Delaware — unemployment insurance benefit appeals

Agency

Delaware Department of Labor (19 Del. C. § 3302(11)), acting through its Division of Unemployment Insurance

First-level body

An appeal tribunal — either a salaried referee sitting alone or a three-member panel that a referee chairs (19 Del. C. § 3319) — which the Board's own rules call the Appeals Referee (19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 1.0)

Second-level body

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, five members appointed by the Governor (19 Del. C. § 3101)

Verified

2026-09-09

A. Bodies

A1. Agency — law. The statutory administering agency is the Department of Labor. 19 Del. C. § 3302(11) defines the term used throughout chapter 33:

"Department" means the Department of Labor.

— 19 Del. C. § 3302(11)

The operating division is named by the administrative code itself: 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 sits under the heading "1200 Division of Unemployment Insurance," and the publisher's own cumulative table files the regulation under the Department of Labor's Division of Unemployment Insurance. So the chain is the Department of Labor, acting through that Division.

A2. First-level body — law. The statute names this body the "appeal tribunal" (19 Del. C. §§ 3318(c), 3319). Its composition is set by § 3319:

To hear and decide disputed claims, protests under § 3368(e) of this title, disputed overpayments and overpayment waivers under § 3325 of this title, and hearings under § 3369 of this title, the Department shall appoint 1 or more impartial appeal tribunals consisting in each case of either a salaried examiner, to be known as a referee, or a body consisting of 3 members, 1 of whom shall be a referee who shall serve as chairperson, 1 of whom shall be a representative of employers and the other of whom shall be a representative of employees.

— 19 Del. C. § 3319

The same section requires the chairperson's presence for any hearing to proceed:

In no case shall the hearing proceed unless the chairperson of the appeal tribunal is present.

— 19 Del. C. § 3319

So the appeal tribunal is either a single salaried referee sitting alone, or a three-member panel (referee as chairperson, one employer representative, one employee representative), and the referee-chairperson must be present regardless of which form it takes.

The rules do not use the term "appeal tribunal." 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 1.0 defines a related but distinct term, "Hearing Officer," used to describe whichever person or body heard the case below when it comes up to the Board on review:

"Hearing Officer" shall mean the Appeals Referee or the Appeals Referee's designate who heard the initial appeal.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 1.0

So there are two names in play at the first level: the statute's "appeal tribunal" (§§ 3318(c), 3319), and the rules' "Appeals Referee," which the rules in turn define via "Hearing Officer" (1201 § 1.0) as whoever — Appeals Referee or that referee's designate — actually heard the initial appeal. Nothing read equates "Appeals Referee" with the three-member tribunal § 3319 also permits; the rules' vocabulary is built around a single hearing officer, and the statute's around a body that may have three members. That the two vocabularies do not map cleanly onto each other is an observation about the texts, not a rule stated in either.

A3. Second-level body — law. The second-level body is the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Its founding and composition are set by 19 Del. C. § 3101:

The Employment Security Commission of Delaware, renamed the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), is continued. It shall consist of 5 members to be appointed by the Governor, each for a term of 6 years. Two members shall reside in New Castle County, 1 of whom shall reside in the City of Wilmington, 1 member shall reside in Kent County, 1 member shall reside in Sussex County and 1 member to serve in an at large position. Appointed members shall include, but not be limited to representatives from labor, the business community and the public.

— 19 Del. C. § 3101(a)

So the Board is the continued and renamed Employment Security Commission of Delaware: 5 gubernatorial appointees, 6-year terms, with residency seats (two from New Castle County, one of those two specifically in Wilmington; one from Kent County; one from Sussex County) plus one at-large seat, and a mandate that appointees include labor, business, and public representatives. Section 3101(b) adds a party-balance rule and a bar on partisan office-holding while serving:

During the member's term of membership on the Board, no member shall serve as an officer or committee member of any political party organization and not more than 3 members of the Board shall be members of the same political party.

— 19 Del. C. § 3101(b)

Vacancies are filled by the Governor for the unexpired term (§ 3101(c)); members serving as of June 30, 2012 finish out their existing terms under the law as it stood at their last appointment (§ 3101(d)).

Sections 3103, 3104, and 3106 bear directly on how the Board sits and decides. Quorum and continued authority despite vacancy:

Any 3 Board members shall constitute a quorum. No vacancy shall impair the right of the remaining Board members to exercise all of the powers of the Board.

— 19 Del. C. § 3103

The Board's chairperson is chosen by the Governor, not by the Board itself:

The Board shall have a Chairperson who shall be designated by the Governor from among its members. Whenever the term of the Chairperson expires or whenever there is a vacancy in such office for any cause, the Governor shall designate a new Chairperson.

— 19 Del. C. § 3104

And the Board may designate its own Secretary:

The Board may designate a suitable employee to act as Secretary of the Board.

— 19 Del. C. § 3106

Taken together: a 5-member Board sits with a 3-member quorum, is chaired by a Governor-designated Chairperson (distinct from the Hearing Officer/appeal tribunal chairperson at the first level, see A2), and may appoint its own Secretary. (All law, §§ 3101, 3103, 3104, 3106.)

B. First-level appeal

B1. Deadline — law. The controlling text is 19 Del. C. § 3318(b), which sets the deadline for appealing a Claims Deputy's determination to the appeal tribunal and identifies what starts the clock:

Unless a claimant or a last employer who has submitted a timely and completed separation notice in accordance with § 3317 of this title files an appeal within 15 calendar days after such Claims Deputy's determination was mailed to the claimant's and last employer's last known addresses or otherwise delivered by the Department to the claimant and the last employer, the Claims Deputy's determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith.

— 19 Del. C. § 3318(b)

The deadline is 15 calendar days. The triggering event is stated in the alternative: mailing of the determination to the claimant's and last employer's last known addresses, or other delivery of the determination by the Department to the claimant and the last employer. It does not run from the date of the underlying separation, the date of the claim, or the date of receipt by the claimant — it runs from the mailing (or other Department delivery) of the Claims Deputy's determination itself.

19 Del. C. § 3304, titled "Day of filing; computation of time," supplies three additional rules that apply across the chapter, including to this deadline. All three sentences of the section:

When any notice, report or other document is required to be filed under this chapter and the same is forwarded by mail to the Department, the day of mailing shall be deemed to be the day of filing. When the day, or the last day, for doing any act required to be done falls on Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the act may be done on the first ensuing day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday. Unless otherwise specified, all references to days in this chapter shall mean calendar days.

— 19 Del. C. § 3304

Plainly stated: for an appeal filed by mailing it to the Department, the day the appeal is placed in the mail counts as the day it was filed — not the day the Department receives or opens it. The second sentence is the weekend/holiday rule (see B2). The third sentence confirms that the 15-day period in § 3318(b) is calendar days, not business days, absent a contrary specification.

The 15-day figure is a 2023 amendment. 84 Del. Laws, c. 150 (HB 176), § 3, amended § 3318 by changing the filing period from 10 days to 15 days — the act prints the old number struck through beside the new one underlined. The act's effective-date clause:

Section 8. This Act shall take effect October 1, 2023.

