ucappeals.orgUnemployment appeals, state by state

Indiana — unemployment insurance benefit appeals

Agency
Department of Workforce Development (IC 22-4-18-1(a))
First-level body
Administrative law judge (IC 22-4-17-4) — the office is the "appellate division" in the rules, the "unemployment insurance appeals division" in the employer-side statute, and the "Appeals Division" on the department's own pages
Second-level body
Review board (IC 22-4-17-5) — three members appointed by the governor
Verified
2026-08-21

What is unusual here. Indiana gives fifteen days, and the clock starts on the day the department sent the determination — not the day it arrived. The statute then makes the printed date self-proving: the date shown as the date sent "is prima facie evidence that the determination was sent to the party on that date." Nothing in the unemployment article or in the department's appeal rules excuses a late appeal. There is no good-cause provision, no excusable-neglect provision, and no outer limit to argue about. The rule says a filing outside the computed period "will be considered to be untimely," and the department's handbook tells claimants that an appeal filed late "will be dismissed."

Against that, a second statute quietly hands three days back. IC 22-4-17-14 says that where a notice is served through the United States mail, "three (3) days must be added to a period that commences upon service of that notice" — and it names the sections it reaches, including section 2, the section carrying every fifteen-day appeal deadline in the chapter. The department's own rule repeats that sentence word for word. Neither the department's "File an Appeal" page nor its claimant handbook mentions the three days; both state fifteen, flat. The one crack in the reading is that section 2 starts its period when the determination was "sent," while section 14 adds its three days to a period commencing on "service." Nothing read for this page equates the two words, so this page prints both texts and does not tell anyone to count eighteen.

Indiana's appeal rules also exist twice. 646 IAC 5-10, Appellate Procedure, is the live chapter. 646 IAC 3-12 carries the same title, runs twenty-two sections with familiar headings — request for hearing before administrative law judge, conduct of hearings, decision of review board, representation, telephone hearings — and every one of those twenty-two carries no text at all. Each is marked expired or repealed, the expiries worked by a rule-sunset statute, IC 4-22-2.5, that has itself since been repealed and replaced. A page built on the appeals chapter whose number comes first would have described Indiana's appeal procedure entirely out of headings.

Above the review board there is no trial court. An Indiana unemployment appeal runs from a three-member administrative board straight to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, on two separate thirty-day clocks — thirty days to file a notice of intention to appeal, then thirty days from that notice to take the appeal — with the board's findings of fact "conclusive and binding."

A. Bodies

A1. Agency

Law. The department is created by statute, inside the separate Department of Workforce Development article rather than the Unemployment Compensation article itself:

There is created a department under IC 22-4.1-2-1 which shall be known as the department of workforce development.

— IC 22-4-18-1(a)

Law. The same section gives the department authority to administer the unemployment insurance program and to adopt rules under IC 4-22-2, and bars it from charging claimants for the services it provides under the article except as provided in IC 22-4-17-12 (transcript fees on further appeal).

Law. Rulemaking authority for the appeal rules specifically is also stated in the companion article that creates the department:

The commissioner shall adopt rules under IC 4-22-2 necessary to implement this article.

— IC 22-4.1-3-3

Every rule in 646 IAC article 5 read for this page cites both IC 22-4-18-1 and IC 22-4.1-3-3 as its authority.

A2. First-level body

Law. The statutory office is the administrative law judge, and the statute carves the office out from Indiana's general administrative-law-judge statute:

The department shall employ one (1) or more administrative law judges to hear and decide disputed claims. Administrative law judges employed under this section are not subject to IC 4-21.5 or any other statute regulating administrative law judges, unless specifically provided.

— IC 22-4-17-4(a)

Law. The rules add a bar-membership qualification the statute does not itself state:

All administrative law judges shall be: (1) admitted to the practice of law in the state of Indiana; and (2) a member in good standing of the Indiana Bar.

— 646 IAC 5-10-4(a)

Practice. The department's own materials place the administrative law judges inside a named division:

All appeals are handled by Administrative Law Judges assigned to the Appeals Division.

— Indiana DWD Claimant Handbook (practice, not law)

No statute or rule read for this page uses the name "Appeals Division"; it is the department's own label for where its administrative law judges sit. The department's "File an Appeal" page similarly refers in passing to "the Appeals Division" without defining it in law.

A3. Second-level body

Law. The review board is a three-member, gubernatorially appointed body with a bar-membership requirement for at least one seat:

The governor shall appoint a review board composed of three (3) members, not more than two (2) of whom shall be members of the same political party, with salaries to be fixed by the governor. The review board shall consist of the chairman and the two (2) members who shall serve for terms of three (3) years. At least one (1) member must be admitted to the practice of law in Indiana.

— IC 22-4-17-5(a)

Law. Two members constitute a quorum for the board's business:

Two (2) members of the review board shall constitute a quorum for the: (1) transaction of any business; and (2) performance of any act required or authorized to be transacted or performed by the review board.

— 646 IAC 5-10-10(b)

B. First-level appeal

B1. Deadline

Law. Fifteen calendar days, running from the date the determination was sent — not received, and not mailed in the sense of postmarked, but sent:

Unless the individual, within fifteen (15) days after the determination was sent by the department to the individual, asks for a hearing before an administrative law judge, the determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the determination. The date listed under date sent on the determination of eligibility is prima facie evidence that the determination was sent to the party on that date.

— IC 22-4-17-2(a)(1)

Law. A second, separately worded fifteen days governs the notice of a disputed eligibility or disqualification determination — the "Determination of Eligibility" that the department's own appeal instructions point to — and it too runs from the date sent:

Except as otherwise provided in this section regarding parties located in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, unless the claimant or the employer, within fifteen (15) days after the notification required by subsection (e), was sent by the department to the claimant or the employer, asks for a hearing before an administrative law judge, the decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

— IC 22-4-17-2(f)

Law. The request itself has a stated form requirement:

If a claimant or an employer requests a hearing under subsection (f) or (g), the request shall be filed with the department within the prescribed periods provided in this section and shall be in the form and manner prescribed by the department.

— IC 22-4-17-2(h)

Law — a separate fifteen days that restarts, not extends, the clock. Where the department corrects its own "obvious administrative error" on a determination, the appeal period runs anew from the correction, not from the original determination:

Solely on the ground of obvious administrative error appearing on the face of an original determination, and within the benefit year of the affected claims, the commissioner, or a representative authorized by the commissioner to act in the commissioner's behalf, may reconsider and direct the deputy to revise the original determination so as to correct the obvious error. Time for filing an appeal and requesting a hearing before an administrative law judge regarding the determinations handed down pursuant to this subsection shall begin on the date following the date of revision of the original determination and shall be filed with the commissioner in the form and manner prescribed by the department within the prescribed periods provided in subsection (c).

— IC 22-4-17-2(j)

Law — the three-day mail question, stated precisely. Two instruments — one a statute, one a rule — say that three days are added to a period when notice is served by mail. The statute states which sections it reaches:

This section applies to notices given under sections 2, 3, 11, and 12 of this chapter. This section does not apply to rules adopted by the department, unless specifically provided.

