as an appeal, provided said written communication is received by any office of the Louisiana Workforce Commission or by the board within 15 days after notification, was given or was mailed to his last known address.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-109(B)

Law. What the determination notice itself must tell the claimant is addressed at two levels. The rule requires the notice to disclose the existence, place, manner, and time limit of the appeal right:

Each notice of benefit determination which the administrator is required to furnish the claimant shall, in addition to stating the decision and its reason, include a notice specifying the claimant's appeal rights. The notice of appeal rights shall state clearly the place and manner for taking an appeal from the determination and the period within which an appeal may be taken.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-351(A)

The underlying statutes require notice of the determination and its reasons in the first place — R.S. 23:1624 for the initial monetary determination ("notice of this monetary determination shall be delivered to the claimant") and R.S. 23:1625 for a determination involving a disqualification ("notice of the determination together with the reasons therefor shall be promptly delivered to the claimant and to the employer... or mailed to their last known address") — but neither 1624 nor 1625 itself spells out the content of the appeal-rights notice; that content requirement comes from § IV-351(A) above.

Practice. The agency's claimant FAQ describes three channels and an address for a mailed appeal, none of which appears in the statute or rule text reviewed for this page:

There are three methods of filing an appeal: on-line @ www.LouisianaWORKS.net, by mail addressed to: Louisiana Works, Appeals Unit, P. O. Box 94094, Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9094 or fax to (225) 342-4223. If mailed, the letter must be postmarked no more than 15 days from the date of the determination and must be signed by the person filing the appeal.

— Louisiana Works, UI Claimant Appeals FAQ (accessed as stamped, last updated May 15, 2026)

B4. Late appeals

Law — trap: no good-cause exception found. R.S. 23:1629 and R.S. 23:1630 were checked, along with the full nineteen-section rule chapter (LAC §§ IV-101 through IV-137) and the two further Chapter 3 rules bearing on appeals (§§ IV-303, IV-351). None of them contains a provision permitting a late-filed first-level appeal (i.e., one filed after the fifteen days run under R.S. 23:1629(A)(1)) to be accepted on a showing of good cause, excusable neglect, or any similar standard. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE.

The good-cause language that does appear in this rule chapter is addressed to two different problems, neither of which is a late-filed appeal. Section IV-113(D) sets the standard for excusing a party's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing or for granting a "reopening" of a decision already issued:

The administrative law judge or the board of review shall make a determination of good cause for failure to appear only if the written request for reopening or the appeal filed by the party contains a statement of the reason(s) for his failure to act in a timely manner and reasonably justifies a finding of good cause to excuse such failure.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-113(D)(1)

That standard governs a request for reopening, which § IV-113(B) fixes at "within seven days of the date of mailing of the dismissal decision" — a different deadline, running from a different event (mailing of a dismissal or decision after a hearing was missed), than the fifteen-day period to file the first-level appeal itself. Section IV-113 nowhere states that its good-cause standard can be used to accept an appeal filed more than fifteen days after the determination was mailed; it is written throughout as an appear/reopen mechanism, not a late-appeal cure, and this page does not present it as one.

C. Hearing

C1. Format

Law. Nothing in the rule chapter prescribes telephone or in-person format for an appeal-referee hearing. § IV-113(B) and (C) both simply presuppose that either can occur. Subsection (B) speaks of an appellant who "fails to appear or fails to be available to participate in a telephone hearing," while subsection (C) speaks in the same breath of an appellee who "fails to appear at the scheduled hearing time of an in-person hearing, or fails to be available to receive the telephone call to participate in a scheduled telephone hearing." Neither provision says which format applies to a given case or who chooses.

If the appellee, who is the party whose agency determination is being appealed by another party before the appeals tribunal, fails to appear at the scheduled hearing time of an in-person hearing, or fails to be available to receive the telephone call to participate in a scheduled telephone hearing at the scheduled hearing time, the administrative law judge shall proceed to conduct the hearing and issue a decision on the merits based upon the administrative record and any evidence and testimony presented by the appellant.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-113(C)

Law. The statute that authorizes these rules leaves the "manner in which appealed claims shall be presented and the conduct of hearings" to the board's own regulations, rather than fixing a format itself.

The manner in which appealed claims shall be presented and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance with regulations prescribed by the board of review for determining the rights of the parties, whether or not such regulations conform to the usual rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure.

— La. R.S. 23:1631

Practice. The agency's own FAQ states that telephone is in fact the default format actually used.

Most hearings are conducted by telephone. The hearing notice will state the number on record for the claimant and this is the number the Administrative Law Judge will call, unless you update your telephone number.

— Louisiana Works, UI Claimant Appeals FAQ, "Where will the appeal hearing be held?"

Law. On notice of the hearing itself, § IV-111(A) and R.S. 23:1629(A)(1) independently fix the same seven-day minimum.

A notice of hearing shall be mailed to all parties to the appeal at least seven days prior to the date of the hearing, specifying the place, date and time of the hearing.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-111(A)

The statute repeats the same seven-day figure and adds detail about what the notice must be called and what accompanies it.

The appeal referee shall mail a "notice to appear for a hearing" to all parties to the appeal at least seven days prior to the date of hearing, and copies of the statements by the claimant and employer, which were used in the appealed determination, shall be sent with such notice if requested.

— La. R.S. 23:1629(A)(1)

Law. The statute — but not the rule and not the FAQ — also provides that a party can waive this seven-day notice period in writing, after the appeal is filed.

A party to an appeal may expressly waive the seven-day advance notice requirement by written waiver executed after the appeal has been filed. A copy of the written waiver shall be included in the record. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to dispense with the requirement that a "notice to appear for hearing" be mailed.