— 84 Del. Laws, c. 150, § 8

The act was "Approved August 9, 2023" per the session law's own signature line. Before this amendment, the § 3318(b) filing period was 10 calendar days; secondary sources describing Delaware's first-level appeal deadline as 10 days are describing the pre-October 1, 2023 rule, not the current one. Note that 84 Del. Laws, c. 150 also amended § 3318(c) (appeal to the Board), § 3320(b) (cross-reference), § 3322(a) (finality of Board decision), § 3325(d) (recoupment appeal), and § 3344(c) (employer-liability appeal) in the same 10-to-15 pattern; § 3323(a), the deadline for reaching a court, was not touched by the act and is still 10 days — and it runs from a different event again. See F3.

B2. Weekend/holiday rule — law, with one inference. The operative text is § 3304's second sentence, already quoted in full in B1:

When the day, or the last day, for doing any act required to be done falls on Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the act may be done on the first ensuing day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday.

— 19 Del. C. § 3304

Which days are "legal holidays" for this purpose is fixed by 1 Del. C. § 501(a), a 13-item list that expressly includes Saturdays as a category of their own:

(11) Saturdays.

— 1 Del. C. § 501(a)(11)

Section 501(a) also lists New Year's Day, Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Good Friday, Juneteenth, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, the Friday following Thanksgiving Day, Christmas, the day of the General Election, and (in Sussex County) Return Day; subsection (c) adds Memorial Day. Section 501(b) contains a shifting rule for when a listed holiday itself falls on a weekend:

If any of the legal holidays fall on Sunday, the Monday following shall be a legal holiday. If any of the legal holidays other than Saturday fall on Saturday, the Friday preceding shall be a legal holiday.

— 1 Del. C. § 501(b)

Separately, 1 Del. C. § 502 states that an act done on a legal holiday is not thereby invalidated:

No contract made, instrument executed, or act done on any of the legal holidays designated in § 501 of this title shall be thereby rendered invalid, and nothing in that section shall be construed to prevent or invalidate the entry, issuance, service or execution of any writ, summons, confession, judgment, order or decree, or other legal process whatever, or the proceedings of any court or judge or board of canvass on any of such holidays.

— 1 Del. C. § 502

§ 502 is a validity-saving provision, not a deadline-extension provision: it says that acting on a holiday does not make the act void, which is a different question from when a deadline that falls on a holiday must be met. It does not itself push a deadline forward; that work is done by § 3304's second sentence.

Applying § 3304 to a first-level appeal: because the section names Saturday and Sunday itself, a 15-day period under § 3318(b) that would otherwise end on a weekend runs instead to "the first ensuing day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday" — ordinarily the Monday, and past it if that Monday is one of the days § 501(a) designates. The section reaches "a holiday" generally, so it needs no help from § 501 to extend a deadline that lands on Christmas or Thanksgiving. § 501 matters at one remove: it supplies the list of days that count, and § 501(b) can move an observed holiday onto the weekday beside a weekend, which then triggers § 3304 the same way. That last step — § 501(b) shifting a holiday, and § 3304 then extending a deadline that lands on the shifted date — is an inference from reading the two sections together; neither states it.

B3. How to file, required form — law, and a gap. 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 2.0 addresses filing, but by its own terms only filing with the Board, the second-level body — not filing an appeal from a Claims Deputy's determination to the appeal tribunal at the first level:

2.1 All correspondence or other papers or documents filed with the Board shall be filed, either by mail or by hand delivery, at the following address: Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, Department of Labor, 4425 North Market Street, Wilmington, DE 19802. The Board phone number is (302) 761-8370 and the Board's fax number is (302) 761-6635.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 2.1

2.2 Notices of Appeal to the Board may be filed, by mail or personal delivery, at any local Unemployment Office or at the Board Office listed at subsection 2.1. All Notices of Appeal must be in writing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 2.2

Because 1201 governs the Board only (see A2 and A3), § 2.0 does not answer how to file a first-level appeal to the appeal tribunal, and no other published rule does either.

What the statute itself supplies for first-level filing is narrow. § 3304's first sentence establishes that a first-level appeal, like any other document under the chapter, may be filed by forwarding it by mail to the Department, with the day of mailing counting as the day of filing (quoted in full in B1). § 3318(b) establishes that the filing described there is an appeal "file[d] ... within 15 calendar days" (quoted in full in B1) but does not itself specify a required form, a required addressee office, or a manner of delivery beyond what can be read into "files an appeal."

Beyond that, no agency-issued instructions, form number or filing address for a first-level appeal could be read at all — Delaware's agency host rejects every request, as the Sources note records. Whether a first-level appeal must be filed on a particular form, at a particular office, or in a particular manner (in writing, online, by fax, etc.) is NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE.

Fees are addressed directly by statute, and apply at every level, including this one. 19 Del. C. § 3372(a):

No employer or individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding under this chapter by the Department or its representatives. No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding under this chapter by any court or any officer thereof.

— 19 Del. C. § 3372(a)

So no fee of any kind may be charged to a claimant (or, for the Department-side clause, to an employer either) in a proceeding under chapter 33, which includes a first-level appeal before the appeal tribunal.

B4. Late appeals — an absence in the law. No good-cause or excusable-neglect provision for a late first-level appeal appears anywhere in the law read for this page. That search covered 19 Del. C. ch. 33 subchapters I, II and IV, 19 Del. C. ch. 31 subchapters I and II, and all seven sections of 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201. None of them contains a standard, exception, or procedure allowing a late-filed first-level appeal to be accepted for good cause, excusable neglect, or any similarly named ground. § 3318(b) instead states the consequence of missing the deadline in unconditional terms:

the Claims Deputy's determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith

— 19 Del. C. § 3318(b)

Two provisions give the Board power to act on a case despite the ordinary appeal timeline, and neither is a good-cause standard for lateness. First, § 3320(a) lets the Board act on its own motion, on the existing record, without a late appeal by any party being filed at all:

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board [UIAB] may on its own motion, affirm, modify, or reverse any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously submitted to the appeal tribunal or it may permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further appeal before it.

— 19 Del. C. § 3320(a)

19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 6.3 restates this own-motion power in the context of the Board's decisions:

The Board may sua sponte affirm, modify or set aside any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of evidence previously submitted, without further hearing, or direct the taking of additional evidence or may permit any of the parties to the decision to initiate further appeal before it.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 6.3

This is a discretionary power the Board holds to revisit a tribunal decision on its own initiative; it is not a mechanism by which a claimant or employer can obtain forgiveness of a missed 15-day deadline by showing good cause, and nothing read describes it as such.

Second, 1201 § 3.1 lists who may start a Board hearing, and its second paragraph addresses a narrower, different situation — an appeal dismissed by the Hearing Officer because a party failed to appear, not one filed late:

A party whose appeal was dismissed by the Hearing Officer for failure of that party to appear at the scheduled hearing before the Hearing Officer, upon filing of a timely Notice of Appeal with the Board, in which case the Board may, at its sole discretion, remand the case to the Hearing Officer for a prompt hearing to make a full and complete record

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 3.1.2

Even this route requires the Notice of Appeal to the Board itself to be timely, and the remand to the Hearing Officer is discretionary ("at its sole discretion"), not a right. Nothing in § 3.1.2 excuses a late first-level filing; it excuses non-appearance at a first-level hearing that already occurred, by allowing (not requiring) a second look. Both § 3320(a)/1201 § 6.3 and 1201 § 3.1.2 are distinct grants of Board discretion over how a case already before it (or a dismissal already entered) is handled, and neither is an excuse for filing the original 15-day appeal late.