— IC 22-4-17-14(a)

Section 2 is the section that states the fifteen-day appeal deadlines quoted above. The same statute then adds the three days:

If a notice is served through the United States mail, three (3) days must be added to a period that commences upon service of that notice.

— IC 22-4-17-14(c)

The rule made under the department's general rulemaking authority says the identical sentence:

If a notice is served through the United States mail, three (3) days must be added to a period that commences upon service of that notice.

— 646 IAC 5-10-19(c)

Inference. Both the three-day provisions and the fifteen-day deadlines sit in the same chapter, and IC 22-4-17-14(a) expressly says the three-day rule applies to notices given under section 2 — the section containing the fifteen-day clocks quoted above. But section 2's own text starts its clock from the date the determination "was sent," while section 14(c) adds three days to a period that "commences upon service of that notice." Whether an item that is "sent" by mail is thereby "served" — such that the three days apply to extend the fifteen — is not stated by either provision, and this page does not resolve it or add the three days to the fifteen. A person relying on eighteen days rather than fifteen would be relying on an inference this page does not draw.

Practice. The department's own instructions to appellants state the deadline as fifteen days from the sent date, without mentioning the three-day mail provision at all:

Indiana state law requires that to file an appeal for a hearing in front of an Administrative Law Judge you must do the following within 15 days from the "sent" date on the Determination of Eligibility

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

The claimant handbook states the same fifteen days from the sent date and adds a consequence for missing it:

Appeals must be filed within the statutorily required fifteen (15) day time limit from the date the department sent this Determination of Eligibility. Any appeal not filed within the timeframe allowed by Indiana law will be dismissed.

— Indiana DWD Claimant Handbook (practice, not law)

B2. Weekend / holiday rule

Law. Indiana's general statute on construction of statutes, IC 1-1-4-1, is opened here for the computation-of-time question and contains no such provision. Its six numbered rules cover plain meaning, joint authority, singular/plural, gender, performance by an agent, and disqualification for interest — nothing about deadlines or how to count days:

The construction of all statutes of this state shall be by the following rules, unless the construction is plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or of the context of the statute:

— IC 1-1-4-1

Law. The weekend/holiday rule instead comes from the appellate-procedure rule, and it has four branches, not the usual two or three:

When computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this article, by order of an administrative law judge or the review board, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is: (1) a Saturday; (2) a Sunday; (3) a legal holiday as defined by state statute; or (4) a day that the department is closed during regular business hours. If the last day of the response period falls on a day described in subdivisions (1) through (4), then the period runs until the end of the next regular business day of the department.

— 646 IAC 5-10-19(f)

Law. The same rule states plainly that missing the computed deadline, however computed, is untimely:

Responses filed outside of a time period computed pursuant to this section will be considered to be untimely.

— 646 IAC 5-10-19(g)

Inference. The fourth branch — "a day that the department is closed during regular business hours" — is broader than a fixed list of state holidays; it turns on whether the department in fact closed that day, a fact not stated in either instrument read for this page.

B3. How to file; required form

Law. The rule states the filing obligation in general terms and requires a copy of the determination being appealed, but sets no numbered or titled form:

A party appealing a determination issued by the department shall file its appeal in the manner prescribed by the department. The appealing party shall include with its appeal a copy of the determination being appealed.

— 646 IAC 5-10-2(c)

No numbered or titled appeal form is prescribed by statute or rule read for this page. IC 22-4-17-2(h), quoted at B1, likewise defers the form and manner of the request to the department rather than stating one itself.

Practice — and the agency states it two different ways in two of its own documents. The department's public "File an Appeal" page lists three channels and no others:

File the appeal within fifteen (15) days from the date your "Determination of Eligibility" was sent by one of these methods: Mail the appeal to 10 North Senate Avenue, Indianapolis, IN 46204; Fax the appeal to (317) 233-6888; Deliver the appeal in person to the Department at 10 N. Senate Ave., Indianapolis, IN 46204.

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

The claimant handbook adds a fourth channel the "File an Appeal" page does not mention:

Claimants may appeal online by going to the Issue History section on their Uplink Claimant Self-Service (CSS) Homepage and selecting "File Appeal." Appeals may also be faxed to (317) 233-6888.

— Indiana DWD Claimant Handbook (practice, not law)

The same handbook page directs the reader to a second department web address for filing instructions:

Information on how to file an appeal may be found either at a WorkOne Center or by visiting the following website address: http://www.in.gov/dwd/2456.htm

— Indiana DWD Claimant Handbook (practice, not law)

That address returned a 404 as of the date this page was verified. Neither the mismatch between the two agency documents (online filing named in one, absent from the other) nor the dead link is resolved by anything in the statute or rules; both are reported here as features of the department's own materials, not of the law.

Practice. The "File an Appeal" page also states content requirements not found in the rule text: a legible written statement of the reasons for disagreement, a signature identifying the signer as claimant or employer, a mailing address and telephone number, the last four digits of the claimant's Social Security number, and a copy of the determination being appealed.

B4. Late appeals

NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE. No statute or rule read for this page — IC 22-4-17 in full, 646 IAC 5-1, 5-7, 5-9, and 5-10 in full, or the practice and handbook material — states a good-cause, excusable-neglect, or equivalent exception under which a first-level appeal filed after the fifteen days could be treated as timely. 646 IAC 5-10-19(g), quoted at B2, states only that a late filing "will be considered to be untimely," with no exception attached. The handbook states the same thing to claimants directly, also with no exception: "Any appeal not filed within the timeframe allowed by Indiana law will be dismissed" (quoted in full at B1).

Law — two "good cause" standards nearby that are not this one. The same rule chapter that governs the appeal uses "good cause" twice, for different filings than the notice of appeal itself. First, for continuing a hearing that has already been scheduled:

An administrative law judge or the review board may continue any hearing upon its own motion, or upon request by any party to the appeal. The request must be received not later than three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the requesting party can demonstrate an unforeseen emergency. The request must set forth good cause for the granting of the request.

— 646 IAC 5-10-6(a)

Second, for reinstating an appeal that the appealing party itself withdrew:

After an appeal has been withdrawn, the appealing party may file a request for reinstatement of the appeal within seven (7) days after the date the notice of withdrawal was sent. ... The request for reinstatement must show good cause for the reinstatement, and will be granted or denied at the discretion of the director of unemployment insurance appeals, or the director's designee, or the chairperson of the review board, or the chairperson's designee, depending upon the level of the appeal. No appeal shall be reinstated more than once after a withdrawal.

— 646 IAC 5-10-7(b)

Neither provision reaches a party who simply files the original notice of appeal after the fifteen days have run. The obvious-administrative-error mechanism at IC 22-4-17-2(j), quoted at B1, is also not a late-filing exception: it is triggered by the department's own revision of its determination, not by a showing from the claimant or employer, and it runs a fresh fifteen days from the revision rather than excusing a late filing against the original one.

C. Hearing

C1. Format

Law. Two rules both make telephone the default, and they are not the same rule. The first sits in the general hearings chapter and speaks only to the administrative law judge level:

All hearings held before an administrative law judge shall be held by telephone, unless otherwise directed by the commissioner, the commissioner's designee, or the administrative law judge having jurisdiction over the case, or as otherwise provided in this article.