— La. R.S. 23:1629(A)(2)-(3)

Law. Two further, related default-and-reopening rules appear only in the rule chapter, not the statute or the FAQ. First, an appellant who is unreachable more than fifteen minutes into a telephone hearing (or fails to appear at an in-person one) is defaulted and the appeal dismissed:

If the appellant, who is the party who files the appeal before the Appeals Tribunal, fails to appear or fails to be available to participate in a telephone hearing within 15 minutes after the scheduled hearing time, the administrative law judge shall order the appellant in default and issue a dismissal of appeal. In such event, the agency determination shall become the final decision.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-113(B)

A defaulted appellant, or a non-appearing appellee against whom the ALJ instead proceeded to a decision on the merits, then has a separate seven-day clock — measured from mailing of the dismissal or decision, not from the missed hearing itself — to seek reopening for good cause:

The appellant either may file a written request for reopening before the administrative law judge, with a showing of good cause, within seven days of the date of mailing of the dismissal decision or may file an appeal before the board of review under §109 and §125.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-113(B)

Law. This is the only place in these sources where "good cause" is defined for the appeals process, and it governs failure to appear and reopening — not a late-filed appeal. The rule lists nine non-exclusive factors an ALJ or the board must weigh:

To determine whether good cause has been shown in a request for reopening or in an appeal to excuse the failure of a party to appear, the administrative law judge and the board of review shall consider any relevant factors, including, but not limited to: a. reasonably prudent behavior; b. untimely receipt of notice; c. administrative error; d. reasons beyond control or avoidance; e. reasons unforeseen; f. timely effort to request continuance; g. physical inabilities; h. degree of untimeliness; or i. prejudice to parties.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-113(D)(2)

Inference. Because § IV-113's good-cause standard is textually confined to non-appearance and reopening (and, separately, to admission of newly discovered evidence under § IV-113(D)(5)), it does not on its face supply a good-cause exception to a missed fifteen-day appeal deadline; no such exception appears anywhere else in these sources either.

C2. Who presides

Law. The statute assigns hearings to "appeal referees" appointed by the secretary, who must complete a prescribed training course and may not sit on a case in which they have an interest.

To hear and decide appealed claims, the secretary of Louisiana Works shall with the approval of the governor appoint one or more impartial appeal referees all of whom shall complete a course of study prescribed by the administrator of Louisiana Works, by rule, to ensure competency prior to their participation in any claim resolution under this Chapter. Each referee shall be selected in accordance with R.S. 23:1656 and 1657. No referee shall participate in any case in which he is an interested party.

— La. R.S. 23:1628

Law. The rule chapter, written later, calls the same office an "administrative law judge" throughout rather than "appeal referee." Both terms describe the same first-level hearing officer under two different names, statute versus rule and agency usage.

The administrative law judge shall preside over the hearing. All testimony shall be given under oath or affirmation. The administrative law judge shall have the right to question and cross-examine all witnesses. Each party to the appeal, or their representatives, shall have the right to question their own witnesses and to cross-examine the opposing parties and witnesses.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-115(A)

Law. A separate, broader conflict-of-interest bar applies to anyone participating on behalf of the administrator or the board, not just referees.

No person shall participate on behalf of the administrator or the board of review in any case in which he has a direct or indirect interest.

— La. R.S. 23:1631

Law. The rules also impose a training requirement on newly hired administrative law judges before they take part in any claim resolution.

Prior to participation in any claim resolution, newly hired administrative law judges will participate in web-based and/or in-person training on: agency policy and precedent, benefits analysis, the unemployment insurance system, the appeals process, and the proper methods for conducting hearings and writing decisions according to federal quality standards.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-303(A)

C3. Record and evidence

Law. The controlling sentence on the record is in the statute, not the rules: a record is always kept, but it is transcribed only if the case moves to further review.

A record shall be kept of all testimony and proceedings in connection with an appeal, but the testimony need not be transcribed unless further review is initiated.

— La. R.S. 23:1631

Law. The same statutory section allows consolidation of hearings where the evidence overlaps, at the referee's discretion and subject to a no-prejudice condition.

When the same or substantially similar evidence is relevant and material to the matters in issue in claims by more than one individual or in claims by a single individual with respect to two or more weeks of unemployment, the same time and place for considering each claim may be fixed, hearings thereon jointly conducted, a single record of the proceedings made, and the evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding considered as introduced in the others, if in the judgment of the referee having jurisdiction of the proceeding such consolidation would not be prejudicial to any party.

— La. R.S. 23:1631

Law. On admissibility, the rules set a pertinence requirement and relax the ordinary rules of evidence.

Only testimony pertinent to the issue involved in the appeal shall be admitted by the administrative law judge.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-115(B)

That relaxation is itself qualified, not open-ended.

Technical rules of evidence need not be complied with so long as all parties are given an opportunity to fully present their case.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-115(C)

Law. Hearsay is admissible, but the rule limits what an ALJ may do with it.

Hearsay testimony is admissible, but may only be considered by the administrative law judge in making his decision to substantiate or corroborate other direct evidence.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-115(D)

Law. One category of evidence is barred outright.

Expunged criminal records shall not be deemed admissible evidence.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-115(E)

Law. The rules also let either party or the ALJ exclude witnesses from the hearing room and restrict what excluded witnesses may discuss.

Either party or the administrative law judge may require that a witness may be excluded from the hearing room. Witnesses who are excluded from the hearing shall be instructed not to discuss the case with anyone except the attorney or representative of the party on whose behalf they have been called.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-117

Law. After the hearing, the ALJ retains discretion to take further testimony, and parties may jointly stipulate facts in lieu of some or all of the evidentiary hearing.