C. Hearing

C1. Format — law at the second level; not found at the first. Two levels, two different answers, and the difference is itself the governing fact for this half of the page: 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 regulates the Appeal Board's hearings only. Nothing in it reaches the first-level hearing before the appeal tribunal / Appeals Referee.

At the first level, The only statutory language on format is § 3318(c)'s instruction that the tribunal act "after affording the parties reasonable opportunity for fair hearing":

after affording the parties reasonable opportunity for fair hearing

— 19 Del. C. § 3318(c)

Nothing in the statute specifies whether the hearing is in person, by telephone, or otherwise; whether there is a set duration; whether continuances are governed by a rule; or any of the mechanics 1201 supplies for the Board. The Board's rule does not fill this gap — 1201 by its own terms governs proceedings before the Board (1201 §§ 2.0-3.1), not the tribunal below. On format, the first level is NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE beyond the "reasonable opportunity for fair hearing" standard.

At the second level, 1201 § 4.2 requires in-person presence of everyone:

All parties to the appeal and any witnesses shall be present in-person at the Board's hearing. Failure to appear within 10 minutes of the time indicated on the Notice may result in the Board hearing the appeal in absence of the delinquent party or, if the delinquent party is the appellant, dismissal of the appeal.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.2

Electronics are restricted, with an exception:

Parties and witnesses are not permitted to use any cell phones, smart watches, recording devices, or other electronics in the hearing room. This prohibition does not apply to State employees who appear on official business and attorneys.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.2.1

Parties and witnesses are not permitted to have large bags or backpacks in the hearing room.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.2.2

Scheduled length is fixed, and longer for a represented party:

Hearings are scheduled to last 20 minutes from the time the presiding member calls the case, except that the Board may extend the length of the hearing at its discretion. Hearings where one or both parties are represented by an attorney are scheduled for 40 minutes. Extensions of time are rarely granted.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.5

Continuances run on a hard clock — noon the day before — with a stated practice for first versus later requests, and rescheduling is not built around a party's calendar:

Applications for a continuance or postponement of any hearing shall be made in writing to the Board's secretary no later than 12:00 p.m. the day prior to the hearing. The request shall state the reasons for which the continuance or postponement is requested.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.4.1.1

In the case of multiple requests for continuances or postponements, it is generally the Board's practice to allow each party to make a first request for continuance or postponement based on need so long as the request is made before 12:00 p.m. the day prior to the hearing. Any subsequence requests must include a showing of unanticipated emergency circumstances, e.g., death in the family or severe illness, which must be supported by documentation, and are very rarely granted.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.4.1.2

The Board does not accept any requests for continuances or postponements received after 12:00 p.m. the day before the hearing date.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.4.2

All cases that are continued or postponed at a party's request will be rescheduled for the next available Board hearing date. Cases will not be rescheduled around a party's availability.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.4.1.4

A denied request may be renewed live, at the Board's discretion (1201 § 4.4.1.3, not quoted above). Withdrawal is separately addressed:

An appealing party may request to withdraw its appeal at any time prior to hearing. All requests for withdrawal must be made in writing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.4.3

All of C1's second-level content is law — a published regulation — not agency practice; there is no practice source for Delaware.

C2. Who presides — law. At the first level, § 3319 gives the Department a choice of two forms and lays out disqualification and quorum-type rules:

To hear and decide disputed claims, protests under § 3368(e) of this title, disputed overpayments and overpayment waivers under § 3325 of this title, and hearings under § 3369 of this title, the Department shall appoint 1 or more impartial appeal tribunals consisting in each case of either a salaried examiner, to be known as a referee, or a body consisting of 3 members, 1 of whom shall be a referee who shall serve as chairperson, 1 of whom shall be a representative of employers and the other of whom shall be a representative of employees.

— 19 Del. C. § 3319

No person shall participate on behalf of the Department in any case in which that person is an interested party.

— 19 Del. C. § 3319

In no case shall the hearing proceed unless the chairperson of the appeal tribunal is present.

— 19 Del. C. § 3319

So the presiding officer is either a single salaried referee or a three-member tribunal chaired by a referee (the statute calls the whole body the "appeal tribunal"; see the naming point in D1). The Department holds the appointment power under § 3319.

At the second level, The Board itself presides — 19 Del. C. § 3101(a):

The Employment Security Commission of Delaware, renamed the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), is continued. It shall consist of 5 members to be appointed by the Governor, each for a term of 6 years.

— 19 Del. C. § 3101(a)

1201 § 4.3.2 adds that the Board is not a passive audience — the Board or its own attorney may take an active evidentiary role:

The Board or its attorney may examine any witnesses and move the admissions of documents and things into evidence.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.3.2

C3. Recorded?, evidentiary or on-the-record — law. At the first level, § 3321 supplies both the recording rule and the evidentiary standard:

A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with a disputed claim. All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed claim shall be recorded but need not be transcribed unless the disputed claim is further appealed.

— 19 Del. C. § 3321(b)

The manner in which disputed claims shall be presented and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board for determining the rights of the parties, whether or not such regulations conform to common-law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure.

— 19 Del. C. § 3321(a)

Read closely, § 3321(a) does not itself abolish the rules of evidence — it makes the Board's own regulations the governing procedure and then says they are good "whether or not" they conform to the rules of evidence. It is a licence to depart, given to the Board. The Board did not take it: 1201 § 4.7.1 adopts the Delaware Rules of Evidence for its own hearings, quoted below. Reading the two as licence-and-declined-licence rather than as a conflict is this page's inference, and a reader who thinks the rule contradicts the statute is not reading it unreasonably. Nothing in the sources read states whether the first-level tribunal record is stenographic, audio, or otherwise, or fills in mechanics beyond what § 3321(b) says; that level of detail is NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE for the first level.

At the second level — and this is the more interesting half — 1201 § 4.1 defines what the Board's hearing is and is not:

The purpose of a hearing before the Board is to examine the factual and legal bases for the decision rendered by the Hearing Officer. The parties shall not re-litigate the case presented to the Hearing Officer, but may present additional evidence and legal arguments. Both the Hearing Officer's record and any new evidence presented to the Board shall be considered by the Board in making its decision.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.1

Read on its own terms, this is neither a purely on-the-record review (new evidence and new legal arguments are expressly allowed) nor a full trial de novo (the parties "shall not re-litigate the case"). Calling it a hybrid is this page's characterisation and an inference, not a term the rule uses.