— 646 IAC 5-10-3

The second is its own numbered section, titled "Telephone hearings," and reaches both levels:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, all hearings scheduled before an administrative law judge, or the review board, shall be set as telephone hearings, in which all parties to the appeal shall participate by telephone.

— 646 IAC 5-10-24(a)

Law. A companion statute states the same telephone-default rule for both levels in nearly identical terms, and adds a right to object that the rule cross-references:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, all hearings scheduled before an administrative law judge or the review board shall be set as telephone hearings, in which all parties to the appeal shall participate by telephone or other means of electronic communication.

— IC 22-4-17-8.5(b)

A party to a hearing scheduled by telephone has a right to object to telephone or electronic participation and be allowed to participate in the hearing in person. An objection shall be filed in accordance with the procedures set out in 646 IAC 5-10-24.

— IC 22-4-17-8.5(c)

Law. The rule's own version of that right is the operative text for a claimant, quoted in full because it is the field's central claimant-facing provision. It is a right, conditioned on a deadline, and it makes the other party's in-person attendance a matter of the judge's discretion rather than the objecting party's choice:

Once an administrative law judge hearing is scheduled by telephone, a party to the appeal has the right to: (1) object to telephone participation; and (2) be allowed to participate in the hearing in person. Such an objection must be filed with the administrative law judge assigned to the case not later than three (3) days prior to the scheduled hearing date. A revised notice of hearing will then be sent to the parties, changing the type of hearing for the requesting party to an in-person hearing at the hearing site closest to where the employment services were performed. Whether the nonrequesting party will also be required to participate in person shall be at the discretion of the administrative law judge assigned to the case.

— 646 IAC 5-10-24(b)

Law. Both the administrative law judge and the review board also retain a freestanding discretion to schedule an in-person hearing on their own initiative, independent of any party's objection:

An administrative law judge, or the review board, may, at their discretion, schedule and conduct an in-person hearing under this rule.

— 646 IAC 5-10-24(c)

Law. At the review board level specifically, the default is telephone at a fixed location, again subject to the board's own contrary direction:

Unless otherwise directed by the review board, all hearings before the review board shall be conducted by telephone in the office of the review board in Indianapolis, Indiana.

— 646 IAC 5-10-11(a)

Video hearings are NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE. IC 22-4-17-8.5(b) adds "or other means of electronic communication" to the statutory default, but no rule read for this page names videoconferencing as a hearing format or an alternative a party may elect.

Practice. The department's public appeal page and the claimant handbook both describe telephone as the practical norm and give the claimant no separate instruction for requesting an in-person hearing:

Most hearings are scheduled as telephone hearings where the Administrative Law Judge calls both parties.

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

If your case is being heard by telephone, this means that you must be available for the telephone call when the Administrative Law Judge tries to contact you.

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

C2. Who presides

Law. At the first level, an administrative law judge employed by the department:

The department shall employ one (1) or more administrative law judges to hear and decide disputed claims. Administrative law judges employed under this section are not subject to IC 4-21.5 or any other statute regulating administrative law judges, unless specifically provided.

— IC 22-4-17-4(a)

Inference. IC 4-21.5 is Indiana's general Administrative Orders and Procedures Act, the state's ordinary APA. This section removes the unemployment chapter's administrative law judges from that general framework by name, leaving the chapter 17 and 646 IAC 5-10 provisions read here as the governing procedure rather than a supplement to it.

Law. The rules add an admission requirement the statute does not state:

All administrative law judges shall be: (1) admitted to the practice of law in the state of Indiana; and (2) a member in good standing of the Indiana Bar.

— 646 IAC 5-10-4(a)

Law. Training is mandatory and recurring, and noncompliance is a disciplinary matter — an unusual pairing worth setting out in full:

The department shall provide at least annually to all administrative law judges, review board members, and other individuals who adjudicate claims training concerning: (1) unemployment compensation law; (2) rules for the conduct of hearings and appeals; and (3) rules of conduct for administrative law judges, review board members, and other individuals who adjudicate claims during a hearing or other adjudicative process.

— IC 22-4-17-4(b)

An individual who does not strictly comply with the law and the rules described in subsection (b), including the rules of conduct for administrative law judges, review board members, and other individuals who adjudicate claims during a hearing or other adjudicative process, is subject to disciplinary action by the department, up to and including suspension from or termination of employment.

— IC 22-4-17-4(d)

Law. Impartiality is separately codified, naming the grounds for disqualification:

An administrative law judge may not preside over or otherwise participate in the hearing or disposition of an appeal in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including instances where the judge: (1) has: (A) personal bias or prejudice concerning a party; or (B) personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the appeal; (2) has served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy; or (3) knows that the judge has any direct or indirect financial or other interest in the subject matter of an appeal or in a party to the appeal.

— IC 22-4-17-15(a)

Law. Change of the assigned judge is a separate, party-initiated mechanism, discretionary and limited to one use:

Upon written application to the director of unemployment insurance appeals, a party to a hearing before an administrative law judge may request a change of the assigned judge. The requesting party must establish good cause for the change, and the decision to change is at the discretion of the director of unemployment insurance appeals. A party is entitled to only one (1) change of judge.

— 646 IAC 5-10-21

Law. At the second level, a three-member review board, at least one of whom must be a lawyer:

The governor shall appoint a review board composed of three (3) members, not more than two (2) of whom shall be members of the same political party, with salaries to be fixed by the governor. The review board shall consist of the chairman and the two (2) members who shall serve for terms of three (3) years. At least one (1) member must be admitted to the practice of law in Indiana.

— IC 22-4-17-5(a)

Two members constitute a quorum. 646 IAC 5-10-10(b).

C3. Recorded; evidentiary or on the record

Law. This is the central tension in this field, and the two instruments are not in conflict — the statute grants the department a freedom the department's own rule declines to fully exercise. The statute frees the agency from the ordinary rules of evidence:

The manner in which disputed claims shall be presented and the conduct of hearings and appeals, including the conduct of administrative law judges, review board members, and other individuals who adjudicate claims during a hearing or other adjudicative process, shall be in accordance with rules adopted by the department for determining the rights of the parties, whether or not the rules conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure.

— IC 22-4-17-6(a)

The department's own rule then adopts, "in general," the very body of rules the statute says it need not follow:

The parties to the appeal may appear for themselves, by attorney, or by duly authorized agent or representative, under section 18 of this rule, and shall have the right to examine their own witnesses, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses of the opposing party. ... In general, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and the Indiana Rules of Evidence shall govern proceedings before an administrative law judge or the review board.

— 646 IAC 5-10-5(a)

Law. The rule then writes its own, more permissive hearsay regime rather than a straight incorporation of the evidence rules:

In general, hearsay evidence shall not be considered; however, an administrative law judge shall consider all hearsay evidence as would be admissible under common law or the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Hearsay evidence that is not admissible under a recognized hearsay exception may be admitted, but shall not be entitled to the same evidentiary weight as direct testimony. Hearsay evidence properly objected to, but not falling within a recognized hearsay exception, that is admitted into the record shall not form the sole basis for a decision by an administrative law judge or the review board.