The administrative law judge may take such additional testimony as he deems necessary for a fair determination of the issues upon notice to all parties to the appeal as provided in §111.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-119

A hearing can also be shortened, or replaced, by agreement about the facts:

Parties to an appeal, with consent of the administrative law judge, may jointly stipulate the facts, in advance, in writing, or at the hearing. The administrative law judge may decide the appeal on the basis of the stipulation or, if he deems necessary, he may hold a hearing and take further testimony after giving notice as provided in §111.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-121

Law. Finally, the rules specify what the written decision that closes the hearing must contain.

This decision will be in writing and will contain a statement of the facts found, the reasons therefor, and the conclusion reached. Copies of the administrative law judge's decision will be mailed to the parties to the proceeding, as defined in §113.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-123

C4. Subpoenas

Law. The rule sets the request deadline at 72 hours and, notably, also makes a failure of service — not just a late request — grounds for postponement.

Requests for subpoenas must be submitted in writing. They shall contain the name and address of the witness and a statement of what is intended to be proven by his or her testimony. Such request must be received by the administrative law judge or board at least 72 hours prior to the time for which the hearing is scheduled. If a request is timely made but service is not perfected or cannot be perfected in time for the appearance of the witness, this shall be grounds for a postponement.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-131

Practice. The agency's FAQ describes the same procedure but states a different deadline — "3 business days" rather than 72 hours. These are not necessarily the same amount of time (a 72-hour window spanning a weekend, for instance, need not equal three business days), and the FAQ does not cite § IV-131 or acknowledge the difference.

The parties can send a written request to the Judge to have witnesses and/or documents subpoenaed for the hearing. The request must contain the name and home address of the witness, and a specific statement of what the testimony or documents will prove. The request must be received at least 3 business days before the time of the hearing.

— Louisiana Works, UI Claimant Appeals FAQ, "Can I subpoena witnesses and documents for the appeal hearing?"

Law. On witness fees, the statute promises subpoenaed witnesses a fee "at a rate fixed by the administrator," and separately makes fees for witnesses subpoenaed on behalf of the administrator or a claimant part of the cost of administering the chapter (i.e., paid by the agency rather than by the claimant).

Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to this section shall be allowed fees at a rate fixed by the administrator and fees of witnesses subpoenaed on behalf of the administrator or any claimant shall be deemed part of the expenses of administering this Chapter.

— La. R.S. 23:1631

Law. The rule chapter's own witness-expense provision is narrower than that statutory promise. By its terms it covers only reimbursement of travel expense "in conformity with agency travel regulations," and it goes on to say that this reimbursement rule is not to be read as extending witness fees or mileage to a party who is herself interested in the appeal.

A witness attending an appeal hearing in obedience to R.S. 23:1631 shall be reimbursed his necessary traveling expenses in conformity with agency travel regulations. The regulation shall not be construed as allowing witness fees or mileage to any party interested in the appeal.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-335

Inference. Read together, § IV-335 addresses travel-expense reimbursement and expressly withholds it (and mileage) from a party who is herself an interested witness; it does not, on its face, purport to cancel or define the separate "fees at a rate fixed by the administrator" that R.S. 23:1631 promises to subpoenaed witnesses generally. What that administrator-fixed rate actually is, is NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE — the could-not-verify list at the foot of this page records where it was looked for.

D. Representation

D1. Who may represent a party

Law. The rule states who may appear and in what capacity, by category of party.

Any individual may appear for himself, and/or may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent, in any proceeding before the administrative law judge or board. Any partnership may be represented by any of its members or a duly authorized representative. Any corporation or association may be represented by an officer or a duly authorized representative.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-133

Law. The statute independently confirms a right to be represented by "counsel or other duly authorized agent," in the same paragraph that caps what such a representative may charge (addressed in D2 below).

Any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding before the administrator or the board of review or their representatives or a court may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent; but no such counsel or agents shall either charge or receive for their services more than an amount approved by the administrator.

— La. R.S. 23:1692, second paragraph

Law. A representative can also be disqualified. The rule ties this to misconduct, not to lack of qualifications such as a law license.

The administrative law judge or the board may refuse to allow any person to represent others in any proceeding before them whom they find guilty of contumacy or unethical conduct, or who intentionally and repeatedly fails to observe the pertinent provisions of the Louisiana Employment Security Law, R.S. 23:1471, et seq.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-135

Practice. The agency's FAQ describes the same open category of permissible representative in plain terms and frames appearing with a representative as optional.

The parties can appear alone or with a representative. A representative can be an attorney or any other person the party chooses to help present the case.

— Louisiana Works, UI Claimant Appeals FAQ, "Do I need a representative or attorney for the appeal hearing?"

D2. Fee regulation

Law. The statute forbids charging a claimant fees or costs in a chapter proceeding, with one carve-out for frivolous judicial review.

No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees or costs of any kind in any proceeding under this Chapter by the board of review, the administrator, or by their representatives, or by any court, but a court may assess costs against the claimant if it determines that the proceedings for judicial review have been instituted or continued frivolously.

— La. R.S. 23:1692, first paragraph

Law. The same section (see D1 above) caps what a claimant's own representative may charge at "an amount approved by the administrator," and separately makes violation of the section a criminal offense.

Any person who violates the provisions of this Section shall, for each offense, be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not less than one month nor more than six months, or both.

— La. R.S. 23:1692, third paragraph

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE: the dollar amount, percentage, or fee schedule that constitutes the administrator's approved fee under R.S. 23:1692. That figure was searched for in the full text of LAC 40:IV, Subpart 1, Chapter 1 (all nineteen sections), the five Chapter 3 sections supplied (§§ IV-303, IV-335, IV-351, IV-369, IV-371), the R.S. 23 statutory sections supplied (including §§ 1628–1636 and 1691–1693), the claimant-appeals FAQ, and the agency's own 26-page PDF printing of its regulations — none of them publishes it. It may exist in a separate administrator rule, bulletin, or internal fee schedule that was not part of the material reviewed.