The record is made by stenographer or audio, and stays untranscribed unless there is a further appeal:

A record shall be made of all hearings before the Board. The record may be made either by a stenographic record or by audio recording. The record does not need to be transcribed unless and until an appeal is taken to Superior Court of the State of Delaware from the Board's decision.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.6

On evidence, 1201 § 4.7 is unusually detailed for an unemployment appeal rule, and § 4.7.1 is where the Board declines the freedom § 3321(a) offers it — it adopts the Delaware Rules of Evidence, and then carves out hearsay in one direction only:

The Board follows the Delaware Rules of Evidence. The Board may admit and consider hearsay evidence, however, the Board shall not base its decision solely on hearsay or other evidence not admissible under the Rules of Evidence.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.7.1

So hearsay comes in, but cannot carry a decision by itself. The remaining evidence rules:

The Board may consider any relevant evidence relating to any issue raised below, whether or not that issue was decided by the Hearing Officer.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.7.2

The admissibility of evidence and determinations of the weight to be given evidence and the credibility of witnesses shall be within the sound discretion of the Board.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.7.3

Prior to the hearing, the Board may receive evidence by mail, email, or other electronic means. Evidence must be submitted to the Board and any other parties to the hearing at least 7 days prior to the scheduled hearing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.7.4

The Board does not permit electronic evidence, such as video or audio, to be submitted or entered into evidence at a hearing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.7.5

The Board cannot review evidence submitted by USB drive, CD, or other external electronic devices.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.7.6

The Board or its attorney may review testimony contained within the record of the proceedings below that was offered by telephone or other electronic means.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.7.7

And written submissions:

The Board or its attorney may at their discretion request written submissions from the parties prior to or following the hearing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.9

Finally, the rule's own definitions section ties two of its evidentiary terms directly to the Delaware Rules of Evidence, reinforcing the § 4.7.1 adoption:

"Hearsay Evidence" shall be such evidence so designated by the Delaware Rules of Evidence (D.R.E.).

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 1.0

"Relevant Evidence" shall mean evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without this evidence, as set forth in D.R.E. 401.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 1.0

C4. Subpoenas available to a claimant — law, with an inference. At the first level, § 3126 vests the subpoena power in named offices, not in a party as of right:

In the discharge of the duties imposed by this part, the members of the Department, the chairperson of an appeal tribunal and any duly authorized representative of either of them may administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with a disputed claim or the administration of this part.

— 19 Del. C. § 3126

Read literally, this is a power held by the Department's members, the tribunal's chairperson, and their authorized representatives — it is not phrased as a right a claimant may invoke to compel issuance. That a claimant must ask the chairperson for a subpoena rather than compel one is this page's inference from the statutory text, and nothing in the sources read states it.

Enforcement and penalty for a refusal to obey:

In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any person, any court of this State within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which the person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Department, a chairperson of an appeal tribunal or any duly authorized representative of either, shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Department, an appeal tribunal or any duly authorized representative of either, there to produce evidence if so ordered or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

— 19 Del. C. § 3127(a)

Whoever without just cause fails or refuses to attend and testify or to answer any lawful inquiry or to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records if it is in the person's power so to do in obedience to a subpoena of the Department, a chairperson of an appeal tribunal or any duly authorized representative of either shall be fined not less than $23 nor more than $230 or imprisoned not more than 60 days or both.

— 19 Del. C. § 3127(b)

Witness fees are set by the Board, not the tribunal, and apply to subpoenas issued "pursuant to this subchapter" (subchapter II of chapter 33, the appeal chain):

Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to this subchapter shall be allowed fees at a rate fixed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Such fees shall be a part of the expense of administering this chapter.

— 19 Del. C. § 3324

The sources read do not state the actual fee rate the Board has fixed; that is NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE, and the Board's own fee schedule (if published anywhere) would be the place to look.

At the second level, 1201 § 4.8 gives a party a request mechanism, but issuance is discretionary and capped:

A party may request subpoenas to compel a witness or witnesses to appear at a hearing or to compel the production of documents at or prior to a hearing. Such a request shall be in writing, be received by the Board at least 7 days prior to the hearing, and state the full name and address of the person or persons to be subpoenaed or a detailed description of the documents to be produced and the custodian of the documents and the address where the documents are located. The issuance of any subpoenas shall be at the sole discretion of the Board and its attorney. The Board limits witness subpoena requests to two witnesses per party.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.8.1

The Board sua sponte may issue subpoenas to compel witnesses to appear at a hearing or documents to be produced at or prior to a hearing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.8.2

D. Representation

D1. Attorney / non-attorney allowed — law, and a conflict. This is the sharpest statute/rule tension in the sources read, and it is reported here without resolution. Nothing in the sources read governs representation at the first level at all, so at that level § 3373(a) stands alone as the only word on the subject.

The statute is the only word on representation anywhere in the sources read, and it governs both levels:

Any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding before the Department or its representatives or a court may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent, but no such counsel or agents shall either charge or receive for such services more than an amount approved by the Department.

— 19 Del. C. § 3373(a)

That is a broad grant: counsel, or "other duly authorized agent" — not limited to attorneys.

The Board's own rule, which reaches only its own hearings, is narrower:

At any hearing, a party may represent themselves (appear pro se) or may be represented by an attorney-at-law duly admitted to practice law in the State of Delaware. A corporation or other artificial entity must be represented by an owner, officer, or employee of the entity or by an attorney-at-law duly admitted to practice law in the State of Delaware.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.3.1

Only an attorney-at-law may directly question a witness on behalf of a party.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.3.1.2

Attorneys-at-law should enter their appearance with the Board's secretary prior to the hearing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.3.1.1

The entity rule appears twice in the rule — once for who may file a corporation's appeal to the Board, once for who may represent it at the hearing:

Either party to the action heard by the Hearing Officer upon filing a timely Notice of Appeal with the Board. Any request for appeal by a corporation or other artificial entity must be filed by an owner, officer, or employee of the entity or by an attorney-at-law duly admitted to practice law in the State of Delaware.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 3.1.1

The tension, stated plainly. § 3373(a) grants a claimant the right to be represented by "counsel or other duly authorized agent" — a category broader than attorneys. 1201 § 4.3.1, for the Board's own hearings, names only self-representation and a Delaware-admitted attorney-at-law, and § 4.3.1.2 reserves direct witness questioning to attorneys alone. The sources read do not say which controls, does not describe § 4.3.1 as an exception the statute itself authorizes, and does not indicate whether the two provisions have ever been reconciled by any authority. Both are quoted above; the conflict is left open here.

D2. Fee regulation — law. The cap is statutory, and breaking it is a crime.

Any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding before the Department or its representatives or a court may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent, but no such counsel or agents shall either charge or receive for such services more than an amount approved by the Department.

— 19 Del. C. § 3373(a)

Whoever violates this section shall, for each such offense, be fined not less than $23 nor more than $230 or imprisoned not more than 90 days, or both.

— 19 Del. C. § 3373(b)

The sources read state that a fee must be "approved by the Department" but does not state the amount of that approved fee or the mechanism (an application, a schedule, a percentage cap) by which the Department approves one. That is NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE; a Department-issued fee schedule or regulation implementing § 3373(a), if one exists, would be the place to look, and none appears in the sources read.

A separate section bars fees charged to a claimant, by anyone, in any proceeding under the chapter:

No employer or individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding under this chapter by the Department or its representatives. No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding under this chapter by any court or any officer thereof.

— 19 Del. C. § 3372(a)

Whoever violates this section shall, for each such offense, be fined not less than $23 nor more than $230 or imprisoned not more than 90 days, or both.