— 646 IAC 5-10-5(b)

Inference. IC 22-4-17-6(a)'s "whether or not the rules conform" language frees the department's rulemaking from an obligation to track the trial rules and evidence rules; it does not forbid the department from choosing to look to them. 646 IAC 5-10-5(a) is that choice, made "in general" rather than as a strict incorporation, and 5-10-5(b) then carves out a hearsay standard that is looser than a court's in the claimant's and employer's favor (hearsay otherwise excluded may still be admitted, just not as the sole basis for a decision). This is a permission not fully taken up, not a command overridden.

Law. The proceeding before the administrative law judge is de novo:

The proceedings before an administrative law judge are de novo, except as provided in subsection (c).

— IC 22-4-17-6(b)

Subsection (c) lets the judge consider department records made available to the parties before the hearing as part of the record. IC 22-4-17-6(c).

Law. The review board level is different in kind — confined to the administrative law judge's record unless the board itself opens it further:

Each hearing before the review board shall be confined to the evidence submitted before the administrative law judge unless it is an original hearing. Provided, however, the review board may hear or procure additional evidence upon its own motion, or upon written application of either party, and for good cause shown, together with a showing of good reason why the additional evidence was not procured and introduced at the hearing before the administrative law judge.

— 646 IAC 5-10-11(b)

Law. On recording: a full record is required, and testimony need not be transcribed unless the claim is further appealed — the statute's and the rule's phrasing track each other closely, and this page reports both:

A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with a disputed claim. The testimony at any hearing upon a disputed claim need not be transcribed unless the disputed claim is further appealed.

— IC 22-4-17-6(d)

All evidence introduced into the record at any hearing before an administrative law judge or the review board shall be preserved. All oral evidence shall be electronically recorded. Hearing recordings shall not be transcribed unless a review board decision is appealed to the Indiana court of appeals, and the transcript becomes a necessary part of the administrative record on appeal.

— 646 IAC 5-10-16

Practice. The department describes the same practice to claimants in plainer terms:

All hearings are digitally recorded. The Administrative Law Judge will review all of the evidence presented at the hearing and will issue a decision.

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

The Administrative Law Judge will follow general rules of trial procedure and evidence. However, the claimant and employer are not required to have an attorney.

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

C4. Subpoenas

Law. Issuing power is granted broadly to the department, the review board, and administrative law judges alike:

In the discharge of the duties imposed by this article, the department, the review board, an administrative law judge, or any duly authorized representative of any of them, shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue and serve subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with the disputed claim or the administration of this article.

— IC 22-4-17-7

Law. A claimant's access to a subpoena runs through the rule, and it is a request, not a right: necessity must be shown, and the outcome is discretionary.

Whenever the attendance of a witness, or the production of documents or other evidence, is desired by any party to a hearing, the party must request the issuance of a subpoena. The request must be submitted to the administrative law judge in writing or by telephone directed to the clerk of the administrative law judge. ... The request must be made in time for the subpoena to be issued, and served, prior to the time and date of the hearing. The request will be granted or denied at the discretion of the administrative law judge.

— 646 IAC 5-10-13(a)

A subpoena shall be issued only upon a showing of necessity by the party requesting the subpoena. The request for a subpoena must contain: (1) the name and address of the individual being subpoenaed; and (2) a description of the document, record, or object to be produced.

— 646 IAC 5-10-13(b)

Law. Enforcement against a noncompliant witness runs through the courts:

In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any person in the administration of this article, any court of this state within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the department, the review board, or a duly authorized representative of either of these, shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the department, the review board, an administrative law judge, or the duly authorized representative of any of these, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter in question or under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

— IC 22-4-17-8

Law — a citation worth reporting as written. 646 IAC 5-10-13's own Affected line cites IC 22-4-17-8 (the enforcement/contempt section), and subsection (c) of the rule cross-references that same section for enforcement. The general issuing power for administrative law judges, however, is granted by a different section, IC 22-4-17-7. The rule is not wrong to cite section 8 — it governs what happens when a subpoena is disobeyed — but a reader looking for the source of the issuing power itself has to go to section 7, one section earlier, which the rule's citation does not point to. This page reports the mismatch rather than correcting it.

Law. No individual may refuse to testify or produce records on self-incrimination grounds, though the compelled testimony carries a use-immunity protection:

No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records before the department, the review board, an administrative law judge, or the duly authorized representative of any of them, in obedience to the subpoena of any of them in any cause or proceeding before any of them on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of the person may tend to incriminate the person or subject the person to a penalty or forfeiture, but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which the person is compelled after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

— IC 22-4-17-9

D. Representation

D1. Attorney or non-attorney

Law. At both the administrative law judge and review board levels, the general representation rule for a claimant permits self-representation, an attorney, a certified accountant, or a labor-organization agent:

A claimant for unemployment benefits may appear: (1) in person; (2) by an attorney, as defined in subsection (e); (3) by an accountant in good standing with the Indiana board of accountancy; or (4) by an authorized agent of a bona fide labor organization to which the claimant belonged at the time the pending claim occurred.

— 646 IAC 5-10-18(b)

Law. The parallel statutory list of claimant representatives is worded almost identically, but not quite — the accountant qualification is phrased differently in the two instruments:

A claimant for benefits may be represented by: (1) the claimant in person; (2) an attorney; (3) an accountant certified by and in good standing with the state; or (4) an authorized agent of a bona fide labor organization to which the claimant belonged at the time the pending claim occurred.

— IC 22-4-17-3.2(c)

Inference. The statute's "an accountant certified by and in good standing with the state" and the rule's "an accountant in good standing with the Indiana board of accountancy" point at the same general idea — a state-credentialed accountant — but they are not the same sentence, and the rule adds a specific naming of the licensing board (the Indiana board of accountancy) that the statute does not use. This page reports the difference in wording rather than resolving it.

Law — a statutory option missing from the rule. IC 22-4-17-3.2 has a fourth subsection, immediately after the claimant list quoted above, that the representation rule at 646 IAC 5-10-18(b) does not carry forward:

In addition to the persons listed in subsection (c), a claimant for benefits may designate a lay person of the claimant's choice to assist the claimant in the presentation of the claimant's case to the administrative law judge, the review board, or another individual who adjudicates claims.

— IC 22-4-17-3.2(d)

Inference. 646 IAC 5-10-18(b)'s four-item list of who may appear for a claimant — self, attorney, accountant, labor-organization agent — has no fifth item corresponding to subsection (d)'s lay-person designee. Subsection (d) is phrased as an addition "to the persons listed in subsection (c)," and subsection (c) is the statute's own list, not the rule's; nothing read for this page states whether the rule's omission narrows the statutory allowance or is simply an unupdated cross-reference. This page reports the gap rather than resolving it.

Law. 646 IAC 5-10-18(c) adds a further, separate category not tied to either list: any individual or class of individuals the Indiana Supreme Court has authorized by rule to appear in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. 646 IAC 5-10-18(c).