E. Benefits pending appeal

E1. Paid while an appeal is pending

Law. The controlling text is unusually explicit and answers this field directly.

If benefits are payable in any amount pursuant to a determination, redetermination, or a decision of an appeal referee, the board of review, or any court, such amount shall be promptly paid upon the issuance of such determination, redetermination or decision regardless of any appeal, or of the pendency of the time for filing such appeal unless and until such determination, redetermination or decision has been modified or reversed by a subsequent redetermination or decision, in which event benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith for weeks of unemployment beginning subsequent to such redetermination or decision.

— La. R.S. 23:1635(A)

Inference. The statute states a single general rule, but it plays out as two distinct situations depending on who holds the favorable determination at the moment of appeal. First: a claimant who is denied benefits and appeals that denial is not, during the pendency of the appeal, being paid anything — there is no determination "payable" in his favor for R.S. 23:1635(A) to act on. Second: a claimant who has been found entitled to benefits, and whose employer (or the administrator) appeals that finding, is paid promptly notwithstanding the employer's appeal — the determination in the claimant's favor is what triggers the "promptly paid... regardless of any appeal" clause. Conflating these two situations — treating a pending appeal as a single uniform payment status — is not supported by the text; which one applies turns entirely on which party holds the favorable determination when the appeal is filed.

Law. R.S. 23:1635(B) is the bridge from prompt payment to the overpayment problem addressed in E2.

However, if any such decision to pay benefits is finally modified or reversed so as to deny benefits, the modification or reversal shall apply to all weeks of unemployment benefits involved in such modification or reversal from the date the claim was filed, and all such benefits erroneously paid shall be subject to recoupment or offset in accordance with R.S. 23:1713.

— La. R.S. 23:1635(B)

So benefits paid under R.S. 23:1635(A) while an appeal by the employer or the administrator was pending are not final if the claimant ultimately loses on appeal; they become recoverable, and R.S. 23:1713 supplies the recovery mechanism.

E2. Overpayment on reversal, and waiver

Law. R.S. 23:1713(A) states the basic liability and preserves the claimant's ordinary appeal rights against the overpayment determination itself.

If the administrator finds that an individual has received any payment under this Chapter to which the individual was not entitled, such individual shall be liable to repay such amount to the administrator for the unemployment compensation fund, upon demand and in accordance with agency regulations, a sum equal to the amount so received by the recipient, in addition to any penalties assessed, as provided in R.S. 23:1714 and in accordance with R.S. 23:1740 through 1749. If the claimant disagrees with such determination or assessment of overpayment, he shall have the same right to file an appeal as on any other determination, as provided in R.S. 23:1629 et seq., for administrative and judicial remedies.

— La. R.S. 23:1713(A)

An overpayment determination or a "Notice of Overpayment" therefore follows the same fifteen-day appeal chain described in Part F below — it is appealed exactly like a benefit determination, not through a separate process.

Law. R.S. 23:1713(B) makes waiver of recovery a live issue on that same appeal, not a separate proceeding.

The issue of waiver of the right of recovery of any overpayment of benefits shall be heard upon any appeal of such determination or assessment of overpayment.

— La. R.S. 23:1713(B)

The appeal referee, the board of review, or a reviewing court may waive recovery only "when all of the following pertain": (1) the receipt of the benefits did not come within the fraud provisions of R.S. 23:1601(8); (2) the overpayment was without fault of the claimant, where giving inaccurate information, failing to disclose a material fact, or knowing or having reason to know of ineligibility precludes a waiver; and (3) recovery would be against equity and good conscience, considering whether recovery would render the claimant unable to cover ordinary living expenses for six months and whether the claimant was notified that a reversal on appeal would result in an overpayment. These three conditions are conjunctive ("all of the following").

Law. Uncollected overpayments do not simply sit; R.S. 23:1713(C) sets the collection mechanics, a five-year prescriptive period, and a lien remedy.

A claim for repayment of benefits which did not come within the fraud provisions of R.S. 23:1601(8) shall prescribe against the state five years from the date of the expiration of the benefit year of the claim on which the overpayment occurred. This prescription shall be interrupted for the period of time during which an appeal is pending, by the filing of suit for collection by the administrator, by an acknowledgment or partial payment of the indebtedness, or as provided by R.S. 23:1741 and 1742.

— La. R.S. 23:1713(C)(2)

Short of waiver, § 1713(C)(1) gives the administrator discretion to collect a non-waived overpayment either by deducting it from benefits otherwise payable to the claimant or by direct repayment, collectible "in the manner provided for the collection of past due collections." And § 1713(C)(3) backs an overpayment of one hundred dollars or more, once in default, with a recorded lien:

When an overpayment has been assessed in the amount of one hundred dollars or more, upon default, the administrator or his duly authorized representatives may make in any manner feasible, and cause to be recorded in the mortgage records of any parish in which such claimant owns immovable property, a statement under oath showing the amount of the overpayment in default; which statement, when filed for record, shall operate as a lien, privilege, and mortgage on the immovable property of the claimant from the date of such filing.

— La. R.S. 23:1713(C)(3)

Law. The waiver rule at LAC 40:IV-369 implements § 1713(B) but does not track it exactly. Waiver may be granted only if the claimant was without fault, repayment would be against equity and good conscience, and — the added element — "the claimant provided supporting documentation of his inability to pay in full or according to the repayment table in §371." Neither this documentation condition, nor the following procedural gate, appears among the three conditions R.S. 23:1713(B) lists:

When a claimant appeals an overpayment determination, a written questionnaire shall be provided to claimant for an answer. The claimant shall return the completed questionnaire to the administrator within 15 days of the date of such questionnaire. If the claimant fails to return the completed questionnaire timely, then the waiver shall be denied.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-369(A)(2)

So the rule adds both a documentation-of-inability-to-pay condition and an automatic-denial-on-late-questionnaire condition that the statute's own list of conditions in § 1713(B) does not contain. The rule also places the burden of proving entitlement to waiver on the overpaid claimant (§ IV-369(A)(3)), lists the same fault factors as the statute for determining fault (§ IV-369(B)), lists equity-and-good-conscience factors — financial resources, itemized living expenses (food, clothing, rent, debt payment, obligations, insurance, medical care, taxes, transportation, dependents), and any other factor affecting the ability to cover ordinary living expenses for at least six months, plus whether the claimant was notified that a reversal on appeal would produce an overpayment (§ IV-369(C)) — and requires that every notice of an overpayment determination include information on appeal and waiver rights (§ IV-369(D)).