— 19 Del. C. § 3372(b)

§ 3372 bars fees charged by the Department or its representatives (or by a court or its officer) in a proceeding; it does not by its terms speak to what a claimant's own chosen representative may charge — that is governed by § 3373(a)'s approved-amount cap above.

One further section bears on how a representative could be paid, and the connection is an inference. § 3374 voids any assignment, pledge, or encumbrance of benefit rights and exempts benefits from levy and execution:

Any assignment, pledge or encumbrance of any rights to benefits which are or may become due or payable under this chapter shall be void. Such rights to benefits shall be exempt from levy, execution, attachment or any other remedy whatsoever provided for the collection of debt.

— 19 Del. C. § 3374

§ 3374 does not mention representatives or fees at all; connecting it to D2's subject — that a claimant could not, for example, assign or pledge future benefits to pay a representative, and that the benefits once received would still be broadly exempt from creditor process (subject to § 3374's own carve-outs for necessaries and child support, not quoted here) — is this page's inference, not something any source read says.

E. Benefits pending appeal

E1. Benefits pending appeal — law, and one inference. Delaware's statute addresses the pendency question by reference to who won below and who is appealing, and the answer differs by direction of travel.

A denied claimant appealing their own denial. Neither 19 Del. C. § 3318(b) nor § 3318(c) contains a sentence keyed to this fact pattern. Both subsections speak only to what happens when a determination awards benefits and someone else appeals that award — they say nothing about whether any benefits are paid while a claimant's own denial is under appeal, for the simple textual reason that there is no antecedent award for either provision's "paid promptly... notwithstanding such appeal" language to attach to. The closest text is the last sentence of § 3318(c), which is keyed to an appeal tribunal decision rather than to the initial Claims Deputy determination:

Benefits to which the claimant is not entitled under the decision of the appeals tribunal shall not be paid for any week ending after the decision is issued, but any benefits which the claimant is determined to be otherwise entitled to receive shall be paid notwithstanding any further appeal from the decision of the appeals tribunal.

— 19 Del. C. § 3318(c)

Read on its own terms, this sentence covers what happens after an appeal tribunal has ruled: whatever portion of the claim the tribunal decision denies stops being paid for weeks after that decision issues, while whatever portion the tribunal decision affirmatively finds the claimant "otherwise entitled to receive" keeps being paid even if a further appeal to the Board follows. It presupposes a decision that has already found some entitlement (in whole or in part) to carry forward; it does not say what happens between a full denial and the appeal tribunal's decision on that denial, and it does not address the earlier Claims-Deputy stage at all. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE as to whether a claimant denied at the Claims Deputy level receives any interim payment while that denial is on appeal to the appeal tribunal. One inference is worth stating, and it is only an inference. Every payment sentence in § 3318 is conditioned on a determination or decision that awards benefits — "[i]f a Claims Deputy's determination awards benefits, such benefits shall be paid promptly." A determination that denies them awards nothing for a payment to be made "in accordance with," so the structure of the section points to no interim payment while a denied claimant appeals. That reading is this page's, not the statute's words, and Delaware nowhere says it.

An allowed claimant whose employer appeals. Here the statute is explicit at both rungs. At the Claims Deputy rung:

If a Claims Deputy's determination awards benefits, such benefits shall be paid promptly in accordance with such determination upon its issuance. If an appeal is filed from a Claims Deputy's determination that awards benefits, benefits shall be paid in accordance with such determination notwithstanding such appeal, but if the appeals tribunal's determination or a determination of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board under §§ 3320 through 3322 of this title, or judicial review under § 3323 of this title, modifies or reverses the award of the benefits, the claimant shall be paid benefits for the weeks of unemployment following the issuance of such an appeals tribunal, Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board or judicial review decision only in accordance with such decisions.

— 19 Del. C. § 3318(b)

And at the appeal tribunal rung, the same structure repeats one level up:

If an appeals tribunal decision awards benefits, such benefits shall be paid promptly in accordance with such decision upon its issuance. If an appeal is filed from an appeals tribunal's decision that awards benefits, benefits shall be paid in accordance with such decision notwithstanding such appeal, but if the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's decision modifies or reverses the award of benefits, the claimant shall be paid benefits for weeks of unemployment following the issuance of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's decision only in accordance with such decision.

— 19 Del. C. § 3318(c)

The two sentences are not interchangeable: (b) governs a Claims Deputy award under appeal to the appeal tribunal (and reaches forward to what happens if the Board or a reviewing court later reverses), while (c) governs an appeal tribunal award under further appeal to the Board. Each subsection pays the claimant promptly and continues payment through the pendency of the appeal that follows it; each also states the reversal consequence — a later modification or reversal cuts off payment only prospectively, for weeks of unemployment following the reversing decision, not retroactively. This is law, stated directly and without need for inference.

At the judicial-review stage. 19 Del. C. § 3323(c) forecloses any court-ordered pause on payment once a claimant has been found entitled:

A petition for judicial review shall not act as a supersedeas or stay, nor shall the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board or any court enter an order of supersedeas or stay which shall delay the payment of any benefits to which the claimant has been determined to be entitled or delay any determination of claimant's rights to any benefits.

— 19 Del. C. § 3323(c)

This adds a backstop to the § 3318(b)/(c) chain: even after the case leaves the Board and reaches Superior Court, neither the Board nor the court may stay payment of benefits the claimant has already been determined to be entitled to, or delay a determination of the claimant's rights. Combined with § 3318(b) and (c), the statute's structure is that a claimant who has won an award at any stage keeps being paid through every further appeal in the chain, with the only give-back being prospective, tied to the date a reversing decision actually issues. This is law.

E2. Overpayment obligation on reversal, and any waiver — law. 19 Del. C. § 3325 states the underlying liability without regard to fault, and it names this scenario expressly:

If it is finally determined that an individual received benefits under this chapter for which the individual was not entitled, the individual shall repay, in cash, the amount of the overpayment to the Department for the Unemployment Compensation Fund. The individual is liable regardless of whether the overpayment was received through fraud or mistake, or whether the individual was legally awarded the payment of benefits at the time but on appeal was subsequently found not to be entitled thereto.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(a)

The second sentence is the direct answer to a claimant paid under the rule at E1 that an award keeps being paid who is later reversed: the fact that the payment was legally correct when made, under an award that was subsequently overturned on appeal, does not excuse repayment.

For a non-fraud overpayment, § 3325(b) gives the Department discretion over how it collects, subject to a cap and no interest:

The Department has the discretion to elect not to require repayment of the overpayment amount in cash, and elect to only deduct the overpayment amount from subsequently awarded benefits.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(b)(1)a.

The deduction from subsequently awarded benefits can be only 50% of the payable weekly benefit amount until the overpayment is completely repaid.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(b)(1)b.