Law. Both the administrative law judge and the review board retain discretion to exclude a representative for cause:

An administrative law judge, or the review board, in their discretion, may refuse to allow any person to represent a party in any proceeding before the administrative law judge, or the review board, if the administrative law judge, or the review board, finds that this person is or has been guilty of unethical conduct, or has intentionally or repeatedly failed to observe the provisions of IC 22-4, the rules of the department, or other rules or regulations relating to unemployment insurance hearings.

— 646 IAC 5-10-18(d)

Practice. The department tells claimants representation is available but optional, in materially the same substance both instruments state as law:

You have the right to be represented by an attorney at the hearing, but it is not required.

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

The Administrative Law Judge will follow general rules of trial procedure and evidence. However, the claimant and employer are not required to have an attorney. Because of this, the Administrative Law Judge will assist both parties in understanding the process and procedure.

— Indiana DWD, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

D2. Fee regulation

Law. The statute delegates the entire fee-limit question to the review board without stating a figure:

An individual claiming benefits in a proceeding before the review board, an administrative law judge, or a court may be represented by counsel or other authorized agent, but no counsel or agent may charge or receive for the counsel's or agent's service more than an amount approved by the review board.

— IC 22-4-33-2(b)

Law. The figure is supplied only by the rule: a percentage cap, expressed against the unpaid balance of the claimant's maximum benefit amount, with an exception nothing read for this page defines:

Fees charged to claimants for representation before an administrative law judge or the review board shall be in a sum subject to the approval of the review board. Except in unusual cases, this fee shall be for a sum not in excess of fifteen percent (15%) of the unpaid balance of the claimant's maximum benefit amount.

— 646 IAC 5-10-18(f)

Three things worth separating precisely in that sentence. First, the rule states an approval requirement that reads as running to every fee ("subject to the approval of the review board"), not only to a fee that exceeds the cap; nothing in the text limits the approval requirement to the unusual-case, above-cap situation. Second, the fifteen percent ceiling is measured against the unpaid balance of the claimant's maximum benefit amount — a different base than a percentage of benefits actually recovered or actually paid. Third, "[e]xcept in unusual cases" is undefined: no rule or statute read for this page states what makes a case unusual, or what ceiling, if any, applies once a case is found unusual. What "unusual cases" means is NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE.

Law. The statute's companion subsection addresses a different fee question — not the counsel's fee, but fees the department itself may charge the claimant — and cross-references a separate section for the one exception to a general no-charge rule:

Except for fees charged under IC 22-4-17-12, no individual claiming benefits may be charged fees of any kind in a proceeding by the review board, an administrative law judge, or the representative of either of them or by any court or any officer thereof.

— IC 22-4-33-2(a)

Inference. IC 22-4-17-12 is the transcript-fee section for a further appeal to the court of appeals (transcript cost charged to the appellant, with a poverty-affidavit exception). IC 22-4-33-2(a)'s cross-reference to it marks the one carve-out from the no-charge rule as being about transcript costs, not about a representative's fee — a distinct question from IC 22-4-33-2(b) and 646 IAC 5-10-18(f), which concern what a claimant's own attorney or agent may charge, not what the department or the court may charge the claimant directly. This page keeps the two separate rather than treating IC 22-4-33-2(a) and (b) as stating a single rule.

Whether the fifteen percent figure applies at the review board level, the administrative law judge level, or both is not fully separated in the rule's text — 646 IAC 5-10-18(f) refers to "representation before an administrative law judge or the review board" as a single phrase, so this page reads it as reaching both without a stated distinction between the two.

E. Benefits pending appeal

E1. Payment while an appeal is pending

The statute answers only one half of this question. Indiana Code speaks directly to what happens when a claimant has already been allowed benefits and the employer (or the department) appeals that allowance. It does not, anywhere read for this page, speak directly to what happens to a claimant who has been denied and appeals that denial.

Allowed claimant, employer appeals. Law. Payment continues by default, and undisputed weeks are carved out entirely from the appeal's effect:

If a claimant or an employer requests a hearing under subsection (f) or (g), the request shall be filed with the department within the prescribed periods provided in this section and shall be in the form and manner prescribed by the department. In the event a hearing is requested by an employer or the department after it has been administratively determined that benefits should be allowed to a claimant, entitled benefits shall continue to be paid to the claimant unless the administrative determination has been reversed by a due process hearing. Benefits with respect to any week not in dispute shall be paid promptly regardless of any appeal.

— IC 22-4-17-2(h)

Two separate rules sit inside that one subsection: continued payment of the disputed benefit runs until a "due process hearing" reverses the administrative determination, and payment of any undisputed week is not stayed by the appeal at all — it is due "promptly regardless of any appeal." Nothing in the subsection defines what counts as a "due process hearing" as distinct from the administrative law judge hearing described elsewhere in the same chapter; this page does not resolve that beyond noting the phrase appears nowhere else in the sections read.

Denied claimant appeals. Law. NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE. No section of IC 22-4-17, IC 22-4-13, or the 646 IAC 5 rules read for this page provides for payment of benefits to a claimant whose own denial is under appeal. IC 22-4-17-2(h), quoted above, is drafted only for the case where benefits were "administratively determined" to be allowed and an employer or the department is the one appealing; its continued-payment clause has no counterpart running the other direction.

Practice. The department's own materials tell a denied claimant to keep acting as though the claim were live, without saying benefits are paid in the meantime:

CLAIMANT: If you have been disqualified you should continue to file vouchers on-line. You must continue to track your work searches and maintain all necessary documents should you win your case on your appeal.

— Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Claimant Handbook (practice, not law)

You should file a weekly voucher even if you have an issue delaying your benefits or are appealing a decision. When a determination is made all eligible payments will be released.

— Indiana Department of Workforce Development, "File for Unemployment" (practice, not law)

Inference. Read together, the practice pages describe a claimant who keeps a claim alive by weekly filing during the appeal but is not described as being paid until "a determination is made" — consistent with no payment flowing while a denial is on appeal, but neither page says so as a rule, and no statute or rule read for this page states it either way as law.

E2. Overpayment and waiver

Law. Where a knowing nondisclosure or falsification caused the overpayment, interest accrues, distinct from the no-interest treatment of an ordinary overpayment:

Any individual who knowingly: (1) fails to disclose amounts earned during any week in the individual's waiting period, benefit period, or extended benefit period; (2) fails, or causes another to fail, to disclose a material fact; or (3) falsifies, or causes another to falsify, a material fact; that would disqualify the individual for benefits, reduce the individual's benefits, or render the individual ineligible for benefits or extended benefits, and as a result thereof has received any amount as benefits to which the individual is not entitled under this article, shall be liable to repay such amount, with interest at the rate of one-half percent (0.5%) per month, to the department for the unemployment insurance benefit fund or to have such amount deducted from any benefits otherwise payable to the individual under this article.

— IC 22-4-13-1(c)

Law. An ordinary (non-knowing) overpayment carries no interest, and collection by civil action has a ten-year outer limit measured from finality of the eligibility determination, including any appeal:

Where any individual is liable to repay any amount to the department for the unemployment insurance benefit fund for the restitution of benefits to which the individual is not entitled under this article, the amount due may be collectible without interest, except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), by civil action in the name of the state of Indiana, on relation of the department, which remedy by civil action shall be in addition to all other existing remedies and to the methods for collection provided in this article. The department must commence a civil action as described in this subsection not later than ten (10) years following the date the determination of eligibility becomes final, including the exhaustion of all appeals.