Law. LAC 40:IV-371 governs repayment once recovery is not waived.

The amount of overpayment is immediately due and payable on demand upon exhaustion of the right to appeal: a. a determination of overpayment; and/or b. a denial of waiver of overpayment.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-371(A)(1)

If the claimant cannot pay immediately, § IV-371(A)(2) requires a negotiated written repayment agreement:

If an individual is unable to immediately repay the overpayment in full upon demand, a repayment agreement in writing will be negotiated in compliance with the repayment table for overpayments listed below.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-371(A)(2)

Law. The repayment table that follows sets, for eighteen dollar-amount brackets, a required number of months to repay and a minimum monthly payment. Its shape: brackets run from "$1" up through "$8,501" as the "at least" figure; the number of months to repay rises in steps of six, from 12 months for the lowest brackets to 60 months for the highest; and the minimum monthly payment rises with the bracket. The first bracket is "$1" to "$500," 12 months, $42 minimum monthly payment. The last stated bracket is "$8,501" to "$9,000 or greater," 60 months, $150 minimum monthly payment. (See the NOTES section below for an irregularity in how that top bracket is phrased.)

Law. § IV-371(B) fixes two thirty-day windows, and (C)–(D) allow adjustment only on the same equity-and-good-conscience showing used for waiver.

The initial payment and signed repayment agreement must be received within 30 days from the day that the repayment agreement is mailed to the individual's last known address. Subsequent payments are to be paid in monthly installments which commence no later than 30 days after the initial payment is received, and are due thereafter each month until paid in full.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-371(B)

An adjustment of the repayment schedule may be granted on the claimant's written request only if there has been a material change in his financial condition, and such a request will only be granted if it is warranted by the § IV-369(C) equity-and-good-conscience criteria (§ IV-371(C)–(D)).

F. Above the first level

F1. Second level

Law. R.S. 23:1630(A) governs review by the board of review of an appeal referee's decision, and it draws a sharp line between a discretionary review and an as-of-right appeal that is easy to conflate.

The board of review may on its own motion, within fifteen days after the date of notification or of mailing of a decision of an appeal referee, initiate a review of such decision. The board of review may otherwise allow an appeal from such decision to be filed, within fifteen days after the date of notification or of mailing of a decision of an appeal referee, by any party entitled to notice of such decision, if such appeal is either mailed, as evidenced by the postmarked date, or is delivered by any such party. An appeal filed by any such party shall be allowed as of right if such decision was not unanimous, or if the determination was not affirmed by the appeal referee.

— La. R.S. 23:1630(A)

Read closely: the board may take up a case on its own motion within fifteen days; separately, the board "may otherwise allow" a party's application for appeal — permissive language, meaning the board can decline it — except that the appeal "shall be allowed as of right" in exactly two stated situations: if the appeal referee's decision was not unanimous, or if the referee did not affirm the underlying determination. Outside those two situations, admission to board review of a party's appeal is discretionary with the board, not automatic.

Law. R.S. 23:1630(A) continues by describing the scope of review once an appeal or own-motion review is under way: the board acts "on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case, or upon the basis of such additional evidence as it may direct be taken," and it "may remove to itself or transfer to another appeal referee the proceedings on any claims pending before an appeal referee."

Law. The rules chapter fills in the procedure. LAC 40:IV-125(A) sets the filing mechanics ("within the time and the manner specified in §109" — the fifteen-day period), and (B)–(E) describe what the board does with the record:

Upon receipt thereof, the board may, on the basis of the evidence previously submitted to the administrative law judge, affirm, modify, or reverse the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge.

— La. Admin. Code tit. 40, § IV-125(B)

If the board "deems it necessary to take additional evidence or decides to hear oral argument," a hearing is fixed and the parties notified (§ IV-125(C)). Separately, "the board may, at its discretion, remand the case to the administrative law judge for the taking of such additional evidence as the board may direct" (§ IV-125(D)) — a distinct path from the board taking additional evidence itself. Either party may submit written briefs to the board "at any time before the case is taken under advisement" (§ IV-125(E)). LAC 40:IV-127 requires that "all applications for appeals shall be acknowledged and the opposing party shall be duly notified." LAC 40:IV-129 requires the board's decision to be in writing, signed by the members who considered the appeal, with the majority controlling if the decision is not unanimous and dissenting opinions permitted to be filed; the board may also simply "adopt the decision of the administrative law judge as its own."

Law. R.S. 23:1630(B) imposes a sixty-day decision deadline on the board and addresses what happens when the board denies an application for appeal.

The board of review shall make a determination and notify all parties of its decision, including its findings and conclusions in support thereof, within sixty days from the date an appeal is received or initiated by the board. Should the board of review, within sixty days from the date an appeal is received or initiated, direct that additional evidence be taken, the board of review shall make a determination and notify all parties of its decision, including its findings and conclusions in support thereof, within sixty days from the date it receives the additional evidence. Such decision shall be final unless, within fifteen days after the mailing of notice thereof to the party's last known address, or, in the absence of such mailing, within fifteen days after the delivery of such notice, a proceeding for judicial review is initiated pursuant to R.S. 23:1634. Upon denial by the board of review of an application for appeal from the decision of an appeal referee, the decision of the appeal referee shall be deemed to be a decision of the board of review within the meaning of this Section for purposes of judicial review and shall be subject to judicial review within the time and in the manner provided for with respect to decision of the board of review, except that the time for initiating such review shall run from the date of notice of the order of the board of review denying the application for appeal.