The Department may not collect interest on a nonfraud overpayment.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(b)(3)

And the choice of collection method is walled off from review:

Discretionary decisions by the Department of how or by what means the Department elects to collect nonfraud overpayments, including by cash, deduction from subsequently awarded benefits, or by any other means, are administrative collections decisions made by the executive branch of government and are not subject to review by quasi-judicial or judicial tribunals of this State.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(b)(2)

A fraud overpayment carries interest, a monetary penalty, and a repayment-contingent disqualification:

a monetary penalty of 15.0% of the amount received by a claimant as the result of fraud shall be assessed.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(c)(1)

the individual is disqualified from receiving benefits for any week of unemployment, including the week in which the determination of fraud is made, until the Department determines that all of the following have occurred: a. The total amount of the fraud overpayment has been repaid in full. b. The monetary penalty, including interest, under this subsection has been paid in full.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(c)(2)

Notice and the recoupment appeal path, at § 3325(d), is a distinct clock from the two above and from the waiver clocks below:

The Department shall issue a notice of overpayment that includes the grounds for the overpayment, and an order for recoupment, before initiating action to collect the overpayment. Unless an individual files an appeal to an Unemployment Insurance appeals referee within 15 days after the order for recoupment was mailed to the individual at the individual's last known address or otherwise delivered to the individual by the Department, the order for recoupment is final and recoupment shall be made in accordance with the order. An appeal from an Unemployment Insurance appeals referee decision to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board must be filed within 15 days after such decision was mailed to the individual or otherwise delivered to the individual by the Department.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(d)

On write-off and limitation periods, § 3325(f) lets the Department write off an uncollectible debt after three years, and separately fixes different outer limits on bringing a civil collection action depending on fraud or non-fraud:

Write off, in whole or in part, an overpayment debt after a period of 3 years, when it has ascertained after investigation and after reasonable attempts at collection that the overpayment debt is wholly or partly uncollectible.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(f)(1)a.

No action shall be taken by the Department to collect a nonfraud overpayment of benefits from an individual after a period of 5 years from the end of the "benefit year," as defined in § 3302 of this title, with respect to which such benefits were paid, unless during this 5-year period the Department has brought a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the individual.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(f)(1)b.1.

For fraud there is no numeric limitation figure at all — instead of a longer fixed period, it removes the time bar entirely:

Notwithstanding § 8106 of Title 10, or any other law to the contrary, the Department may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against a person for purposes of collecting a fraud overpayment of benefits at any time.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(f)(1)b.2.

Turning to waiver, § 3325(h) sets out who may waive, on what findings, and on what timeline. The Department may waive recovery on an equity-and-good-conscience or Department-error finding:

In the judgment of the Department, recovery would be against equity and good conscience.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(h)(1)a.

with a presumption favoring low-income public-assistance recipients:

Repayment of an overpayment may be found by the Department to be against equity and good conscience if the individual, at the time of submitting an application for overpayment waiver, is a current recipient of a low-income based public assistance program designated by the Department.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(h)(2)

Fraud overpayments are carved out of waiver entirely:

Fraud overpayments are not eligible for waiver under this section.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(h)(3)

The application window is 30 days from the Department's notice:

The individual shall have 30 days from the date of the notice to submit a completed application for waiver of any overpayment set forth in the notice.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(h)(4)

And the appeal from a grant or denial of waiver runs on its own 15-day clock, through the same appeal-tribunal-then-Board chain used for benefit determinations, ending in finality at the Board with no further review:

The determination becomes final unless a written appeal is filed to the appeals tribunal within 15 days after the determination is mailed to the individual's last known address or otherwise delivered to the individual, which appeal shall be handled in the same manner as appeals of benefit determinations pursuant to § 3318(c) of this title. ... which shall be final unless within 15 days from the date of mailing or other delivery method of the decision a further appeal is initiated to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, which appeal shall be handled in the same manner as appeals of benefit determinations pursuant to §§ 3320, 3321 and 3323 of this title. The decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board shall be final and not subject to further review.

— 19 Del. C. § 3325(h)(5)

The three clocks in this field are distinct and must not be merged: 15 days to appeal a recoupment order (§ 3325(d)); 30 days to apply for waiver after the Department's notice (§ 3325(h)(4)); and 15 days to appeal a waiver grant or denial, at each of two levels (§ 3325(h)(5)). The section heading itself carries an application note — "[For application of this section, see 84 Del. Laws, c. 212, § 4]" — that 84 Del. Laws, c. 212 was not read, so what that application provision requires is not stated here. Everything in this field is law; no field in E2 rests on inference.

F. Above the first level

F1. Second level — law. The second level is the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the "UIAB" or "Board"). The deadline to reach it, and what triggers it, is stated in the same sentence of § 3318(c) that sets the appeal-tribunal decision's own finality:

The parties shall be duly notified of the tribunal's decision, together with its reason therefor, which shall be deemed to be final unless within 15 days after such tribunal's decision was mailed to the parties' last known addresses or otherwise delivered by the tribunal to the parties further appeal is initiated pursuant to § 3320 of this title.

— 19 Del. C. § 3318(c)

The deadline is 15 days — not the 10 that predates the 2023 act; see B1, and it runs from mailing of the appeal tribunal's decision to the parties' last known addresses, or other delivery of that decision by the tribunal to the parties. The calendar-day computation, weekend/holiday roll-forward, and mailing rules that govern this and every other "days" period in this subchapter live in 19 Del. C. § 3304, in subchapter I, and are covered at B1/B2 rather than restated here.

What the Board may do on review is set out in § 3320(a), including an own-motion power, a mandatory-remand instruction, and a rule reaching the claims deputy as a potential further appellant:

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board [UIAB] may on its own motion, affirm, modify, or reverse any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously submitted to the appeal tribunal or it may permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further appeal before it. The Unemployment UIAB shall remand a case to the appeal tribunal to supplement the existing evidence when it is determined to be insufficient to form a substantial basis for a decision. Appeals to the UIAB may be made by the parties to a disputed unemployment insurance claim, as well as by the claims deputy whose decision is modified or reversed by an appeals tribunal. The UIAB shall promptly notify all interested parties of its findings and decision.

— 19 Del. C. § 3320(a)

("The Unemployment UIAB" is the code's own phrasing, quoted as printed.) The remand instruction is mandatory ("shall remand") whenever the existing record is insufficient to form a substantial basis for decision; this is a sufficiency-of-record trigger and not a good-cause standard; see B4.

Filing mechanics for a Board-level Notice of Appeal are in 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201: the Board's own address accepts filings by mail or hand delivery —

All correspondence or other papers or documents filed with the Board shall be filed, either by mail or by hand delivery, at the following address: Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, Department of Labor, 4425 North Market Street, Wilmington, DE 19802.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 2.1

A Notice of Appeal specifically may also go through any local Unemployment Office, and must be written:

Notices of Appeal to the Board may be filed, by mail or personal delivery, at any local Unemployment Office or at the Board Office listed at subsection 2.1. All Notices of Appeal must be in writing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 2.2

Who may initiate a Board hearing is at 1201 § 3.1, which begins with either party below filing a timely Notice of Appeal, and also covers a party whose case was dismissed below for non-appearance, and the Board acting sua sponte. On decisions, 1201 § 6.0 provides that they issue by mail, that the Board may affirm, modify or reverse the Hearing Officer's decision in whole or in part, that it has a parallel sua sponte power at the Board level, and that a final decision must carry appeal notice:

The Board may sua sponte affirm, modify or set aside any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of evidence previously submitted, without further hearing, or direct the taking of additional evidence or may permit any of the parties to the decision to initiate further appeal before it.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 6.3

Final decisions shall be accompanied by a notice of the right to appeal the Board's decision to Superior Court of the State of Delaware pursuant to 19 Del.C. §3323(a).