— IC 22-4-13-1(h)

Law. Where the overpayment was the department's own doing — a missed notice of suitable work — the claimant owes nothing back at all, though the payment is still classed as "improperly paid":

When benefits are paid to an individual who was eligible or qualified to receive such payments, but when such payments are made because of the failure of representatives or employees of the department to transmit or communicate to such individual notice of suitable work offered, through the department, to such individual by an employing unit, then and in such cases, the individual shall not be required to repay or refund amounts so received, but such payments shall be deemed to be benefits improperly paid.

— IC 22-4-13-1(f)

Law. Apart from that carve-out, the general waiver gate is a conjunctive, two-part test:

Except as provided in subsection (l), liability for repayment of benefits paid to an individual for any week may be waived upon the request of the individual if: (1) payment of the benefits was without fault of the individual, regardless of intent; and (2) repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.

— IC 22-4-13-1(i)

Law. The statute then defines the second half of that test by a number, not by a general equitable standard:

An individual's repayment of an overpayment is contrary to equity and good conscience under subsection (i) when the individual's combined household gross income is sixty-five percent (65%) or less of the current Federal Poverty Guidelines for a household of the individual's household size for the first two (2) of the last three (3) completed calendar quarters before the date the waiver request is reviewed.

— IC 22-4-13-1(j)

Law. The household for that calculation is defined by rule of its own:

(1) The size of the household is calculated using the same time period of the first two (2) of the last three (3) completed calendar quarters. (2) The individual's household consists of the individual as well as the following persons, if they share the use of the individual's dwelling: (A) The individual's spouse or partner, a person the individual has claimed or plans to claim as a dependent, and a person the individual's spouse or partner has claimed or plans to claim as a dependent. (B) A military member away on active duty so long as the military member: (i) is the head or co-head of the household; (ii) is the spouse of the individual; or (iii) has left behind a spouse or dependent child in the dwelling. (C) A child who is: (i) in joint custody agreements; and (ii) in the dwelling at least fifty percent (50%) of the time.

— IC 22-4-13-1(k)

Law. Subsection (i)'s opening clause — "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (l)" — points to two categories the waiver gate does not reach at all:

A request for waiver under subsection (i) will not be considered in the following circumstances: (1) An overpayment of benefits paid under any state or federal unemployment compensation law, which were due to a final determination or decision made under: (A) section 1.1(a) of this chapter; or (B) any federal unemployment compensation law which subjects individuals to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1001. (2) An overpayment of benefits or extended benefits paid to an individual employed by an employer electing to make payments in lieu of contributions, except that this subdivision does not apply to programs for which the employer is not chargeable for benefit payments.

— IC 22-4-13-1(l)

The first excluded category is a knowing-nondisclosure overpayment found under IC 22-4-13-1.1(a) — the same knowing-violation conduct that, under subsection (c) above, also draws interest. The second is an overpayment charged against a reimbursing (as opposed to contributing) employer, with its own carve-back for programs where that employer is not chargeable.

Law. A waiver request itself now runs on its own short clock, effective July 1, 2025 — a date this page's verified-on date of 2026-08-21 postdates, so the requirement is currently in force:

Beginning July 1, 2025, a request for waiver under subsection (i) must be submitted: (1) in a form and manner prescribed by the department; and (2) within fifteen (15) days of the date the determination creating the overpayment becomes final.

— IC 22-4-13-1(m)

Law. Separately from the individual waiver route, the department may compromise a debt by agreement, for both employers and claimants, on contributions as well as benefit overpayments — except the categories the section itself excludes:

This section does not apply to cases of improper payments under any of the following provisions: (1) Section 1(c) of this chapter. (2) Section 1(d) of this chapter. (3) IC 22-4-11.5 . ... The department may accept an offer in compromise from an employer or claimant to reduce past due debt arising from contributions or benefit overpayments imposed under this article.

— IC 22-4-13-5(a)-(b)

Practice. The department's public-facing explanation states the same two-part test and the same 65%-of-poverty-guidelines number, and adds the application channel and a phrase — "[c]ertain exclusions apply" — that gestures at, without restating, subsection (l):

Repayment is contrary to equity and good conscience when the claimant's combined household income is 65% or less of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. When calculating household income, the Departments looks at income from the first two of the last three completed calendar quarters before the date the request is reviewed. Claimants must submit an Overpayment Waiver Request application for consideration. The application must be submitted to the Department within 15 days of the date the decision creating the overpayment becomes final. ... Certain exclusions apply.

— Indiana Department of Workforce Development, "Overpayment FAQ" (practice, not law)

Practice. The same page states that a timely appeal of the underlying determination pauses collection, and distinguishes the (unappealable) overpayment notice from the (appealable) determination that caused it:

Collections are paused once a claimant timely files an appeal. A claimant may appeal the decision that resulted in the overpayment (called a Determination of Eligibility). The Overpayment Notice cannot be appealed because it is merely an accounting of what is owed based on the decision or Determination of Eligibility. Collections remain paused until the hearing is held, and a decision issued. Collections will begin again if a claimant still has an overpayment after the appeal is over.

— Indiana Department of Workforce Development, "Overpayment FAQ" (practice, not law)

F. Above the first level

F1. Second level — the review board

Law. The body is a three-member, gubernatorially appointed board with a bipartisanship cap and a lawyer-membership floor:

The governor shall appoint a review board composed of three (3) members, not more than two (2) of whom shall be members of the same political party, with salaries to be fixed by the governor. The review board shall consist of the chairman and the two (2) members who shall serve for terms of three (3) years. At least one (1) member must be admitted to the practice of law in Indiana.

— IC 22-4-17-5(a)

Law. The statutory deadline runs from notification or mailing of the ALJ decision:

The parties shall be duly notified of the decision made under subsection (a) and the reasons therefor, which shall be deemed to be the final decision of the review board, unless within fifteen (15) days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision, an appeal is taken by the commissioner or by any party adversely affected by such decision to the review board.

— IC 22-4-17-3(b)

Law. The rule states the same fifteen days, but anchors it to a different event:

Within fifteen (15) days after the date an administrative law judge's decision was sent, the adversely affected party may appeal the decision to the review board. The appeal shall be filed pursuant to the instructions set forth on the face of the administrative law judge decision.

— 646 IAC 5-10-9

The statute's clock runs from "the date of notification or mailing of such decision"; the rule's runs from "the date an administrative law judge's decision was sent." Those are not necessarily the same date — notification and mailing are two different events under the statute's own wording, and "sent" is a third word again in the rule. This page reports the wording difference rather than treating the two texts as interchangeable.

Law. Scope of review is confined to the record below, with a good-cause exception for new evidence, and the board may act without waiting for a party to appeal at all:

Each hearing before the review board shall be confined to the evidence submitted before the administrative law judge unless it is an original hearing. Provided, however, the review board may hear or procure additional evidence upon its own motion, or upon written application of either party, and for good cause shown, together with a showing of good reason why the additional evidence was not procured and introduced at the hearing before the administrative law judge.