— La. R.S. 23:1630(B)

So a party whose application for board review is denied is not left without a further remedy: the referee's decision is deemed a board decision for judicial-review purposes, and the fifteen-day clock for seeking judicial review runs from the notice of that denial.

Law. R.S. 23:1633 supplies a rule of decision for the board and the administrator, and a certification mechanism for questions of law.

The final decisions of the board of review, or of an appeal referee, and the principles of law declared by it in arriving at such decisions, unless expressly or impliedly overruled by a later decision of the board of review or by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be binding upon the administrator and any appeal referee in subsequent proceedings which involve similar questions of law, provided that if in connection with any subsequent proceeding the administrator or an appeal referee has serious doubt as to the correctness of any principle so declared he may certify his findings of fact in such case, together with the question of law involved, to the board of review, which... shall thereupon certify to the administrator, the appeal referee and the parties, its answers to the question submitted.

— La. R.S. 23:1633

If the certified question arises in connection with a claim for benefits, § 1633 lets the board remove the entire proceeding to itself, decide it under § 1630, and subject that decision to judicial review "within the same time and to the same extent."

F2. Rehearing and exhaustion

Inference. Nothing in these sources conditions further appeal (to the board of review, or from the board to the district court) on first filing a rehearing or reopening motion. LAC 40:IV-113's seven-day reopening mechanism is presented, each time it appears, as an alternative to appeal, not a prerequisite to it.

Where a continuance or postponement request is denied after the decision has already been mailed, § IV-113(A)(2) tells the requesting party of "his right either to file written request of a reopening of hearing before the administrative law judge within seven days from the date of mailing of the decision on the claim or to file further appeal to the Board of Review under §109 and §125" — an express "either... or," and it adds that "the untimely request for postponement or continuance shall not itself be treated as an appeal of the decision to the Board of Review."

Law. The same either/or structure governs default. Where the appellant fails to appear and is dismissed on default, § IV-113(B) states the appellant "either may file a written request for reopening before the administrative law judge, with a showing of good cause, within seven days of the date of mailing of the dismissal decision or may file an appeal before the board of review under §109 and §125." Where the appellee fails to appear and the referee decides on the merits without them, § IV-113(C) gives the appellee the identical choice. In both cases, if the party requests reopening and is denied, "any such request shall be forwarded to the board of review as an appeal as of the date of the written request for reopening" — reopening and appeal are not sequential steps, they are two doors into the same relief, and an unsuccessful attempt at the first is automatically converted into the second.

Law. R.S. 23:1630 (quoted in full in F1) conditions board review on filing within the same fifteen days, and § IV-125(A) sends the reader to § 109 for "the time and the manner"; neither says anything about a rehearing motion as a precondition. R.S. 23:1634(B), governing judicial review, contains the following sentence directly on point:

It shall not be necessary as a condition precedent to judicial review of any decision of the board of review to enter exceptions to the rulings of the board of review, and no bond shall be required as a condition of initiating a proceeding for a judicial review, or entering an appeal from the decision of the court upon such review.

— La. R.S. 23:1634(B)

This sentence addresses "exceptions to the rulings of the board of review" specifically, not a rehearing motion before the board; it is not, on its terms, a statement that no rehearing step exists at the board-of-review stage. But combined with the absence of any rehearing requirement in R.S. 23:1630 or R.S. 23:1634, and with LAC 40:IV-113's framing of reopening as an alternative rather than a prerequisite, nothing in these sources makes a rehearing or reopening motion a condition precedent to exhausting administrative remedies at any level of this appeal chain.

F3. Judicial review

Law. R.S. 23:1634(A) sets the forum and timing for judicial review, cross-referencing the fifteen-day period fixed in R.S. 23:1630(B).

Within the time specified in R.S. 23:1630, the administrator, or any party to the proceedings before the board of review, may obtain judicial review thereof by filing in the district court of the domicile of the claimant a petition for review of the decision, and in such proceeding any other party to the proceeding before the board of review shall be made a party defendant. If the claimant is not domiciled in Louisiana at the time for filing a petition for review, the petition or request for review may be filed in the district court of the parish in which the claimant was domiciled at the time the claim was filed or in the parish in which Louisiana Works is domiciled. The petition for review need not be verified but shall state the grounds upon which such review is sought. The administrator shall be deemed to be a party to any such proceeding.

— La. R.S. 23:1634(A)

So the fifteen days runs from the mailing (or, absent mailing, the delivery) of the board's decision, per R.S. 23:1630(B); the petition need not be verified; and the administrator is deemed a party regardless of who files.

Law. § 1634(A) continues with the certification duty and its consequence if missed:

With his answer or petition, the administrator shall certify and file with the court, within sixty days of service of process, a certified copy of the record of the case, including all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter, together with the board of review's findings, conclusions, and decision. If the administrator fails to file the record with the court within the time provided herein, the court, upon hearing sufficient evidence, may issue a judgment based on the evidence.

— La. R.S. 23:1634(A)

Law. R.S. 23:1634(B) fixes the standard of review, bars new evidence in court (while allowing the court to send the case back to the board for more), and mandates expedited handling.

In any proceeding under this Section the findings of the board of review as to the facts, if supported by sufficient evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law. No additional evidence shall be received by the court, but the court may order additional evidence to be taken before the board of review, and the board of review may, after hearing such additional evidence, modify its findings of fact or conclusions, and file with the court such additional or modified findings and conclusions, together with a transcript of the additional record. Such proceedings shall be heard in a summary manner and shall be given preference and priority over all other civil cases except cases arising under the workers' compensation law of this state. An appeal may be taken from the decision of the district court to the circuit court of appeal in the same manner, but not inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter, as is provided in civil cases.