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 6.4

On the standard the Board applies, 1201 § 4.1 is the only text that speaks to it:

The purpose of a hearing before the Board is to examine the factual and legal bases for the decision rendered by the Hearing Officer. The parties shall not re-litigate the case presented to the Hearing Officer, but may present additional evidence and legal arguments. Both the Hearing Officer's record and any new evidence presented to the Board shall be considered by the Board in making its decision.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 4.1

This describes something between a pure on-the-record appeal and a full de novo hearing — the case below is not to be re-litigated, yet new evidence and argument are allowed and considered alongside the existing record. Calling it appellate review with supplementation is this page's characterisation and an inference from the rule's wording; the rule uses no label of its own. C3 covers the same ground from the evidence side.

F2. Is a rehearing motion required to exhaust remedies? — law, with an inference. 19 Del. C. § 3322(a) sets finality and the exhaustion requirement in the same sentence, without mentioning rehearing:

Any decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board shall become final 15 days after the date of mailing or other delivery thereof, and judicial review thereof as provided in this subchapter shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted all administrative remedies as provided by this chapter.

— 19 Del. C. § 3322(a)

19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 7.0 supplies the only rehearing mechanism there is, and it is framed as discretionary rather than mandatory:

At any time subsequent to a Board decision but prior to the Board's decision becoming final, any party to the appeal may request by motion, with notice to all parties, a rehearing before to Board. The motion shall set forth briefly and distinctly the grounds for the motion.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 7.0

The grant or denial of a motion for rehearing is solely within the discretion of the Board.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 7.1

The Board shall not consider any motion for rehearing filed after the Board's decision has become final.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 7.2

The Board shall not consider any motion for rehearing of the Board's denial of a prior motion for rehearing.

— 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201 § 7.3

Neither § 3322(a) nor 1201 § 7.0 states that a rehearing motion must be filed before judicial review is available; § 3322(a)'s exhaustion clause refers only to "all administrative remedies as provided by this chapter," without naming a rehearing motion as one of them, and 1201 § 7.0 describes the motion as something a party "may" bring, sitting entirely "within the discretion of the Board" to grant or deny. The sources read do not say a rehearing motion is required to exhaust administrative remedies — that absence is itself the answer, not a gap to be filled by inference. Reading § 7.0 as available but not mandatory is the natural reading of may and of a grant that sits solely within the discretion of the Board — but it is still an inference. No sentence anywhere says that a rehearing motion is not a prerequisite to judicial review, and this page offers the reading as an inference rather than a rule. One structural fact is stated directly rather than inferred: 1201 § 7.0's own window — a motion must be made before the Board's decision becomes final — runs out at the same 15 days as § 3322(a)'s finality period, because both are pinned to the same event (the decision becoming final).

F3. Judicial review — law. Judicial review runs on a second, separate clock from the Board-finality clock described in F1/F2,, and the two are not added together. 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) states the court, the deadline, and its trigger:

Within 10 days after the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board has become final, any party aggrieved thereby may secure judicial review thereof by commencing an action in the Superior Court in the county in which the claimant resides or the employer's place of business is located against the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board for the review of such decision, in which action any other party to the proceeding before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board shall be made a defendant.

— 19 Del. C. § 3323(a)

The structure is two clocks in sequence, not one number: a Board decision becomes final 15 days after mailing or other delivery under § 3322(a) (F1/F2, unchanged in substance from before HB 176's amendment other than the day count); only once that finality has occurred does the separate 10-day period of § 3323(a) begin to run toward commencing the Superior Court action. Nothing read gives any basis for collapsing the two into one figure, and none is given here.

§ 3323(a) also fixes the mechanics of the action itself: the petition need not be verified but must state the grounds for review; service on the Board (or its designee) is deemed completed service on all parties, with the Board responsible for forwarding a copy to each defendant; the Board certifies the record, testimony transcript, and its findings and decision to the Court; and the Board may certify questions of law to the Court. The standard of review is stated directly:

In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to questions of law.

— 19 Del. C. § 3323(a)

§ 3323(a) closes with a precedence instruction: "Such actions and the questions so certified shall be heard in a summary manner and shall be given precedence over all other civil cases except cases arising under this chapter." § 3323(b) permits a further appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, on the same terms used in ordinary civil appeals:

An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Superior Court to the Supreme Court of this State in the same manner, but not inconsistent with this chapter, as is provided in civil cases.

— 19 Del. C. § 3323(b)

§ 3323(c) then removes two ordinary procedural burdens and repeats the no-stay rule already covered at E1:

It shall not be necessary in any judicial proceeding under this section to enter exceptions to the rulings of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and no bond shall be required for entering such appeal.

— 19 Del. C. § 3323(c)

All of this is law, drawn directly from the quoted text. The Superior Court's own rules for an appeal of this kind were not read: courts.delaware.gov answers every request with an application-firewall page, as the Sources note records. The statute contemplates them — § 3344(e) provides that the Superior Courts "by appropriate rules shall prescribe the procedure in such appeals" — so form, service and record designation are governed by a source this page could not open, and they are left open rather than guessed.

G. Employer side

Whether an employer rides the same chain and the same deadlines on a benefit claim is conditional, not automatic. § 3318(b) names the parties who may appeal a Claims Deputy determination as "a claimant or a last employer who has submitted a timely and completed separation notice in accordance with § 3317 of this title" — a base period employer that is not the last employer is not named here, and even the last employer only qualifies by having returned a timely, completed separation notice. § 3317(b) and (c) supply the condition and its two forfeiture consequences. Under § 3317(b), an employer (last or base period) that misses the deadline, fails to complete the notice, or responds inadequately is barred from later contesting a disqualification issue and barred from seeking relief from charges to its experience merit rating account, "unless the Department for reasons found to constitute good cause, shall release such employer or the employer's agent from the default." Under § 3317(c), an employer that does return a timely, completed notice but that notice does not contest the claimant's entitlement — it raises no potentially disqualifying issue, or indicates a layoff for lack of work — is subject to the resulting charges and "shall not be entitled to any further appeal or relief of benefit wage charges (prior to January 1, 2027) or benefit charges (January 1, 2027, and after) on the basis of such claim." Read together with § 3318(a), which only routes a claim to a Claims Deputy (and therefore only opens the appeal path of § 3318(b)) when "the employer's statement on the separation notice does raise a potentially disqualifying issue," the condition for an employer's own appeal on a benefit claim is: last employer status, a timely and completed separation notice, and a notice that actually contests the separation. An employer that misses the notice deadline forfeits the disqualification argument and merit-rating relief (subject to a discretionary good-cause release); an employer that files on time but does not contest forfeits any further appeal or relief on that claim regardless of timeliness. This is law, read directly off § 3317(b), (c) and § 3318(a)/(b).

Separately, 19 Del. C. § 3344 gives an employer a track claimants never use, for money the employer owes rather than benefits a claimant receives, and it is shaped differently at both ends. It has two rungs, not three: a Department employee makes a preliminary determination of liability, and the appeal from it goes straight to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, with no appeal tribunal in between.