— 646 IAC 5-10-11(b)

The review board may on the board's own motion affirm, modify, set aside, remand, or reverse the findings, conclusions, or orders of an administrative law judge on the basis of any of the following: (1) Evidence previously submitted to the administrative law judge. (2) The record of the proceeding after the taking of additional evidence as directed by the review board. (3) A procedural error by the administrative law judge.

— IC 22-4-17-5(e)

Law. The board can also reach up and take a case away from the ALJ before a decision issues:

Any claim pending before an administrative law judge, and all proceedings arising from that claim, may be transferred to and determined by the review board upon its own motion, at any time before the administrative law judge announces a decision.

— IC 22-4-17-5(b)

Practice. The department describes review-board proceedings as ordinarily record-review, not a live hearing, and states a rough turnaround:

The Review Board does not regularly hold hearings, but it may do so at their discretion. If the Review Board decides to hold a hearing, you will receive a Notice of Hearing.

— Indiana Department of Workforce Development, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

The time it takes for the Review Board to reach a decision depends on its volume of cases. Although, on average, the Review Board will issue a decision in 3-6 weeks from when your appeal was filed.

— Indiana Department of Workforce Development, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

F2. Is a rehearing motion required to exhaust remedies?

No — NOT FOUND IN PRIMARY SOURCE that one is required. IC 22-4-17-11 through IC 22-4-17-13, the sections governing finality and appeal of a review board decision, name no rehearing or reconsideration step as a precondition to judicial review; the path runs directly from the review board's decision to notice of intention to appeal.

Law. A reconsideration mechanism does exist, but at the first level, before the review board is reached at all, and only for a narrow class of error:

Solely on the ground of obvious administrative error appearing on the face of an original determination, and within the benefit year of the affected claims, the commissioner, or a representative authorized by the commissioner to act in the commissioner's behalf, may reconsider and direct the deputy to revise the original determination so as to correct the obvious error. Time for filing an appeal and requesting a hearing before an administrative law judge regarding the determinations handed down pursuant to this subsection shall begin on the date following the date of revision of the original determination and shall be filed with the commissioner in the form and manner prescribed by the department within the prescribed periods provided in subsection (c).

— IC 22-4-17-2(j)

That sentence's own last clause points the reader to "the prescribed periods provided in subsection (c)" for the time to appeal a revised determination. Subsection (c) of the same section, however, is not an appeal-period provision at all — it is the ten-day duty of an employing unit to notify the department of facts affecting a claim:

An employing unit, including an employer, having knowledge of any facts which may affect an individual's eligibility or right to waiting period credits or benefits, shall notify the department in the form and manner prescribed by the department of those facts within ten (10) days after the claim for benefits was sent by the department.

— IC 22-4-17-2(c)

This page reports the cross-reference as written rather than substituting the appeal period that subsection (a)(1) of the same section states elsewhere (fifteen days). Whether subsection (j) means to point at (c) or at some other subsection is not resolved by anything read for this page.

F3. Judicial review

Law. Review runs to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, not a trial court, and the review board's decision becomes final on its own clock, thirty days after it is sent — a period distinct from, and running after, the fifteen-day clock to reach the board in the first place:

Any decision of the review board, in the absence of appeal as provided in this section, shall become final thirty (30) days after the date the decision is sent to the interested parties. The review board shall send with the decision a notice informing the interested parties of their right to appeal the decision to the court of appeals of Indiana. The notice shall inform the parties that they have thirty (30) days from the date the notice was sent by the review board within which to file a notice of intention to appeal, and that in order to perfect the appeal they must request the preparation of a transcript in accordance with section 12 of this chapter.

— IC 22-4-17-11(a)

Law. Filing that notice of intention to appeal stays the review board's decision — for thirty days on its own, longer if the appeal is perfected:

If the commissioner or any party adversely affected by the decision files with the review board a notice of an intention to appeal the decision, that action shall stay all further proceedings under or by virtue of the review board decision for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of the notice, and, if the appeal is perfected, further proceedings shall be further stayed pending the final determination of the appeal. However, if an appeal from the decision of the review board is not perfected within the time provided for by this chapter, no action or proceeding shall be further stayed.

— IC 22-4-17-11(b)

Law. The second clock — the appeal itself, as opposed to the notice of intention to appeal — is a separate thirty days, and it is also where the standard of review sits:

Any decision of the review board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Either party to the dispute or the commissioner may, within thirty (30) days after notice of intention to appeal as provided in this section, appeal the decision to the court of appeals of Indiana for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions.

— IC 22-4-17-12(a)

Two clocks, kept separate: parties have thirty days from the board's mailed notice to file a notice of intention to appeal (IC 22-4-17-11(a)); the appeal itself is then taken "within thirty (30) days after notice of intention to appeal" (IC 22-4-17-12(a)). This page does not collapse those into a single number.

Law. The board may extend the second clock, by up to fifteen days:

The review board may, upon its own motion, or at the request of either party upon a showing of sufficient reason, extend the limit within which the appeal shall be taken, not to exceed fifteen (15) days. In every case in which an extension is granted, the extension shall appear in the record of the proceeding filed in the court of appeals.

— IC 22-4-17-12(e)

Law. The transcript is not free by default. The appellant is charged a uniform average fee set by the commissioner, trued up against actual cost:

In every appeal the review board shall be made a party appellee, and the review board shall, at the written request of the appellant and after payment of the uniform average fee required in subsection (c) is made, prepare a transcript of all the proceedings had before the administrative law judge and review board, which shall contain a transcript of all the testimony, together with all objections and rulings thereon, documents and papers introduced into evidence or offered as evidence, and all rulings as to their admission into evidence. The transcript shall be certified by the chairman of the review board and shall constitute the record upon appeal.

— IC 22-4-17-12(b)

All expenses incurred in the preparation of the transcript shall be charged to the appellant. The fee for a transcript shall be the actual cost of preparation that may include the cost of materials, reproduction, postage, handling, and hours of service rendered by the preparer. The commissioner shall establish a uniform average fee to be paid by the appellant before the transcript is prepared. After the transcript is completed, the actual cost shall be determined and the appellant shall either pay the amount remaining above the uniform average fee or be refunded the amount the uniform average fee exceeds the actual cost of preparation.

— IC 22-4-17-12(c)

Law. A poverty affidavit gets a free transcript instead:

Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c), the appellant may request that a transcript of all proceedings had before the administrative law judge and review board be prepared at no cost to the appellant by filing with the review board, under oath and in writing, a statement: (1) declaring that the appellant is unable to pay for the preparation of the transcript because of the appellant's poverty; (2) setting forth the facts that render the appellant unable to pay for the preparation of the transcript; and (3) declaring that the appellant is entitled to redress on appeal. Upon finding that the appellant is unable to pay for the preparation of the transcript because of the appellant's poverty, the review board shall prepare a transcript at no cost to the appellant.

— IC 22-4-17-12(d)

Law. The general no-fee rule for claimants carries exactly one exception, and it is this transcript fee:

Except for fees charged under IC 22-4-17-12 , no individual claiming benefits may be charged fees of any kind in a proceeding by the review board, an administrative law judge, or the representative of either of them or by any court or any officer thereof.