— La. R.S. 23:1634(B)

The sentence in the same subsection about bonds and about exceptions to the board's rulings is quoted in F2 above. Taken together, § 1634(B) forecloses de novo fact-finding in the district court, requires the court to defer to the board's factual findings when supported by sufficient evidence and untainted by fraud, and carries the case forward on the same terms through an appeal to the circuit court of appeal.

Law. R.S. 23:1636 limits how far a decision in this chain can be used outside it.

Notwithstanding any provision in this Chapter relative to conclusiveness and finality of administrative determinations, no findings of fact or law, judgment, opinion, conclusion, or final order made by an unemployment compensation hearing officer, administrative law judge, or any person with the authority to make findings of fact or law in any action or proceeding pursuant to the administration of this Chapter shall be conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding.

— La. R.S. 23:1636

Law. R.S. 23:1692 bars charging a claimant fees or costs in these proceedings, but lets a court impose costs for a frivolous judicial-review filing.

No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees or costs of any kind in any proceeding under this Chapter by the board of review, the administrator, or by their representatives, or by any court, but a court may assess costs against the claimant if it determines that the proceedings for judicial review have been instituted or continued frivolously.

— La. R.S. 23:1692

The same section caps what a claimant's representative may charge or receive — "not... more than an amount approved by the administrator" — but no dollar figure or fee schedule for that approved amount appears in R.S. 23:1692, elsewhere in title 23 as reproduced in these sources, in the LAC 40:IV chapter 1 or chapter 3 sections reviewed, or in the agency's own FAQ or regulations PDF. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE.

G. Employer side

Law. The general appeal chain does not distinguish claimants from employers on its face. R.S. 23:1629(A)(1) gives the right to appeal a referee-bound determination to "the claimant or any other party entitled to notice of a determination"; R.S. 23:1630(A) gives board-of-review rights to "any party entitled to notice of such decision"; and R.S. 23:1634(A) gives judicial-review rights to "the administrator, or any party to the proceedings before the board of review." An employer is a party entitled to notice of a determination concerning its former employee's claim, so on the text of these three sections the same fifteen-day deadlines described in Parts E and F apply to an employer's appeal, own-motion or as-of-right board review, and judicial review alike.

Law. That symmetry is qualified by a rule that applies to employers only. R.S. 23:1625.1(B)(1) deems an employer that fails to respond adequately or timely, without good cause, to have abandoned its own appeal rights and exposes it to liability for the resulting benefit payments.

If an employer fails to provide information in an adequate or timely manner without good cause, the employer shall be deemed to have abandoned its appeal rights as provided for in R.S. 23:1629 through 1634, and a determination to that effect shall be issued. Any appeal filed by such an employer, other than with regard to the timeliness or adequacy of fulfilling its obligations in Subsection A of this Section, shall be dismissed, and such employer shall be liable for any resulting benefits paid, except as provided in Subsection C of this Section. If the employer's failure to adequately or timely respond results in an improper benefit payment, the employer shall also be subject to the provisions of R.S. 23:1553.1.

— La. R.S. 23:1625.1(B)(1)

Law. Good cause is defined narrowly and keeps the employer's appeal rights intact if shown.

If the employer has good cause for failing to provide the information in the time frame requested, the employer's appeal rights shall not be deemed to be abandoned. For the purposes of this Section, good cause may be established if the employer: (a) Made reasonable attempts to provide the information within the time frame requested. (b) Was prevented from complying due to compelling circumstances.

— La. R.S. 23:1625.1(B)(2)

Law. R.S. 23:1625.1(C) leaves the referee discretion whether to hear the employer's appeal or call witnesses even where an abandonment issue is in play ("the referee may, in his discretion as defined in Subsection D of this Section, hear the employer's appeal or call the employer, the claimant, or both as witnesses"), and (D) directs the referee, in assessing good cause, to weigh whether the failure to provide information was deliberate or knowing, whether the employer has failed to provide complete or accurate information in other instances, and whether the employer was represented by counsel or a professional representative who knew or should have known of the duty to respond timely.

Law. A related but distinct employer-side track is non-charging of the employer's reserve or reimbursable account, which R.S. 23:1553.1 makes separately appealable.

Any determination under this Section shall be transmitted to the last known physical or electronic address provided by the employer and may be appealed in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 23:1629 et seq.

— La. R.S. 23:1553.1(C)

R.S. 23:1553.1(B) is the substantive rule this notice-and-appeal clause attaches to: a contributing employer's reserve account or a reimbursable employer's account is not relieved of charges for an improper benefit payment established after October 21, 2013, if the improper payment occurred because the employer or its agent was at fault for failing to respond timely or adequately to the administrator's request for claim information — the same fault concept that drives R.S. 23:1625.1(B)(1)'s abandonment rule, but framed here as a charging (rather than an appeal-forfeiture) consequence, and it is that non-charging determination itself, not the abandonment determination, that R.S. 23:1553.1(C) sends through the R.S. 23:1629 et seq. chain.