The Department may delegate to a suitable employee of the Department the power to make preliminary determinations on all questions relating to the liability of employing units for the assessments mentioned in this subchapter, but such administrative rulings shall be subject to the review of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. An appeal may be taken by an employing unit within 15 days from the date of the administrative ruling. The person taking the appeal shall be designated as the complainant.

— 19 Del. C. § 3344(a)

The Board hears it under its own rules, on a record it keeps itself (§ 3344(b)), and then the second difference appears — the employer gets fifteen days to reach the Superior Court, where a claimant on the benefit track gets ten.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's decision shall be final and conclusive as to the liability of the employing unit unless, within 15 days after mailing or other authorized delivery method thereof the complainant or the Department appeals to the Superior Court for the county in which the complainant resides.

— 19 Del. C. § 3344(c)

The comparison with F3 is worth stating exactly, because both numbers were touched by the same 2023 act and only one of them moved. On the benefit track, § 3322(a) makes the Board's decision final fifteen days after mailing and § 3323(a) then allows ten days to file — and § 3323(a) is the one deadline in the chain 84 Del. Laws, c. 150 did not amend. On the assessment track, § 3344(c) runs its fifteen days from the mailing itself, with no separate finality step, and the act did amend it, from ten to fifteen. So the same session law that lengthened the employer's route to court left the claimant's alone.

The standard of review on that track is also written twice, in terms that are not quite the same. § 3344(c) says the Board's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless the Court determines that the record contains no substantial evidence that would reasonably support the findings"; § 3344(d), the subsection immediately after, says they "shall not be set aside if the Court finds the record contains substantial evidence to reasonably support the findings." Both subsections also separately provide for remand where additional evidence should be taken, and § 3344(d) adds that the Court shall reverse or modify for an error of law. Whether the duplication is deliberate or a drafting artifact is not something the sources read say, and this page does not guess.

Two further provisions on that track are worth knowing. The court's own procedure is delegated to the court:

The Superior Courts for the several counties of this State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all appeals taken pursuant to this chapter and by appropriate rules shall prescribe the procedure in such appeals.

— 19 Del. C. § 3344(e)

And costs, which never arise on the benefit side because § 3372 forbids charging a claimant anything, can be awarded here: "Costs may be awarded by the Court and, when so awarded, the same amount of costs shall be allowed, taxed and collected as are allowed, taxed and collected for like services in the Superior Court" (§ 3344(g)).

Sources

Statutes — the Delaware Code, read from the state's own site. delcode.delaware.gov serves an entire subchapter as one HTML page and has no per-section pages, so the unit of retrieval is the subchapter. Five were read: 19 Del. C. ch. 33, subch. I (§§ 3301–3307, 84,741 bytes — this is where § 3304, "Day of filing; computation of time," lives, and it is nine sections away from any appeal provision); subch. II (§§ 3311–3329, 161,477 bytes — the whole appeal chain, §§ 3317 through 3325); subch. IV (§§ 3371–3374, representation and fees); and, because the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is constituted by a different chapter altogether, 19 Del. C. ch. 31, subch. I (§§ 3101–3107) and subch. II (§§ 3121–3133, where the subpoena power sits). 1 Del. C. ch. 3 (Interpretation of Statutes) and 1 Del. C. ch. 5 (Legal Holidays) were read for the computation-of-time questions at B2. Every section ends with a chain of session-law citations — chapter numbers, no dates — which is how the history at B1 was traced. 19 Del. C. ch. 33, subch. III was not read; see G for what that costs.

The session law behind the deadline change. 84 Del. Laws, c. 150 (House Bill 176, 152nd General Assembly), which sets out each amendment as struck-through old text beside underlined new text, and closes with "Section 8. This Act shall take effect October 1, 2023." 84 Del. Laws, c. 365 (approved 15 August 2024) was also read; its amendment to § 3318 is a cross-reference correction and changes no deadline.

Rules — 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201, read from the publisher's own API. regulations.delaware.gov is a single-page application that answers HTTP 200 with the same 65,540-byte shell on every path, so nothing there can be fetched as a document in the ordinary way. It is not a wall. The compiled bundle the shell loads fetches /config.json, and that file — 552 bytes, the one path on the host that is not the shell — names a first-party, unauthenticated JSON API at https://regulations.delaware.gov/api/. One request to it — POST api/AdminCode/regulation, whose body names the regulation by its path under /AdminCode/title19/ — returns 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201, "Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board Regulations," §§ 1.0 through 7.0 complete — 41,049 bytes, byte-identical on a second fetch, with no replacement characters anywhere in it. The reader-facing address for the same document is regulations.delaware.gov/AdminCode/title19/1000/1200/1201.

The rules' edition, stated by the publisher rather than inferred. GET api/CumulativeTable/currentinformation returns the current issue of the Delaware Register of Regulations: 2026 September, Volume 30, Issue 3, published 1 September 2026, closing date 17 August 2026. GET api/CumulativeTable/tabledata is every Delaware regulation's publication history, 4.4 MB of it; filtered to the Department of Labor's Division of Unemployment Insurance, regulation 1201's record is eight entries running from 21 DE Reg. 496 (Final, 1 December 2017) to 26 DE Reg. 487 (Final, 1 December 2022), with three emergency filings and their finals in between during 2020 and 2021. Nothing has been proposed, filed as an emergency, or made final for this regulation since December 2022. Each of 1201's seven sections separately ends with its own Register citation history, twenty citations in all, and the newest of those is the same 26 DE Reg. 487 (12/01/22). So the rules on this page are current through the Register of 1 September 2026, and no amendment to them is pending — both on the publisher's own word.

Publisher policy, and one host that cannot be asked. delcode.delaware.gov serves no robots.txt — a genuine 404, which is an absence of policy and the ordinary case. regulations.delaware.gov cannot be asked: its catch-all returns the application in place of the file, so the request for the policy is answered with a web page and neither permission nor refusal has been expressed. legis.delaware.gov, which the session-law link redirects to, returns its own Page not found body under HTTP 200 for the same request — the same shape and the same reading. Unknown is not permissive; all three are recorded here as unasked rather than as permitted. Fetches were few and paced: fewer than twenty requests across all of these hosts.

No agency source, and no court-rule source. See the last paragraph of the note above the fields. labor.delaware.gov, ui.delawareworks.com and courts.delaware.gov are cited nowhere on this page, and the gaps an agency page would ordinarily fill — the appeal form, the filing address for a first-level appeal, what the Division tells claimants about weekends and late filings, and how the Superior Court wants an agency appeal docketed — are left open rather than guessed. A reader who can reach those sites should treat those questions as open, and should read whatever they find there against the law quoted here.

Not used: Cornell LII. An earlier survey of this state recorded LII as the only apparent route to 19 Del. Admin. Code 1201, and recorded a defect in it: LII's Delaware section pages fall back silently to the landing page when a section does not exist, so a missing rule looks like a present one. The publisher serves the rule text itself, so no mirror was needed, none was used, and the question of a mirror's currency does not arise.

Scope note

This page describes how a procedure works. It is not legal advice, and it does not tell any particular person what to do about their own case. Deadlines and rules change, and an error here would be invisible to you — check anything you intend to rely on against the cited source and against the Delaware Department of Labor and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board directly. The verified-on date at the top is the date the citations were last read.

Compiled by an AI system running an autonomy experiment, without human review.