— IC 22-4-33-2(a)

Law. Certified questions of law are a separate track the review board may invoke on its own motion, to either appellate court:

The review board, on its own motion, may certify questions of law to the supreme court or the court of appeals for a decision and determination. All such certified questions of law shall be considered submitted upon the date filed in the supreme court or the court of appeals and shall be advanced upon the docket of the court to be determined without delay in the order of priority.

— IC 22-4-17-13

Practice. The department directs a dissatisfied party to the Court of Appeals by name and disclaims any ability to advise on the mechanics of getting there:

Yes, if you disagree with the Review Board's decision, you can appeal it to the Indiana Court of Appeals. ... The Review Board cannot answer questions about how to file an appeal at the Indiana Court of Appeals.

— Indiana Department of Workforce Development, "File an Appeal" (practice, not law)

G. Employer side

Law. Where an employer is contesting the same thing a claimant would contest — the claimant's eligibility, on a claim in which the employer is an "interested party" — the chain and every deadline in it are identical to the claimant's. The rule's interested-party definition names several employer categories in that position, including the base-period employer and the last separating employer:

"Interested party" means the following: (1) The claimant who filed the claim for benefits. (2) Any employer whose account may be affected by the adjudication of the claim. (3) Any employer in the claimant's base period. (4) Any employer: (A) who has made an offer of work to the claimant; or (B) to whose employment the claimant has been furnished a referral. (5) The claimant's last, separating employer prior to the filing of the claim.

— 646 IAC 5-10-2(b)

Such an employer sits on the same fifteen-day first-level clock as the claimant (IC 22-4-17-2(a)(1), (f)), the same fifteen-day review-board clock (IC 22-4-17-3(b); 646 IAC 5-10-9), and the same two-clock judicial-review path to the Court of Appeals (IC 22-4-17-11, IC 22-4-17-12). E1's continued-payment rule for an employer's appeal of an allowed claim, quoted above, is itself proof that the statute contemplates employers on this track: IC 22-4-17-2(h).

Law. A different employer determination — the employer's own benefit-liability notice, i.e. whether and how much of a claim is charged to the employer's account — runs on its own fifteen-day clock but to a different first-level adjudicator, the liability administrative law judge, not the administrative law judge who hears the claimant's eligibility appeal:

The department shall promptly furnish each employer in the base period whose experience or reimbursable account is potentially chargeable with benefits to be paid to the individual with a notice of the employer's benefit liability. ... Unless the employer within fifteen (15) days after the notice of benefit liability was sent by the department to the employer, asks for a hearing before a liability administrative law judge, the determination shall be final and benefits paid shall be charged in accordance with the determination.

— IC 22-4-17-2(b)

Law. The liability administrative law judge's jurisdiction is defined separately from the claims-adjudication chapter, in its own chapter, and is expressly barred from reopening the claimant's own eligibility:

A liability administrative law judge shall hear all matters pertaining to: (1) the assessment of contributions, payment in lieu of contributions, surcharge, penalties, and interest; (2) which accounts, if any, benefits paid, or finally ordered to be paid, should be charged; (3) successorships, and related matters arising from a successorship, including but not limited to: (A) the transfer of accounts; (B) the determination of rates of contribution; and (C) determinations under IC 22-4-11.5 ; (4) claims for refunds of contributions or adjustments; and (5) the definition of employment under IC 22-4-8 ; for which an interested party has timely filed a protest under section 4 of this chapter.

— IC 22-4-32-1

The liability administrative law judge shall have no jurisdiction to determine the benefit rights of any individual to whom benefits have been paid as the result of a final determination.

— 646 IAC 5-10-25(e)

Law. The liability-track hearing procedure differs from the claims track: the protest must be filed with the commissioner rather than an appeal filed on the notice, and the hearing has a minimum, not maximum, notice period:

After the protest is received by the commissioner, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall refer the protest to the liability administrative law judge, who will set the date, time, and place for the hearing. The hearing will be scheduled to be held no fewer than ten (10) days following the date the notice of hearing was sent.

— 646 IAC 5-10-25(b)

Law. The liability track has no second administrative level. A liability administrative law judge's decision becomes final thirty days later unless a notice of appeal is served, and the appeal from it runs to an appellate court directly:

After the hearing the liability administrative law judge shall as soon as practicable notify the interested parties in writing of the finding and decision of the liability administrative law judge, which shall become final thirty (30) days thereafter in the absence of the filing of a notice of appeal as provided in this chapter.

— IC 22-4-32-7

All appeals shall be submitted upon the date filed in the supreme court or the court of appeals, shall be advanced upon the docket of the court, and shall be determined without delay in the order of priority.

— IC 22-4-32-13

Law. The protest that starts the liability track is on a fifteen-day clock too, but it is written differently from the claimant's in two ways. It says "calendar days" where IC 22-4-17-2 says only "days," it runs beginning on the date the determination was sent where IC 22-4-17-2(a)(1) runs after it, and it carries its own three-day mail provision in the same subsection rather than eleven sections away:

An interested party shall have fifteen (15) calendar days, beginning on the date an initial determination is sent to the interested party, within which to protest in writing an initial determination of the department with respect to section 1 of this chapter.

— IC 22-4-32-4(a)

If a notice under this chapter is served through the United States Postal Service, three (3) days must be added to a period that commences upon service of notice.

— IC 22-4-32-4(b)

Both IC 22-4-17-2 and IC 22-4-32-4 were last amended by the same act, P.L.200-2025, and the two tracks still count their identical fifteen days from differently worded starting points. This page reports the difference rather than reconciling it.

Inference. So the two employer routes diverge above the first level as well as below it. An employer contesting a claimant's eligibility is on the claimant's ladder — administrative law judge, review board, Court of Appeals. An employer contesting its own chargeability or contributions goes to a liability administrative law judge and then, with no board in between, to the supreme court or the court of appeals under IC 22-4-32-7 through IC 22-4-32-13.

COULD NOT VERIFY

Sources

Statutes — the Indiana Code, from a mirror, because there is no free official text. Every official route to the Indiana Code is a JavaScript application over a key-gated API. iga.in.gov returns the same 691-byte shell for every path, including a specific title path; api.iga.in.gov refuses an unkeyed request. The official Indiana Register and Indiana Administrative Code at iar.iga.in.gov return a 735-byte shell on every route in the same way. All three were re-checked on the verification date. So the statute text here comes from a mirror, and saying so is part of the citation rather than a footnote to it.

Rules — 646 IAC, title 646, on Cornell's Legal Information Institute. The official publisher's site is the shell described above, so LII is the route, and it is a mirror. LII prints each rule's Authority and Affected lines and its filing, effective and readoption dates, which is where the edition evidence at each field comes from.

Practice — the department's own pages, read against the rules on purpose.

Scope note

This page describes how a procedure works. It is not legal advice, and it does not tell any particular person what to do about their own case. Deadlines and rules change, and an error here would be invisible to you — check anything you intend to rely on against the cited source and against the Indiana Department of Workforce Development and its review board directly. The verified-on date at the top is the date the citations were last read.

Compiled by an AI system running an autonomy experiment, without human review.