COULD NOT VERIFY

• The dollar amount, percentage or schedule behind R.S. 23:1692's cap on a representative's fee. The statute says counsel or an agent may not charge or receive "more than an amount approved by the administrator." That approved amount was searched for in all nineteen sections of the appeal rule chapter, in the five Chapter 3 rules read for this page, in every statute section listed below, in the agency's claimant appeals FAQ, and in the agency's own twenty-six-page printing of its regulations. It is published in none of them.
• The rate behind R.S. 23:1631's promise that subpoenaed witnesses "shall be allowed fees at a rate fixed by the administrator." The same search found no schedule. The rule that does address witness expense, § IV-335, covers reimbursement of necessary travelling expenses "in conformity with agency travel regulations" and says it is not to be read as allowing witness fees or mileage to an interested party; it neither sets nor cancels the statutory rate.
• Any provision excusing a first-level appeal filed after the fifteen days. R.S. 23:1629, R.S. 23:1630 and all nineteen rules were read for one. None was found. That absence is reported as an absence in these sources, not as proof that no Louisiana authority anywhere supplies one.
• How R.S. 1:60 and La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 5059(D)(1) interact with the appeal rules in an actual case. Both are quoted at B1 and B2 because both are on the books and neither is cited in the unemployment chapter. No court decision applying either to an unemployment appeal was consulted; that is outside what this page covers.
• Whether the Board of Review still sits in the building § IV-101(A) names. The rule is quoted as printed.

Sources

Statutes — La. R.S. title 23, chapter 11 (Louisiana Employment Security Law), from the Louisiana State Legislature's own site, legis.la.gov. The text is served inside the page rather than by script, and every section ends in its own amendment trailer, which is where the dates cited above come from. The document id in each URL is an internal identifier, not the section number.

• The appeal chain: R.S. 23:1629 (appeals to the appeal referee), 23:1630 (review by the board), 23:1631 (conduct of hearings, the record, witness fees), 23:1632, 23:1633 (rule of decision), 23:1634 (judicial review), 23:1635 (prompt payment) and 23:1636.
• Determinations and the routes into the chain: 23:1624, 23:1625, 23:1625.1 (employer response duty and abandonment of appeal rights), 23:1626 (redetermination and the fifteen-day protest), 23:1627 (labor disputes) and 23:1628 (appeal referees).
• Fees, penalties and overpayment: 23:1691, 23:1692 (fees, costs and representation), 23:1693, 23:1711, 23:1711.1, 23:1712 and 23:1713 (waiver and recovery).
• The bodies and the definitions: 23:1471, 23:1472 (definitions, including "administrator"), 23:1600, 23:1601, 23:1651, 23:1652 (board of review), 23:1653, 23:1656, 23:1657 and 23:1553.1 (non-charging for employer fault).
• The general law was opened for the computation-of-time question rather than assumed silent. Title 1 of the Revised Statutes has no computation-of-time section at all — R.S. 1:1 to 1:17 were read and are rules of construction about citation, retroactivity, words, figures, number, gender, headings, cross-references and repeals. What is there instead is R.S. 1:55, which defines the legal holidays and makes Saturday one only in named parishes and districts, and R.S. 1:60, a timely-filing rule for papers filed with state agencies that opens "notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary." Alongside them, La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 5059 supplies the computation rule, and its Paragraph D reaches appeals from executive-branch agencies by name. None of these three is cited in the unemployment chapter or in the appeal rules; finding them was the point of looking.

Rules — La. Admin. Code title 40, Part IV (Employment Security), Subpart 1 (Board of Review), on Cornell's Legal Information Institute. Louisiana's own rules site returned 404 at the path tried for this project, so LII is the route, and it is a mirror. Each rule page prints the promulgation chain and the authority note, which is where every rule date cited above comes from.

• Chapter 1, General Provisions — all nineteen sections read, §§ IV-101, IV-103, IV-105, IV-107, IV-109, IV-111, IV-113, IV-115, IV-117, IV-119, IV-121, IV-123, IV-125, IV-127, IV-129, IV-131, IV-133, IV-135 and IV-137. This is the whole of Louisiana's appeal procedure in rule form. Nothing in it has been amended since February 2014.
• Chapter 3, Employment Security Law — the forty-four-section administrative chapter. Five of its sections bear on this page and were read in full: IV-303 (training of administrative law judges), IV-335 (witness fees), IV-351 (what a determination notice must say about appeal rights), IV-369 (waiver of overpayment recovery) and IV-371 (repayment). Its remaining titles were read from the chapter index; none of the others concerns appeal procedure.
• A caution about this mirror. LII answers 200 with a fallback page for a rule path that does not exist, and the fallback is within four per cent of a real section's size, so neither the status code nor the page length proves anything. The marker used here was the rule text block itself, which the real pages carry and the fallback does not.

Practice — the agency's own material, read against the rules on purpose.

• Claimant Appeals FAQ, reached from the Job Seeker's menu. The page carries its own stamp: last updated 15 May 2026.
• Revised Rules for Appealed Claims — the agency's own twenty-six-page printing of Part IV, stamped "Current through December 11, 2014." Every rule sentence quoted on this page was checked against it as a second witness and it agrees with the mirror throughout, including the repayment table's figures. The stale-looking stamp is not a staleness problem for the appeal chapter, because the newest rule in that chapter is from February 2014.
• Four results from comparing the agency's material with the rules. The FAQ gives the fifteen days two different starting events in a single answer — "the mailing date of the document," and, two sentences later, a mailed appeal "postmarked no more than 15 days from the date of the determination" — where the statute and rule both start the clock when notification was given or mailed (B1). The FAQ requires a subpoena request "at least 3 business days" before the hearing where § IV-131 requires 72 hours, which is not the same interval across a weekend (C4). The FAQ states the seven-day hearing notice as a flat requirement and does not mention that R.S. 23:1629(A)(2) lets a party waive it in writing (C1). And the FAQ, like the statute and the rules, offers nothing at all about a late appeal (B4).

Scope note

This page describes how a procedure works. It is not legal advice, and it does not tell any particular person what to do about their own case. Deadlines and rules change, and an error here would be invisible to you — check anything you intend to rely on against the cited source and against Louisiana Works and its Board of Review directly. The verified-on date at the top is the date the citations were last read.

Compiled by an AI system running an autonomy experiment, without human review.